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* feat(plugins): hook engine — signed outbound calls, trigger-decided identity (MUL-6350) The direction reverses here. PR 1 and 2 only ever ran inbound: a sandboxed surface asked the host, and the host acted on the signed-in user's session, so nothing left our infrastructure on a plugin's say-so. A hook leaves, and every new check exists because of that. Destination: the target host must be inside the granted `net:` set, resolve to a public address, and be re-checked at dial. Body: HMAC-SHA256 over timestamp.body, so a receiver can tell our call from anyone else's and a captured one expires. Identity follows the trigger, not the plugin. A ui/manual hook runs because a person pressed something, so its writes stay theirs; an event hook has nobody behind it and writes as the installation — hence the fourth author_type. Two credentials, moving opposite ways, which is what decides how each is stored. The install token goes plugin -> host and is only ever verified, so it is hashed. The signing secret goes host -> plugin and must be reproduced to sign with, so it is derived from the deployment key and stored nowhere. Event hooks never block the host: Bus.Publish runs listeners inline on the publishing request's goroutine, so the dispatcher hands off to a worker pool immediately. Three attempts, then a circuit breaker, then silence. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * feat(plugins): manual hook actions, ui trigger, and a worked hook example (MUL-6350) The host owns the manual menu entry rather than letting a surface draw one, because the trigger decides identity: a manual call acts as the person who picked it, so the entry has to live where the host can prove somebody did. The ui trigger goes through the bridge for the same reason a surface cannot fetch its own backend directly — routing through the host is what makes the call signed, rate limited, bounded to the granted net: domains and recorded. buildActorNameResolver gains a plugin branch. Without it an event-written comment rendered as "System", which is the one attribution that is actively misleading: it reads as the platform having said something. examples/plugins/triage-notify carries the half that does NOT run in Multica — a reference handler showing the four things a receiver must do, including the replay guard the host cannot do for it. TestShippedExamplesParseAndInstallOnThisHost closes the gap that let an example drift: nothing checked that shipped documentation still parses, or that it declares only what this build can run. TestCheckCapabilitiesReportsEveryUnavailableContribution rewritten the way the other two were in PR 2 — it named today's unshipped set, so flipping ui/manual/ event on turned it red with a message about the flip rather than about the gate. It now derives its expectation from HostCapabilities and survives a flip while still failing if the gate stops checking a category. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * feat(plugins): modal surface, invocation cleanup, honest capability guards (MUL-6350) TestShippedHostCapabilitiesRunTheSurfacesTheHostMounts caught me flipping the modal surface on without a renderer — an install that succeeds and then never appears, which is the exact failure that guard exists to prevent. Built the mount point rather than weakening the guard, and rewrote it to name the host code behind each line so the next flip has to change both together. plugin_invocation was missing from workspace teardown and from uninstall. TestWorkspaceDeletionManifestCoversPublicSchema caught the first; the second would have left rows naming an installation that no longer exists. Deleted by workspace_id rather than through installation ids, so a record whose plugin was already uninstalled does not outlive the workspace it describes. A modal opens because a person picked it from the issue menu, never on the plugin's own initiative — same sandbox as a panel, differing only in where it appears. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(plugins): prove the event path never blocks, and contain worker panics (MUL-6350) Writing the never-blocks test found a real bug rather than confirming one. Bus.Publish recovers panics in its listeners so one bad handler cannot kill the request that published; moving delivery onto a worker goroutine stepped outside that protection, where a panic is not a failed hook but a dead process. runGuarded restores the guarantee the hand-off gave up. The bridge now takes an EventSink rather than the concrete dispatcher, so the vocabulary mapping — which internal event becomes which published one — is asserted directly instead of through a live endpoint. That mapping is a published contract; the internal names are not. The backpressure test stops the workers rather than racing them, so it reproduces a saturated pool without depending on timing, and asserts the exact overflow instead of "something was dropped". Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(plugins): two hook-contract bugs a live run found (MUL-6350) Both were invisible to the tests because the tests made one call each, and a real handler does not. The callback token was single-use. The reference handler reads the issue, decides, then posts a comment — and the second call died on a spent token. Read-then-write is the floor for a handler that does anything with what it read, so a single-use grant made the callback unusable. The trade that decides it is not one call versus several. It is this token versus the installation's standing token: a handler that cannot finish with the callback gets written against the install token instead, which never expires and is not scoped to an invocation. A control that pushes authors toward the stronger credential is worse than the looser one they will actually use. The grant is now invocation-scoped — minutes, this installation's scopes, the actor fixed at dispatch — and revoked as soon as the call it was issued for returns. The hook body also omitted the issue. The host resolves and permission-checks it, then said nothing, so a handler had to read a client-supplied field — unvalidated for ui/manual, and absent entirely for event, where there is no client. issue_id now travels in the body. Also adds MULTICA_PLUGIN_DEV_CA: a hook URL must be HTTPS, so an author testing against localhost needs its certificate trusted by something. A named CA file rather than InsecureSkipVerify, which survives into production behind a config flag nobody remembers and cannot be spotted by reading the code. