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13
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Bohan Jiangandmultica-agent
|
13f74e651a |
feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600) (#3209)
* feat(agents): remove custom_env from agent resources, add audited env endpoint (MUL-2600)
The agent resource shape (list / get / create / update / archive /
restore responses + WebSocket events) no longer carries `custom_env`
values. Reads/writes of env now flow exclusively through a dedicated
`/api/agents/{id}/env` endpoint that is owner/admin-only, rejects
agent-actor sessions, applies a "****" sentinel preserve guard on
PUT, and writes a persistent audit row per reveal/update.
Why
- `multica agent list --output json` historically returned plaintext
`custom_env` for owner/admin callers (the redaction gate gave only
members the masked map). Any agent token running on the workspace
inherits its owner's role and could read every other agent's
secrets just by listing.
- Patching list/get redaction alone (PR #3175 direction) left
symmetric leaks via mutation responses, WS events, the "reveal"
path itself (no actor-aware auth), and a `****` overwrite footgun
on UpdateAgent.
What changed
- Backend: drop `custom_env` from AgentResponse; add coarse
`has_custom_env` + `custom_env_key_count`. Strip env handling from
UpdateAgent (silently ignored if sent). Keep CreateAgent's
custom_env acceptance.
- Backend: new GET/PUT `/api/agents/{id}/env` handlers in
`internal/handler/agent_env.go`:
- resolveActor → 403 for agent actors (closes the lateral-movement
path).
- Owner/admin role gate via existing helper.
- PUT honours value == "****" as "preserve existing value".
- Both write to `activity_log` with `agent_env_revealed` /
`agent_env_updated` actions. Audit details record key names only,
never values.
- Daemon claim path (`ClaimAgentTask`) unchanged — `TaskAgentData`
still carries plaintext env for runtime injection.
- SQL: new `UpdateAgentCustomEnv` query; sqlc regenerated (v1.31.1).
- CLI: new `multica agent env get|set` subcommands. `--custom-env*`
flags removed from `multica agent update`; the no-fields error
now points to the new path.
- Frontend: drop env fields from `Agent` + `UpdateAgentRequest`; add
`getAgentEnv` / `updateAgentEnv` client methods; rewrite env-tab
to show "N variables configured" + explicit "Reveal & edit"
button, fetching values only on intentional reveal.
- Locales: parity-safe additions to en + zh-Hans.
- Docs: agents-create.{mdx,zh.mdx} reflect the new threat model and
endpoint.
- Mobile: schema drops `custom_env` / `custom_env_redacted`, adds
metadata fields.
Tests
- Handler tests pinned the new invariants: no env in list/get
responses, owner reveal happy-path + audit row, agent-actor 403,
`****` sentinel preserves real values, UpdateAgent silently
ignores `custom_env`, pure `mergeAgentEnv` cases.
- CLI tests pivot to the new flag surface: `agent update` MUST NOT
expose the env flags; `agent env set` MUST expose
--custom-env-stdin/--custom-env-file.
- Frontend test fixtures updated; pnpm typecheck / test / lint
pass cleanly.
This is a breaking API change. Scripts that read `custom_env` from
`/api/agents` must migrate to `GET /api/agents/{id}/env`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
* fix(agents): close actor-spoofing + audit fail-closed in env endpoints (MUL-2600)
Addresses Elon's review of #3209:
* Mint a task-scoped `mat_` token per claim, bound to (agent, task,
workspace, owner). Daemon injects it into the agent process in place
of its own credential. Auth middleware authoritatively rebuilds
X-User-ID / X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID from the token row and sets
X-Actor-Source=task_token; that header is server-set only — incoming
values are stripped before any auth branch runs. resolveActor honors
the header so an agent that strips X-Agent-ID / X-Task-ID still
resolves as actor=agent.
* GetAgentEnv / UpdateAgentEnv are now fail-closed on audit-log
failures: GET refuses to return plaintext, PUT persists inside the
same tx as the audit row so they commit/roll back together.
* PUT /api/agents/{id} returns 400 when the body carries custom_env
instead of silently dropping it — directs callers to the audited env
endpoint.
* Agent actors never see mcp_config, even when the underlying member
is owner/admin; mutation broadcasts go through a redaction shim so
WS subscribers don't pick it up either.
