Files
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

149 lines
4.8 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"log/slog"
"net/http"
"strings"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
)
func (h *Handler) DaemonWebSocket(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if h.DaemonHub == nil {
writeErrorCode(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "daemon_websocket_misconfigured", "daemon websocket unavailable")
return
}
runtimeIDs := parseRuntimeIDs(r)
userID := requestUserID(r)
if len(runtimeIDs) == 0 && userID == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "runtime_ids or user identity required")
return
}
identity, ok := h.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, r, runtimeIDs, userID)
if !ok {
return
}
h.DaemonHub.HandleWebSocket(w, r, identity)
}
// buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity authenticates the connection's entire runtime
// set with one narrow query and seeds the connection-scoped heartbeat leases.
// Runtime ownership is immutable, so the heartbeat hot path can safely use
// this fixed scope without re-reading agent_runtime every 15 seconds.
func (h *Handler) buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, runtimeIDs []string, userID string) (daemonws.ClientIdentity, bool) {
identity := daemonws.ClientIdentity{
DaemonID: middleware.DaemonIDFromContext(r.Context()),
DaemonTokenHash: daemonTokenHashForRequest(r),
DaemonTokenOwnerID: middleware.DaemonTokenOwnerIDFromContext(r.Context()),
UserID: userID,
RuntimeIDs: runtimeIDs,
RuntimeLeases: make(map[string]*daemonws.RuntimeLease, len(runtimeIDs)),
ClientVersion: r.Header.Get("X-Client-Version"),
Capabilities: r.Header.Get("X-Client-Capabilities"),
}
if len(runtimeIDs) == 0 {
return identity, true
}
runtimeUUIDs, ok := parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w, runtimeIDs, "runtime_ids")
if !ok {
return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
}
rows, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntimeHeartbeatLeases(r.Context(), runtimeUUIDs)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("load daemon websocket runtime leases failed", "runtimes", len(runtimeIDs), "error", err)
writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load runtimes")
return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
}
byID := make(map[string]int, len(rows))
for index, row := range rows {
byID[uuidToString(row.ID)] = index
}
workspaceIDs := make([]string, 0, len(runtimeIDs))
seenWorkspaceIDs := make(map[string]struct{}, len(runtimeIDs))
for runtimeIndex, runtimeID := range runtimeIDs {
index, found := byID[uuidToString(runtimeUUIDs[runtimeIndex])]
if !found {
writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
}
rt := rows[index]
// Same runtime-level rule as the HTTP daemon routes (MUL-8154): a
// daemon token must match the runtime's daemon_id, a user credential
// must own the runtime. The leases seeded below authorize every later
// WS heartbeat for this runtime, so this is the only check they get.
workspaceID := uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID)
if !h.requireDaemonRuntimeAuthorized(w, r, workspaceID, rt.DaemonID, rt.OwnerID, "runtime not found") {
return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
}
if workspaceID != "" {
if _, ok := seenWorkspaceIDs[workspaceID]; !ok {
seenWorkspaceIDs[workspaceID] = struct{}{}
workspaceIDs = append(workspaceIDs, workspaceID)
}
}
identity.RuntimeLeases[runtimeID] = daemonws.NewRuntimeLease(
workspaceID,
rt.Status,
rt.LastSeenAt.Time,
rt.LastSeenAt.Valid,
)
}
primaryWorkspaceID := ""
if len(workspaceIDs) > 0 {
primaryWorkspaceID = workspaceIDs[0]
}
identity.WorkspaceID = primaryWorkspaceID
identity.WorkspaceIDs = workspaceIDs
return identity, true
}
// daemonTokenHashForRequest returns the hash of the mdt_ token behind a
// daemon-token request: the one DaemonAuth recorded, or — for a request that
// carries a daemon context without passing DaemonAuth — the Authorization
// header's. Empty for user credentials.
func daemonTokenHashForRequest(r *http.Request) string {
if middleware.DaemonWorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context()) == "" {
return ""
}
if hash := middleware.DaemonTokenHashFromContext(r.Context()); hash != "" {
return hash
}
raw := strings.TrimPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer ")
if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "mdt_") {
return ""
}
return auth.HashToken(raw)
}
func parseRuntimeIDs(r *http.Request) []string {
seen := map[string]struct{}{}
var out []string
add := func(raw string) {
for _, part := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
id := strings.TrimSpace(part)
if id == "" {
continue
}
if _, ok := seen[id]; ok {
continue
}
seen[id] = struct{}{}
out = append(out, id)
}
}
for _, raw := range r.URL.Query()["runtime_id"] {
add(raw)
}
for _, raw := range r.URL.Query()["runtime_ids"] {
add(raw)
}
return out
}