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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
173 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
173 lines
6.8 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/testutil"
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db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
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)
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// The batched skill-file read introduced for GH #7688 owns EVERY skill's files
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// in one query, so a failure there is not a smaller payload — it is a
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// different one: all supporting files vanish at once, and the ref hashes the
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// daemon validates against are computed over that same truncated content. The
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// daemon therefore accepts and caches it, and the agent runs with rules
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// silently missing. These tests pin that neither claim call site nor the
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// resolve endpoint dispatches on a failed read.
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var errInjectedSkillFileRead = errors.New("injected skill file read failure")
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// skillFileBatchFailDBTX passes every statement through to the real pool
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// EXCEPT the batched skill-file read, which it fails.
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type skillFileBatchFailDBTX struct{ inner db.DBTX }
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func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) Exec(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgconn.CommandTag, error) {
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return f.inner.Exec(ctx, sql, args...)
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}
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func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) Query(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgx.Rows, error) {
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if strings.Contains(sql, "ListSkillFilesBySkillIDs") {
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return nil, errInjectedSkillFileRead
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}
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return f.inner.Query(ctx, sql, args...)
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}
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func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) QueryRow(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) pgx.Row {
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return f.inner.QueryRow(ctx, sql, args...)
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}
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// newSkillFileReadFailureHandler is testHandler with the skill-file read
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// broken. It shares the same pool, hub and bus so everything else on the claim
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// path behaves normally.
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func newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t *testing.T) *Handler {
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t.Helper()
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return New(
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db.New(skillFileBatchFailDBTX{inner: testPool}),
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testPool,
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testHandler.Hub,
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testHandler.Bus,
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testHandler.EmailService,
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nil,
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nil,
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analytics.NoopClient{},
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Config{},
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)
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}
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// seedSkillLoadFixture creates a runtime, an agent carrying one workspace
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// skill with a supporting file, and a queued task for it.
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func seedSkillLoadFixture(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name string) (runtimeID, taskID, skillID string) {
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t.Helper()
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runtimeID = createClaimReclaimRuntime(t, ctx, name+" runtime")
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agentID, issueID := createClaimReclaimAgentAndIssue(t, ctx, runtimeID, name+" agent")
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skillID = dbfx.Insert(t, "skill", testutil.Cols{
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"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
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"name": name + "-skill",
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"description": "Skill read failure fixture",
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"content": "main skill content",
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"config": testutil.Raw("'{}'::jsonb"),
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"created_by": testUserID,
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})
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t.Cleanup(func() {
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testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM agent_skill WHERE skill_id = $1`, skillID)
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testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM skill_file WHERE skill_id = $1`, skillID)
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testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM skill WHERE id = $1`, skillID)
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})
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dbfx.Exec(t, `INSERT INTO skill_file (skill_id, path, content) VALUES ($1, 'rules.md', 'rules content')`, skillID)
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dbfx.Exec(t, `INSERT INTO agent_skill (agent_id, skill_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, agentID, skillID)
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taskID = dbfx.Task(t, agentID, testutil.Cols{
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"runtime_id": runtimeID,
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"issue_id": issueID,
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})
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return runtimeID, taskID, skillID
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}
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// TestClaimTaskByRuntime_SkillReadFailurePreservesTask covers both claim call
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// sites — the slim skill-refs claim and the legacy inline-skills claim. Each
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// must refuse the claim and LEAVE THE TASK DISPATCHED so the stale-dispatched
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// reclaim redelivers it, rather than settling it or handing the daemon an
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// agent whose skills silently lost their files.
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func TestClaimTaskByRuntime_SkillReadFailurePreservesTask(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil || testPool == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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tests := []struct {
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name string
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fixture string
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capability string
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}{
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{name: "slim skill refs claim", fixture: "skillrefsfail", capability: protocol.DaemonCapabilitySkillBundlesV1},
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{name: "inline skills claim", fixture: "skillinlinefail", capability: ""},
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}
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for _, tc := range tests {
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t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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failing := newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t)
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runtimeID, taskID, _ := seedSkillLoadFixture(t, ctx, tc.fixture)
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req := newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/claim", nil)
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if tc.capability != "" {
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req.Header.Set("X-Client-Capabilities", tc.capability)
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}
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req = withURLParam(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID)
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testutil.Call(t, failing.ClaimTaskByRuntime, req).Want(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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// Preserved, not settled: still dispatched and never started, which
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// is exactly what the stale-dispatched reclaim picks back up.
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var status string
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var started bool
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dbfx.QueryRow(t, `SELECT status, started_at IS NOT NULL FROM agent_task_queue WHERE id = $1`, taskID).Scan(&status, &started)
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if status != "dispatched" {
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t.Fatalf("task status = %q, want dispatched (a failed skill read must not settle the task)", status)
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}
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if started {
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t.Fatal("task was marked started despite the claim being refused")
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestResolveTaskSkillBundles_SkillReadFailureReturns500 pins the resolve side:
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// a 5xx is what the daemon's existing resolve retry recovers from, and it is
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// the only answer that keeps a bundle built from a failed read out of the
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// daemon's on-disk cache — the daemon validates a bundle against a ref derived
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// from that same bundle, so a truncated one would validate.
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func TestResolveTaskSkillBundles_SkillReadFailureReturns500(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil || testPool == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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ctx := context.Background()
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runtimeID, taskID, skillID := seedSkillLoadFixture(t, ctx, "skillresolvefail")
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dbfx.Exec(t, `UPDATE agent_task_queue SET status = 'dispatched', dispatched_at = now() WHERE id = $1`, taskID)
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body := resolveSkillBundlesRequest{Skills: []resolveSkillBundleRef{{
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ID: skillID,
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Source: "workspace",
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Hash: "sha256:whatever",
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}}}
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// The same request succeeds on the healthy handler, so the 500 below is
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// the injected read failure and not a malformed fixture.
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req := newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/"+taskID+"/skill-bundles/resolve", body)
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req = withURLParams(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID, "taskId", taskID)
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testutil.Call(t, testHandler.ResolveTaskSkillBundles, req).Want(http.StatusOK)
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failing := newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t)
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req = newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/"+taskID+"/skill-bundles/resolve", body)
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req = withURLParams(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID, "taskId", taskID)
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testutil.Call(t, failing.ResolveTaskSkillBundles, req).Want(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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}
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