* Fix backend test that asserted dense JSON (jsonb::text renders
whitespace) and frontend test that assumed a unique "Test User"
match.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
* fix(agents): close residual MUL-2600 gaps from review (MUL-2600)
Migration 108 FK now correctly references agent_task_queue(id) instead
of the non-existent agent_task table; the previous name blocked CI
backend migrations.
Task-token-authenticated requests can no longer be re-routed at a
different workspace by passing workspace_slug / workspace_id /
?workspace_id / a URL workspace param. ResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest
and resolveWorkspaceUUID both short-circuit on X-Actor-Source=task_token
and return only the token-bound X-Workspace-ID; buildMiddleware adds a
defence-in-depth 403 if any URL-resolved workspace disagrees with the
token binding.
mcp_config no longer leaks back to agent actors through UpdateAgent /
CreateAgent / ArchiveAgent / RestoreAgent HTTP responses — the same
redactAgentResponseForActor helper that GetAgent/ListAgents use is now
applied to mutation responses too. WS broadcasts were already redacted
via broadcastAgentResponse.
FailTask and every TaskService cancel path (CancelTask /
CancelTasksForIssue / CancelTasksForAgent / CancelTasksByTriggerComment
/ BroadcastCancelledTasks) now eagerly DeleteTaskTokensByTask so the
mat_ token's 24h window doesn't outlive a terminated task. Failure is
non-fatal — the FK cascade and expiry remain durable guards.
Doc-only: clarify that PUT /api/agents/{id} now hard-rejects bodies
that carry custom_env (was previously "silently ignores").
Tests:
- middleware: TestResolveWorkspaceIDFromRequest gains a task_token
case asserting client-supplied slug/id/query cannot override the
bound workspace.
- handler: TestUpdateAgent_RedactsMcpConfigForAgentActor and
TestUpdateAgent_KeepsMcpConfigForMemberActor pin the mutation-
response redaction contract per actor type.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
* fix(agents): match redacted mcp_config as JSON null, not Go nil (MUL-2600)
`AgentResponse.McpConfig` is `json.RawMessage` without `omitempty`, so
the redacted response serialises as `"mcp_config": null`. On decode,
`json.RawMessage` keeps the literal bytes `null` rather than collapsing
to Go nil, which made the assertion fire on a non-leak.
The product contract (field always present, distinguished from "no
config" via `mcp_config_redacted`) is intentional, so adjust the test
to check for "no secret-bearing content" instead of weakening the
contract via `omitempty`.
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
---------
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
|
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KaguraandClaude Opus 4
|
59617f376e |
feat(auth): make auth token TTL configurable via AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var (MUL-2371) (#2713)
* feat(auth): make auth token TTL configurable via AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var Add AUTH_TOKEN_TTL environment variable (in seconds) to override the hardcoded 30-day auth token lifetime. Self-hosted deployments on trusted networks can set a longer value to avoid frequent magic-link re-authentication. The value is read once at startup and cached. Invalid or missing values fall back to the 30-day default with a warning log. Closes #2685 * refactor(auth): extract parseAuthTokenTTL for testability Address review feedback: extract pure parse function from sync.Once wrapper so the parsing logic can be unit-tested independently. Add TestParseAuthTokenTTL with table-driven cases. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <[email protected]> * refactor(auth): accept Go duration strings + hoist shared TTL in SetAuthCookies Address nice-to-have review feedback from Bohan-J: - parseAuthTokenTTL now tries time.ParseDuration first (e.g. '8760h'), falling back to ParseInt for integer seconds - Warn on unreasonable values (>10 years) but still accept them - Hoist AuthTokenTTL() and time.Now() in SetAuthCookies so both cookies share the exact same expiry - Add security trade-off note in .env.example - Add 5 new test cases for duration strings Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: kagura-agent <[email protected]> * fix: use AuthTokenTTL() in CloudFront middleware, guard ParseInt overflow Address review feedback from Bohan-J (round 2): 1. CloudFront refresh middleware (cloudfront.go:21) was hardcoding 30*24*time.Hour instead of using auth.AuthTokenTTL(). Now calls AuthTokenTTL() so the middleware respects AUTH_TOKEN_TTL env var. 2. parseAuthTokenTTL integer-seconds branch: very large values like 9999999999 would silently overflow int64 when multiplied by time.Second. Added overflow guard comparing against math.MaxInt64/int64(time.Second) before the multiplication. 3. Updated AuthTokenTTL() doc comment to reflect that it accepts Go duration strings or integer seconds (not just seconds). 4. Added middleware test (cloudfront_test.go) verifying short AUTH_TOKEN_TTL produces short cookie expiry, not 30-day hardcode. Also covers nil signer and existing-cookie-skip cases. 5. Added integer overflow test case to cookie_test.go. * style: run gofmt on cookie.go and cookie_test.go --------- Signed-off-by: kagura-agent <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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|
