Files
multica/server/internal/handler/daemon_skill_load_failure_test.go
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

173 lines
6.8 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/analytics"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/testutil"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
)
// The batched skill-file read introduced for GH #7688 owns EVERY skill's files
// in one query, so a failure there is not a smaller payload — it is a
// different one: all supporting files vanish at once, and the ref hashes the
// daemon validates against are computed over that same truncated content. The
// daemon therefore accepts and caches it, and the agent runs with rules
// silently missing. These tests pin that neither claim call site nor the
// resolve endpoint dispatches on a failed read.
var errInjectedSkillFileRead = errors.New("injected skill file read failure")
// skillFileBatchFailDBTX passes every statement through to the real pool
// EXCEPT the batched skill-file read, which it fails.
type skillFileBatchFailDBTX struct{ inner db.DBTX }
func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) Exec(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgconn.CommandTag, error) {
return f.inner.Exec(ctx, sql, args...)
}
func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) Query(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) (pgx.Rows, error) {
if strings.Contains(sql, "ListSkillFilesBySkillIDs") {
return nil, errInjectedSkillFileRead
}
return f.inner.Query(ctx, sql, args...)
}
func (f skillFileBatchFailDBTX) QueryRow(ctx context.Context, sql string, args ...any) pgx.Row {
return f.inner.QueryRow(ctx, sql, args...)
}
// newSkillFileReadFailureHandler is testHandler with the skill-file read
// broken. It shares the same pool, hub and bus so everything else on the claim
// path behaves normally.
func newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t *testing.T) *Handler {
t.Helper()
return New(
db.New(skillFileBatchFailDBTX{inner: testPool}),
testPool,
testHandler.Hub,
testHandler.Bus,
testHandler.EmailService,
nil,
nil,
analytics.NoopClient{},
Config{},
)
}
// seedSkillLoadFixture creates a runtime, an agent carrying one workspace
// skill with a supporting file, and a queued task for it.
func seedSkillLoadFixture(t *testing.T, ctx context.Context, name string) (runtimeID, taskID, skillID string) {
t.Helper()
runtimeID = createClaimReclaimRuntime(t, ctx, name+" runtime")
agentID, issueID := createClaimReclaimAgentAndIssue(t, ctx, runtimeID, name+" agent")
skillID = dbfx.Insert(t, "skill", testutil.Cols{
"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
"name": name + "-skill",
"description": "Skill read failure fixture",
"content": "main skill content",
"config": testutil.Raw("'{}'::jsonb"),
"created_by": testUserID,
})
t.Cleanup(func() {
testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM agent_skill WHERE skill_id = $1`, skillID)
testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM skill_file WHERE skill_id = $1`, skillID)
testPool.Exec(ctx, `DELETE FROM skill WHERE id = $1`, skillID)
})
dbfx.Exec(t, `INSERT INTO skill_file (skill_id, path, content) VALUES ($1, 'rules.md', 'rules content')`, skillID)
dbfx.Exec(t, `INSERT INTO agent_skill (agent_id, skill_id) VALUES ($1, $2)`, agentID, skillID)
taskID = dbfx.Task(t, agentID, testutil.Cols{
"runtime_id": runtimeID,
"issue_id": issueID,
})
return runtimeID, taskID, skillID
}
// TestClaimTaskByRuntime_SkillReadFailurePreservesTask covers both claim call
// sites — the slim skill-refs claim and the legacy inline-skills claim. Each
// must refuse the claim and LEAVE THE TASK DISPATCHED so the stale-dispatched
// reclaim redelivers it, rather than settling it or handing the daemon an
// agent whose skills silently lost their files.
func TestClaimTaskByRuntime_SkillReadFailurePreservesTask(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil || testPool == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
tests := []struct {
name string
fixture string
capability string
}{
{name: "slim skill refs claim", fixture: "skillrefsfail", capability: protocol.DaemonCapabilitySkillBundlesV1},
{name: "inline skills claim", fixture: "skillinlinefail", capability: ""},
}
for _, tc := range tests {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
failing := newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t)
runtimeID, taskID, _ := seedSkillLoadFixture(t, ctx, tc.fixture)
req := newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/claim", nil)
if tc.capability != "" {
req.Header.Set("X-Client-Capabilities", tc.capability)
}
req = withURLParam(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID)
testutil.Call(t, failing.ClaimTaskByRuntime, req).Want(http.StatusInternalServerError)
// Preserved, not settled: still dispatched and never started, which
// is exactly what the stale-dispatched reclaim picks back up.
var status string
var started bool
dbfx.QueryRow(t, `SELECT status, started_at IS NOT NULL FROM agent_task_queue WHERE id = $1`, taskID).Scan(&status, &started)
if status != "dispatched" {
t.Fatalf("task status = %q, want dispatched (a failed skill read must not settle the task)", status)
}
if started {
t.Fatal("task was marked started despite the claim being refused")
}
})
}
}
// TestResolveTaskSkillBundles_SkillReadFailureReturns500 pins the resolve side:
// a 5xx is what the daemon's existing resolve retry recovers from, and it is
// the only answer that keeps a bundle built from a failed read out of the
// daemon's on-disk cache — the daemon validates a bundle against a ref derived
// from that same bundle, so a truncated one would validate.
func TestResolveTaskSkillBundles_SkillReadFailureReturns500(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil || testPool == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
ctx := context.Background()
runtimeID, taskID, skillID := seedSkillLoadFixture(t, ctx, "skillresolvefail")
dbfx.Exec(t, `UPDATE agent_task_queue SET status = 'dispatched', dispatched_at = now() WHERE id = $1`, taskID)
body := resolveSkillBundlesRequest{Skills: []resolveSkillBundleRef{{
ID: skillID,
Source: "workspace",
Hash: "sha256:whatever",
}}}
// The same request succeeds on the healthy handler, so the 500 below is
// the injected read failure and not a malformed fixture.
req := newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/"+taskID+"/skill-bundles/resolve", body)
req = withURLParams(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID, "taskId", taskID)
testutil.Call(t, testHandler.ResolveTaskSkillBundles, req).Want(http.StatusOK)
failing := newSkillFileReadFailureHandler(t)
req = newOwnerDaemonRequest("POST", "/api/daemon/runtimes/"+runtimeID+"/tasks/"+taskID+"/skill-bundles/resolve", body)
req = withURLParams(req, "runtimeId", runtimeID, "taskId", taskID)
testutil.Call(t, failing.ResolveTaskSkillBundles, req).Want(http.StatusInternalServerError)
}