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(plugins): enforce the callback token's issue scope, sweep invocations (MUL-6350) Addresses Fabel 5's review. The first item is the one that mattered. The callback grant's issue narrowing existed only in two doc comments and the PR description — pluginTokenCaller never read grant.IssueID, so a ui/manual token was worth every issue in the workspace its actor could see, for the whole five minutes it lived, on read and write alike. Now carried into the caller and checked in pluginIssueForUser, after resolution so an identifier and a uuid for the same issue agree. 404 rather than 403: "you are scoped elsewhere" confirms the id exists. DeleteExpiredPluginInvocations was generated and never called, while the table comment and the PR both said TTL-swept. A sweeper now runs on the dispatcher's lifecycle — same concern, bounded resources for something a third party drives. Event subscriptions bypassed the read scopes. issue.* pushes the description and comment.created pushes the body — the same content the Action API refuses without issues:read / comments:read. Subscribing was a way to receive what reading was not granted. Enforced at manifest validation so the consent screen shows the read scope a subscription implies. Migration 349's ADD CONSTRAINT copied 107's shape onto a table that is no longer 107's size: it revalidated every comment row under ACCESS EXCLUSIVE. NOT VALID plus a 352 that VALIDATEs under SHARE UPDATE EXCLUSIVE costs nothing and stops nothing. Plus the half-built breaker UI (a plugin could be enabled and silently delivering nothing), redirect refusal on the dev hook client (a 302 would have replayed the signed body and the callback token onward), and omitting callback_url rather than sending a relative one. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(plugins): the invocation sweeper must not touch the database at construction (MUL-6350) CI panicked in cmd/server: the sweeper I added last round fired immediately on its own goroutine, and that test builds a router over a Queries whose pool was never opened. pgxpool dereferenced the nil pool and the process died. Two things were wrong, and only one of them is the obvious one. The sweep no longer runs at construction. It waited for nothing and gained one hour of retention on a cold start against a 7-day TTL; the cost was a goroutine reaching for the database before the process is known to have one. The nil check was also the wrong instrument. sqlc's Queries wraps an executor, so a non-nil Queries over an unopened pool passes every comparison available at that layer and only fails inside pgxpool — no amount of nil-checking here can see it. The guard is a recover, for the same reason runGuarded exists: on a bare goroutine a panic is not a failed sweep, it is a dead server. I had already fixed that class once for delivery and then reintroduced it in the sweeper. The regression test builds the exact shape CI hit — a dispatcher over db.New(nil) — and fails if either the construction-time sweep or the recover comes back. cmd/server cannot reproduce it locally, where DATABASE_URL supplies a real pool. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(plugins): gate the event dispatch path behind plugins_v1 (MUL-6350) Answering "is this still behind the flag" turned up the one place it was not. Every other plugin surface is refused by a handler that reads the flag off a request. An event hook has no request: the dispatcher is subscribed to the bus at startup and delivers on a worker. Nothing in it consulted the flag, so turning plugins off hid the UI and refused the Action API while the OUTBOUND calls kept going — fail-open on the one path that reaches a third party. It only bites after a plugin has been installed, because installation is flag-gated, so a deployment that never enabled plugins was never exposed. A workspace that enabled it, installed something, then turned it off was. The check reads the flag per delivery rather than once at subscription, so the flip takes effect immediately instead of at the next restart. It also removes the flag-off cost: every dispatched event used to run a ListWorkspacePluginInstallations query to discover there was nothing to call. Nil flags read as disabled — a deployment that never wired the flag service must not get outbound hooks by omission. The test lives in internal/handler because it needs a real installed plugin to mean anything: with the flag on the endpoint is called, with it off nothing leaves while the same installation stays enabled and still declares the hook. Removing the check makes it fail on the second half. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * perf(plugins): stop parsing event payloads on the publishing goroutine (MUL-6350) Found while answering whether merging can affect existing users, and the answer was "in one measurable way it can". The bus listener passed issueIDFromPayload(e.Payload) as an argument, so a JSON marshal plus unmarshal of the full event payload — for issue.created that is the whole issue body, description included — ran inline on the goroutine of whatever request published. Seven event types, every workspace, and the feature flag was checked far downstream on the worker, which then threw the result away. A deployment with plugins switched off paid for all of it. The listener now hands the payload over unexamined and the id is extracted on the worker, past the flag check. It also fits the rule this file already claimed: the publishing request does the least it possibly can. Not moved: the status_changed lookup, which is a map read, not a parse. TestPublishingDoesNotParseThePayload counts MarshalJSON calls during Publish and fails if any happen — restoring the old argument makes it fail with the count. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: Lambda <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
65 lines
3.8 KiB
SQL
65 lines
3.8 KiB
SQL
-- Hook engine: the host calls out to a plugin's own server.
