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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
95 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
95 lines
3.3 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"net/http"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
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)
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// rpcResponseCapture is a minimal in-memory http.ResponseWriter so a WS RPC can
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// reuse an existing HTTP handler without a network round trip.
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type rpcResponseCapture struct {
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header http.Header
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status int
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body bytes.Buffer
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}
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func (w *rpcResponseCapture) Header() http.Header {
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if w.header == nil {
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w.header = http.Header{}
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}
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return w.header
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}
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func (w *rpcResponseCapture) WriteHeader(code int) { w.status = code }
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func (w *rpcResponseCapture) Write(b []byte) (int, error) {
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if w.status == 0 {
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w.status = http.StatusOK
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}
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return w.body.Write(b)
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}
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// DaemonRPCHandler is the daemonws.RPCHandler wired into the WS hub (MUL-4257).
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// It dispatches a generic daemon:rpc_request to the matching HTTP handler,
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// reusing all of its auth / payload-building / finalization logic by driving it
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// with a synthetic in-process request carrying the WS connection's identity.
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// The connection is already authenticated and pinned to its daemon + runtime
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// set at connect, so the reused handler's per-runtime daemon/workspace checks
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// see the same scope as the HTTP path.
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func (h *Handler) DaemonRPCHandler(ctx context.Context, identity daemonws.ClientIdentity, method string, body json.RawMessage) (int, json.RawMessage, error) {
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switch method {
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case "tasks.claim":
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return h.rpcClaimTasks(ctx, identity, body)
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default:
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return http.StatusNotFound, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown rpc method %q", method)
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}
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}
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func (h *Handler) rpcClaimTasks(ctx context.Context, identity daemonws.ClientIdentity, body json.RawMessage) (int, json.RawMessage, error) {
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if len(body) == 0 {
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body = json.RawMessage("{}")
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}
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reqCtx := ctx
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// A daemon-token connection is workspace-scoped: pin the daemon context so
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// the reused handler's daemon_id + workspace checks behave exactly like the
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// HTTP path. A PAT/cloud connection (no daemon id) authorizes per-workspace
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// via membership from X-User-ID instead, so we must NOT set a single-
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// workspace daemon context there (it would reject the daemon's other
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// workspaces).
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if identity.DaemonID != "" {
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reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonContext(reqCtx, identity.PrimaryWorkspaceID(), identity.DaemonID)
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// Carry the connection's credential so per-call revocation checks
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// (Qoder) validate the real token instead of an empty header.
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reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonTokenHash(reqCtx, identity.DaemonTokenHash)
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reqCtx = middleware.WithDaemonTokenOwnerID(reqCtx, identity.DaemonTokenOwnerID)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(reqCtx, http.MethodPost, "/api/daemon/tasks/claim", bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return http.StatusInternalServerError, nil, err
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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if identity.UserID != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-User-ID", identity.UserID)
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}
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if identity.Capabilities != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Client-Capabilities", identity.Capabilities)
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}
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if identity.ClientVersion != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Client-Version", identity.ClientVersion)
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}
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rec := &rpcResponseCapture{}
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h.ClaimTasksByRuntime(rec, req)
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status := rec.status
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if status == 0 {
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status = http.StatusOK
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}
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return status, json.RawMessage(rec.body.Bytes()), nil
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}
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