Files
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

95 lines
3.3 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
)
// rpcResponseCapture is a minimal in-memory http.ResponseWriter so a WS RPC can
// reuse an existing HTTP handler without a network round trip.
type rpcResponseCapture struct {
header http.Header
status int
body bytes.Buffer
}
func (w *rpcResponseCapture) Header() http.Header {
if w.header == nil {
w.header = http.Header{}
}
return w.header
}
func (w *rpcResponseCapture) WriteHeader(code int) { w.status = code }
func (w *rpcResponseCapture) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
if w.status == 0 {
w.status = http.StatusOK
}
return w.body.Write(b)
}
// DaemonRPCHandler is the daemonws.RPCHandler wired into the WS hub (MUL-4257).
// It dispatches a generic daemon:rpc_request to the matching HTTP handler,
// reusing all of its auth / payload-building / finalization logic by driving it
// with a synthetic in-process request carrying the WS connection's identity.
// The connection is already authenticated and pinned to its daemon + runtime
// set at connect, so the reused handler's per-runtime daemon/workspace checks
// see the same scope as the HTTP path.
func (h *Handler) DaemonRPCHandler(ctx context.Context, identity daemonws.ClientIdentity, method string, body json.RawMessage) (int, json.RawMessage, error) {
switch method {
case "tasks.claim":
return h.rpcClaimTasks(ctx, identity, body)
default:
return http.StatusNotFound, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown rpc method %q", method)
}
}
func (h *Handler) rpcClaimTasks(ctx context.Context, identity daemonws.ClientIdentity, body json.RawMessage) (int, json.RawMessage, error) {
if len(body) == 0 {
body = json.RawMessage("{}")
}
reqCtx := ctx
// A daemon-token connection is workspace-scoped: pin the daemon context so
// the reused handler's daemon_id + workspace checks behave exactly like the
// HTTP path. A PAT/cloud connection (no daemon id) authorizes per-workspace
// via membership from X-User-ID instead, so we must NOT set a single-
// workspace daemon context there (it would reject the daemon's other
// workspaces).
if identity.DaemonID != "" {
reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonContext(reqCtx, identity.PrimaryWorkspaceID(), identity.DaemonID)
// Carry the connection's credential so per-call revocation checks
// (Qoder) validate the real token instead of an empty header.
reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonTokenHash(reqCtx, identity.DaemonTokenHash)
reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonTokenOwnerID(reqCtx, identity.DaemonTokenOwnerID)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(reqCtx, http.MethodPost, "/api/daemon/tasks/claim", bytes.NewReader(body))
if err != nil {
return http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
if identity.UserID != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-User-ID", identity.UserID)
}
if identity.Capabilities != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Client-Capabilities", identity.Capabilities)
}
if identity.ClientVersion != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Client-Version", identity.ClientVersion)
}
rec := &rpcResponseCapture{}
h.ClaimTasksByRuntime(rec, req)
status := rec.status
if status == 0 {
status = http.StatusOK
}
return status, json.RawMessage(rec.body.Bytes()), nil
}