15152c6ccd |
feat(auth): cache workspace membership for daemon heartbeat path (MUL-2247) (#2638)
* feat(auth): cache workspace membership for daemon heartbeat path Cache workspace membership existence (not role) in Redis to eliminate a DB round-trip on every PAT-authenticated daemon heartbeat. Follows the existing PATCache nil-safe pattern. Key design decisions per reviewer feedback: - Cache existence only (sentinel "1"), not role string. Authorization decisions that depend on role always hit the DB directly. This eliminates the cache-aside race where a stale elevated role could persist after a downgrade. - Proactive invalidation on UpdateMember, DeleteMember, LeaveWorkspace, and DeleteWorkspace (iterates members before cascade delete). - 5 min TTL. Combined with PATCache (10 min), worst-case revocation delay is max(10m, 5m) = 10 min — consistent with original PATCache design decision. Limitations: - Non-members still hit DB on every request (negative caching not implemented — the scenario is rare for daemon endpoints which require valid workspace-scoped tokens). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(auth): drive membership cache invalidation through real handlers - TestRequireDaemonWorkspaceAccess_CacheHit now uses a ghost user with no member row, so the only path to a granted access is the cache short-circuit. Without priming the cache the access check must fail; with priming it must succeed. A future change that bypasses the cache would fail the second assertion. - Replaces the cache-only InvalidatedOnMemberRemoval test (which only re-exercised the auth-package primitive) with four handler-driven tests that exercise DeleteMember, UpdateMember, LeaveWorkspace and DeleteWorkspace via their real HTTP handlers. Each test prepares a real member, primes the cache, calls the handler, and asserts the cache entry is gone — so a refactor that drops one of the Invalidate(...) calls in workspace.go will fail CI. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: Jiang Bohan <[email protected]> |
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Bohan Jiang
|
86e7de3e41 |
feat(server/auth): cache auth token lookups in Redis with 10m TTL
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups in Redis with 60s TTL
Personal access tokens used to hit Postgres on every request: a SELECT
to resolve token_hash → user_id, plus a fire-and-forget UPDATE of
last_used_at. For a CLI / daemon making many requests per second this
is wasted DB load — the token is the same and the answer hasn't changed.
Add a Redis-backed cache (auth.PATCache) keyed by token hash, TTL 60s:
- On cache hit, the auth middleware skips both the SELECT and the
last_used_at UPDATE. last_used_at is now refreshed at most once per
TTL window per token, not per request.
- On cache miss the middleware falls back to today's behavior: query
Postgres, populate the cache, async-update last_used_at.
- On revoke, the handler invalidates the cache entry so revocation
takes effect immediately rather than waiting for the TTL to expire.
This required changing RevokePersonalAccessToken from :exec to :one
RETURNING token_hash.
The cache is nil-safe: when REDIS_URL isn't configured, NewPATCache
returns nil and the middleware degrades to today's always-hit-DB
behavior. JWT validation is untouched (already DB-free).
Tested with REDIS_TEST_URL — same gating pattern the rest of the
suite uses for Redis-backed tests. New tests cover nil-safety, set/
get/invalidate, TTL, and the middleware short-circuit on cache hit.
* fix(server/auth): clamp PAT cache TTL to token's remaining lifetime
GPT-Boy review caught: a PAT expiring in <60s would still be cached
for the full PATCacheTTL window, so the token could continue passing
auth on cache hit for up to ~60s after its expires_at. The DB query
filters expired tokens (revoked = FALSE AND expires_at > now()), but
that filter never ran on a cache hit.
Make Set take an explicit ttl, and add TTLForExpiry to compute it:
- no expires_at → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at far → full PATCacheTTL
- expires_at <60s → time until expiry
- already expired → 0, Set skips caching (TOCTOU defense between
the SELECT and the Set, since the SELECT
already filters expired rows)
Regression test pins the clamp behavior end-to-end against Redis.
