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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
75 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
75 lines
2.4 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"testing"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
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)
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// TestDaemonRPCHandler_TasksClaim pins the WS-first claim binding (MUL-4257):
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// a tasks.claim RPC, driven with the WS connection's identity, reuses the HTTP
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// claim handler and claims a queued task for the daemon's runtime.
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func TestDaemonRPCHandler_TasksClaim(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil || testPool == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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ctx := context.Background()
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rt := createClaimReclaimRuntime(t, ctx, "WS claim rt")
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a, i := createClaimReclaimAgentAndIssue(t, ctx, rt, "WS claim agent")
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taskID := seedQueuedIssueTask(t, ctx, a, rt, i)
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identity := daemonws.ClientIdentity{
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// User-credential connection (the runtime owner): no daemon id.
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UserID: testUserID,
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WorkspaceID: testWorkspaceID,
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WorkspaceIDs: []string{testWorkspaceID},
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RuntimeIDs: []string{rt},
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}
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body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
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"daemon_id": "ws-daemon",
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"runtime_ids": []string{rt},
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"max_tasks": 5,
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})
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status, respBody, err := testHandler.DaemonRPCHandler(ctx, identity, "tasks.claim", body)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("DaemonRPCHandler: %v", err)
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}
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if status != http.StatusOK {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 200: %s", status, string(respBody))
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}
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var resp batchClaimReceiptResponse
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if err := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &resp); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode: %v", err)
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}
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if len(resp.Tasks) != 1 || resp.Tasks[0].ID != taskID {
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t.Fatalf("claimed %+v, want the queued task %s", resp.Tasks, taskID)
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}
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if resp.Tasks[0].RuntimeID != rt {
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t.Fatalf("claimed runtime = %s, want %s", resp.Tasks[0].RuntimeID, rt)
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}
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var dbStatus string
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if err := testPool.QueryRow(ctx, `SELECT status FROM agent_task_queue WHERE id = $1`, taskID).Scan(&dbStatus); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("read status: %v", err)
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}
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if dbStatus != "dispatched" {
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t.Fatalf("task status = %s, want dispatched", dbStatus)
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}
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}
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// TestDaemonRPCHandler_UnknownMethod returns 404 for an unknown method.
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func TestDaemonRPCHandler_UnknownMethod(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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status, _, err := testHandler.DaemonRPCHandler(context.Background(),
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daemonws.ClientIdentity{DaemonID: "ws-daemon"}, "does.not.exist", nil)
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if status != http.StatusNotFound || err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("status=%d err=%v, want 404 + error", status, err)
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}
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}
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