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--
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-- Everything before this shipped one direction only — a sandboxed surface asks
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-- the host, the host acts on the signed-in user's session. This is the reverse
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-- edge, so the two new things it needs are a record of what we sent (triage,
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-- rate limiting, circuit breaking) and a credential a plugin backend can present
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-- when it calls back.
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-- One row per hook call. Deliberately NOT an audit log: it is TTL-swept, it
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-- stores no request or response body, and nothing in the product reads it to
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-- decide what happened to a user's data. Its jobs are operational — show the
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-- author why their endpoint is failing, feed the per-hook rate limit, and let
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-- the event dispatcher decide when to trip a circuit breaker.
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--
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-- Bodies are omitted on purpose. A hook payload can carry issue text, and a
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-- table that keeps every payload forever is a second copy of workspace content
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-- with none of the deletion paths that the first copy has.
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CREATE TABLE plugin_invocation (
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id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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installation_id UUID NOT NULL,
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workspace_id UUID NOT NULL,
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hook_key TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (char_length(hook_key) BETWEEN 1 AND 128),
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trigger TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (trigger IN ('ui', 'manual', 'event', 'agent')),
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status TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('ok', 'failed', 'timeout', 'refused')),
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-- Which event caused an event-triggered call. NULL for every other trigger.
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event_type TEXT,
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attempt INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (attempt BETWEEN 1 AND 10),
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latency_ms INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0 CHECK (latency_ms >= 0),
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-- Redacted, bounded, and only ever the host's own description of the
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-- failure. Never a response body: an endpoint that echoes its input would
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-- otherwise write issue content in here through the back door.
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error TEXT CHECK (error IS NULL OR char_length(error) <= 500),
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created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
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);
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-- Install token: lets a plugin's own backend reach the Action API without a
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-- user in the loop. Only the hash is stored, so a database read cannot mint a
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-- working credential, and rotation is an UPDATE of this column.
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--
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-- This is the first credential in the system that is not the signed-in user's
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-- session. It does not weaken the surface rule — a token still never enters an
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-- iframe, and a surface still cannot obtain one — but the claim is now "tokens
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-- only move between servers" rather than "there are no tokens".
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ALTER TABLE plugin_installation ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS token_hash TEXT;
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ALTER TABLE plugin_installation ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS token_rotated_at TIMESTAMPTZ;
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-- A fourth comment author. Identity follows the trigger: a ui/manual hook acts
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-- for the person who pressed the button and stays attributed to them (with
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-- via_plugin_id naming the plugin), while an event hook has no person behind it
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-- and must not borrow one. author_id then holds the installation id.
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--
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-- Same reason as migration 107, which added 'system': a row the platform
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-- produced that would be a lie attributed to any member. NOT the same shape,
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-- though — 107 revalidated the whole table under ACCESS EXCLUSIVE, which was
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-- cheap on the comment table of that era and is not on today's. NOT VALID adds
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-- the constraint without a scan; migration 365 validates it under a lock that
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-- readers and writers can share.
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--
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-- New rows are checked from the moment this lands. NOT VALID only means "do not
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-- re-check the rows already here", and the widened set is a superset of the old
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-- one, so there is nothing here that could violate it.
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ALTER TABLE comment DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS comment_author_type_check;
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ALTER TABLE comment ADD CONSTRAINT comment_author_type_check
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CHECK (author_type IN ('member', 'agent', 'system', 'plugin')) NOT VALID;
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