* feat(server/auth): cache daemon-token + PAT lookups in DaemonAuth, bump TTL to 10m
Daemon /api/daemon/* requests (heartbeat, claim task) hit DaemonAuth
which previously did its own GetDaemonTokenByHash on every request and
*also* duplicated the PAT lookup on the mul_ fallback — bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Today's daemons authenticate via mul_ PATs
(mdt_ minting isn't wired up yet), so the duplicate PAT path is the one
that actually matters for hot-path DB load.
Three changes:
1. New auth.DaemonTokenCache mirrors PATCache for the mdt_ path
(key = mul:auth:daemon:<sha256>, JSON value = {workspace_id, daemon_id}).
Forward-looking infrastructure for when daemon tokens get minted; the
middleware short-circuits the DB SELECT on cache hit. TTL clamped to
the token's expires_at via the shared TTLForExpiry helper.
2. DaemonAuth now also consults PATCache on its mul_ fallback, sharing
the same cache as the regular Auth middleware. A daemon making 4 hb/min
collapses from 4 GetPersonalAccessTokenByHash + 4 last_used_at writes
per minute to ~1 of each per AuthCacheTTL window (~10 minutes).
3. Rename PATCacheTTL → AuthCacheTTL and bump from 60s to 10 minutes.
The constant is now shared between PAT and daemon caches; 10m matches
the user-requested longer TTL for further DB write reduction. Revoke
latency on the happy path is still instant via active invalidation;
the worst-case (Redis Del miss / direct-DB revoke) grows from ~60s to
~10m.
Tests cover nil-safety, set/get/invalidate, TTL, clamped TTL on near-
expiry tokens, and the middleware short-circuit for both cache paths
(mdt_ via DaemonTokenCache, mul_ fallback via PATCache).
* feat(server/auth): cache PAT lookups on the WebSocket auth path
The third place a PAT is resolved — patResolver.ResolveToken used by
realtime.HandleWebSocket — was still hitting Postgres on every /ws
auth and firing an unconditional last_used_at UPDATE, bypassing the
cache added in 1cdd674c. Wire it through the same shared PATCache so
revoking a token through any path (Auth middleware, DaemonAuth PAT
fallback, or WS auth) hits all three caches with one Invalidate.
Also leaves a comment on DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemon —
the query has no caller today, but a future deregister/rotate flow
must remember to call DaemonTokenCache.Invalidate(hash) for each
deleted row, otherwise deleted daemon tokens stay valid until TTL.
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Bohan Jiang
|
824d943848 |
fix(auth): derive cookie Secure flag from FRONTEND_ORIGIN scheme (#1390)
The session cookie's Secure flag was tied to APP_ENV, and the docker-compose self-host stack defaults APP_ENV to "production". On plain-HTTP self-host deployments (LAN IP, private network) the browser silently drops Secure cookies, leaving every subsequent /api/* call anonymous and surfacing as 401 "auth: no token found" right after a successful login. Derive Secure from the scheme of FRONTEND_ORIGIN so HTTPS origins get Secure cookies and plain-HTTP origins get non-secure cookies the browser will actually store. Also harden cookieDomain() against the other common trap: COOKIE_DOMAIN=<ip>, which RFC 6265 forbids and browsers reject. Log a one-shot warning and fall back to host-only. Docs: correct the COOKIE_DOMAIN description (it was labelled as CloudFront-only but applies to session cookies too) and call out the IP-literal pitfall in SELF_HOSTING_ADVANCED.md, self-hosting.mdx, and .env.example. Refs #1321 |
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LinYushenandClaude Opus 4.6
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95bfd7dd96 |
feat(auth): migrate auth token to HttpOnly Cookie & WebSocket Origin whitelist (#819)
* feat(auth): migrate auth token to HttpOnly cookie & implement WebSocket Origin whitelist Security improvements from the MUL-566 audit report: 1. Auth token is now set as an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax cookie on login, preventing XSS-based token theft. Cookie-based auth includes CSRF protection via double-submit cookie pattern. The Authorization header path is preserved for Electron desktop app and CLI/PAT clients. 2. WebSocket upgrader now validates the Origin header against a configurable allowlist (ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var), rejecting connections from unauthorized origins. Backend: new auth cookie helpers, middleware reads cookie as fallback, WS handler accepts cookie auth, Origin whitelist, logout endpoint. Frontend: CSRF token in API headers, cookie-aware auth store and WS client, web app opts into cookieAuth mode while desktop keeps tokens. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix(auth): address PR review — Strict cookies, HMAC-bound CSRF, origin sync 1. SameSite=Lax → SameSite=Strict per spec requirement 2. CSRF token now HMAC-signed with auth token (nonce.signature format), preventing subdomain cookie injection attacks 3. allowedWSOrigins uses atomic.Value to eliminate data race 4. Removed magic "cookie" sentinel string in WSProvider — pass null token and guard with boolean check instead 5. Removed dead delete uploadHeaders["Content-Type"] in API client Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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Jiang Bohan
