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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Multica Eveandmultica-agent
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4dc39434ef |
MUL-8198: fix(daemon): keep pre-588 Remote MCP tokens working for their issuing owner (#9469)
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> |
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13eb4bda93 |
MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> |
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Bohan Jiangandmultica-agent
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f5c2994aed |
feat(workspace): revoke a member's runtimes when they leave or are removed (#2401)
* feat(workspace): revoke a member's runtimes when they leave or are removed Previously, leaving or being removed from a workspace only deleted the member row — every runtime the departed user owned in that workspace remained in the DB, kept its daemon_token valid, and stayed reachable to the workspace's other members. The departed user lost access but their machine kept doing work. This change converges the runtime state in the same transaction as the member-row deletion: agents pinned to those runtimes are archived, in-flight tasks are cancelled (so the daemon's per-task status poller interrupts the running agent gracefully), the runtimes are forced offline, and the daemon_token rows are deleted. After commit the DaemonTokenCache is invalidated and agent:archived / daemon:register events fire so connected clients reconcile immediately. Server-side state convergence is the production safety net; the daemon_token revoke takes effect once the mdt_ flow is live (today most daemons fall back to PAT/JWT, and the member-row deletion is what stops those requests via requireWorkspaceMember). Daemon-side handling (recognising the resulting 401/404 and tearing down the local pairing for that workspace) lands in a follow-up. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(workspace): also cancel tasks for archived agents on member revoke CancelAgentTasksByRuntime only matched tasks whose runtime_id was in the revoked set, missing a real path: agent.runtime_id can be reassigned via UpdateAgent, but agent_task_queue.runtime_id keeps the value from when the task was queued. So an agent currently bound to the leaving member's runtime gets archived correctly, but its older tasks still pinned to a prior runtime stay 'queued' — and ClaimAgentTask does not gate on agent.archived_at, so those orphaned tasks remain claimable by the prior runtime. Replace CancelAgentTasksByRuntime with CancelAgentTasksByRuntimeOrAgent, which OR-matches runtime_ids and the archived agent IDs in one UPDATE. Pass the archived agent IDs through from revokeAndRemoveMember. Adds TestDeleteMember_CancelsTasksFromAgentReassignment as a regression guard: same agent, two runtimes, the older task on the surviving runtime must end up cancelled while the surviving runtime stays online. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> |
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Bohan Jiang
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86e7de3e41 |
feat(server/auth): cache auth token lookups in Redis with 10m TTL
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups in Redis with 60s TTL
Personal access tokens used to hit Postgres on every request: a SELECT
to resolve token_hash → user_id, plus a fire-and-forget UPDATE of
last_used_at. For a CLI / daemon making many requests per second this
is wasted DB load — the token is the same and the answer hasn't changed.
Add a Redis-backed cache (auth.PATCache) keyed by token hash, TTL 60s:
- On cache hit, the auth middleware skips both the SELECT and the
last_used_at UPDATE. last_used_at is now refreshed at most once per
TTL window per token, not per request.
- On cache miss the middleware falls back to today's behavior: query
Postgres, populate the cache, async-update last_used_at.
- On revoke, the handler invalidates the cache entry so revocation
takes effect immediately rather than waiting for the TTL to expire.
This required changing RevokePersonalAccessToken from :exec to :one
RETURNING token_hash.
The cache is nil-safe: when REDIS_URL isn't configured, NewPATCache
returns nil and the middleware degrades to today's always-hit-DB
behavior. JWT validation is untouched (already DB-free).
Tested with REDIS_TEST_URL — same gating pattern the rest of the
suite uses for Redis-backed tests. New tests cover nil-safety, set/
get/invalidate, TTL, and the middleware short-circuit on cache hit.
* fix(server/auth): clamp PAT cache TTL to token's remaining lifetime
GPT-Boy review caught: a PAT expiring in <60s would still be cached
for the full PATCacheTTL window, so the token could continue passing
auth on cache hit for up to ~60s after its expires_at. The DB query
filters expired tokens (revoked = FALSE AND expires_at > now()), but
that filter never ran on a cache hit.
Make Set take an explicit ttl, and add TTLForExpiry to compute it:
- no expires_at → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at far → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at <60s → time until expiry
- already expired → 0, Set skips caching (TOCTOU defense between
the SELECT and the Set, since the SELECT
already filters expired rows)
Regression test pins the clamp behavior end-to-end against Redis.
* feat(server/auth): cache daemon-token + PAT lookups in DaemonAuth, bump TTL to 10m
Daemon /api/daemon/* requests (heartbeat, claim task) hit DaemonAuth
which previously did its own GetDaemonTokenByHash on every request and
*also* duplicated the PAT lookup on the mul_ fallback — bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Today's daemons authenticate via mul_ PATs
(mdt_ minting isn't wired up yet), so the duplicate PAT path is the one
that actually matters for hot-path DB load.
Three changes:
1. New auth.DaemonTokenCache mirrors PATCache for the mdt_ path
(key = mul:auth:daemon:<sha256>, JSON value = {workspace_id, daemon_id}).
Forward-looking infrastructure for when daemon tokens get minted; the
middleware short-circuits the DB SELECT on cache hit. TTL clamped to
the token's expires_at via the shared TTLForExpiry helper.
2. DaemonAuth now also consults PATCache on its mul_ fallback, sharing
the same cache as the regular Auth middleware. A daemon making 4 hb/min
collapses from 4 GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash + 4 last_used_at writes
per minute to ~1 of each per AuthCacheTTL window (~10 minutes).
3. Rename PATCacheTTL → AuthCacheTTL and bump from 60s to 10 minutes.
The constant is now shared between PAT and daemon caches; 10m matches
the user-requested longer TTL for further DB write reduction. Revoke
latency on the happy path is still instant via active invalidation;
the worst-case (Redis Del miss / direct-DB revoke) grows from ~60s to
~10m.
Tests cover nil-safety, set/get/invalidate, TTL, clamped TTL on near-
expiry tokens, and the middleware short-circuit for both cache paths
(mdt_ via DaemonTokenCache, mul_ fallback via PATCache).
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups on the WebSocket auth path
The third place a PAT is resolved — patResolver.ResolveToken used by
realtime.HandleWebSocket — was still hitting Postgres on every /ws
auth and firing an unconditional last_used_at UPDATE, bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Wire it through the same shared PATCache so
revoking a token through any path (Auth middleware, DaemonAuth PAT
fallback, or WS auth) hits all three caches with one Invalidate.
Also leaves a comment on DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemon —
the query has no caller today, but a future deregister/rotate flow
must remember to call DaemonTokenCache.Invalidate(hash) for each
deleted row, otherwise deleted daemon tokens stay valid until TTL.
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Jiayuan
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afdfee78b9 |
feat(daemon): add authentication for daemon API routes
Issue daemon auth tokens (mdt_) on pairing session claim, bound to workspace_id + daemon_id with 1-year expiry. Add DaemonAuth middleware that validates these tokens and falls back to JWT/PAT for backward compatibility. Apply middleware to all daemon routes except pairing endpoints. |