|
b8c784dda3 |
merge: resolve conflicts with main
- Take main's router.go, rich-text-editor.tsx, comment-card.tsx - Remove deleted daemon_pairing.go - Keep issue mention card feature |
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Jiayuan
|
afdfee78b9 |
feat(daemon): add authentication for daemon API routes
Issue daemon auth tokens (mdt_) on pairing session claim, bound to workspace_id + daemon_id with 1-year expiry. Add DaemonAuth middleware that validates these tokens and falls back to JWT/PAT for backward compatibility. Apply middleware to all daemon routes except pairing endpoints. |
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yushenandClaude Opus 4.6
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f5353c6691 |
feat(upload): signed URLs for CLI + eager load attachments on comments
- Add CloudFrontSigner.SignedURL() for generating per-resource signed URLs - Attachment responses include download_url (5-min signed URL for CLI) - Eager load attachments on comments and timeline (same pattern as reactions) - Add ListAttachmentsByCommentIDs query for batch loading - Update Comment and TimelineEntry types with attachments field Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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yushenandClaude Opus 4.6
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edf4c00c08 |
fix(upload): add file type/size validation, Content-Disposition header
- Add content type allowlist (images, PDF, text, video, audio, zip) - Enforce 10 MB upload limit via http.MaxBytesReader - Set Content-Disposition on S3 objects for proper download filenames - Remove unused CloudFrontSigner.Domain() method Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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yushenandClaude Opus 4.6
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29a80e057e |
feat(upload): add file upload API with S3 + CloudFront signed cookies
Add POST /api/upload-file endpoint that uploads files to S3 and returns CDN URLs protected by CloudFront signed cookies (same pattern as Linear). Infrastructure: - Two private S3 buckets (static.multica.ai, static-staging.multica.ai) - Two CloudFront distributions with OAC and Trusted Key Groups - ACM wildcard cert in us-east-1, DNS records in Route 53 - RSA signing key stored in AWS Secrets Manager Backend: - S3 storage service with CloudFront CDN domain support - CloudFront signed cookie generation (RSA-SHA1) - Private key loaded from Secrets Manager (env var fallback for local dev) - Cookies set on login (VerifyCode) with 72h expiry matching JWT - Upload handler: multipart form → S3 → CloudFront URL response Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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LinYushenandClaude Opus 4.6
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5c9c2f69fd |
feat(auth): email verification login and personal access tokens
* feat(auth): add email verification login flow with 401 auto-redirect Replace the old OAuth-based login with email verification codes: - Backend: send-code / verify-code endpoints, verification_codes table (migration 009), rate limiting, Resend email service - Frontend: two-step login UI (email → 6-digit OTP), auth store with sendCode/verifyCode - SDK: ApiClient gains onUnauthorized callback; 401 responses auto-clear token and redirect to /login - Fix login button staying disabled due to global isLoading state Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * fix(auth): add brute-force protection, redirect loop guard, and expired code cleanup - VerifyCode: increment attempts on wrong code, reject after 5 failed tries (migration 010) - onUnauthorized: skip redirect if already on /login to prevent infinite loops - SendCode: best-effort cleanup of expired verification codes older than 1 hour Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * feat(auth): add master verification code for non-production environments Allow code "888888" to bypass email verification in non-production environments to simplify development and testing workflows. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> * feat(auth): add personal access tokens for CLI and API authentication Add full-stack PAT support: users create tokens in Settings, CLI authenticates via `multica auth login`. Server stores SHA-256 hashes only. Auth middleware extended to accept both JWTs and PATs (distinguished by `mul_` prefix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <[email protected]> |
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Jiayuan Zhang
|
81e64e9fce | Add workspace management and isolated worktree environments |