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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
149 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
149 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/daemonws"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
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)
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func (h *Handler) DaemonWebSocket(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if h.DaemonHub == nil {
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writeErrorCode(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "daemon_websocket_misconfigured", "daemon websocket unavailable")
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return
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}
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runtimeIDs := parseRuntimeIDs(r)
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userID := requestUserID(r)
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if len(runtimeIDs) == 0 && userID == "" {
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writeError(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "runtime_ids or user identity required")
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return
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}
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identity, ok := h.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, r, runtimeIDs, userID)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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h.DaemonHub.HandleWebSocket(w, r, identity)
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}
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// buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity authenticates the connection's entire runtime
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// set with one narrow query and seeds the connection-scoped heartbeat leases.
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// Runtime ownership is immutable, so the heartbeat hot path can safely use
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// this fixed scope without re-reading agent_runtime every 15 seconds.
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func (h *Handler) buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, runtimeIDs []string, userID string) (daemonws.ClientIdentity, bool) {
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identity := daemonws.ClientIdentity{
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DaemonID: middleware.DaemonIDFromContext(r.Context()),
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DaemonTokenHash: daemonTokenHashForRequest(r),
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DaemonTokenOwnerID: middleware.DaemonTokenOwnerIDFromContext(r.Context()),
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UserID: userID,
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RuntimeIDs: runtimeIDs,
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RuntimeLeases: make(map[string]*daemonws.RuntimeLease, len(runtimeIDs)),
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ClientVersion: r.Header.Get("X-Client-Version"),
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Capabilities: r.Header.Get("X-Client-Capabilities"),
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}
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if len(runtimeIDs) == 0 {
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return identity, true
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}
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runtimeUUIDs, ok := parseUUIDSliceOrBadRequest(w, runtimeIDs, "runtime_ids")
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if !ok {
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return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
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}
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rows, err := h.Queries.GetAgentRuntimeHeartbeatLeases(r.Context(), runtimeUUIDs)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("load daemon websocket runtime leases failed", "runtimes", len(runtimeIDs), "error", err)
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writeError(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "failed to load runtimes")
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return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
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}
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byID := make(map[string]int, len(rows))
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for index, row := range rows {
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byID[uuidToString(row.ID)] = index
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}
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workspaceIDs := make([]string, 0, len(runtimeIDs))
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seenWorkspaceIDs := make(map[string]struct{}, len(runtimeIDs))
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for runtimeIndex, runtimeID := range runtimeIDs {
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index, found := byID[uuidToString(runtimeUUIDs[runtimeIndex])]
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if !found {
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writeError(w, http.StatusNotFound, "runtime not found")
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return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
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}
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rt := rows[index]
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// Same runtime-level rule as the HTTP daemon routes (MUL-8154): a
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// daemon token must match the runtime's daemon_id, a user credential
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// must own the runtime. The leases seeded below authorize every later
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// WS heartbeat for this runtime, so this is the only check they get.
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workspaceID := uuidToString(rt.WorkspaceID)
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if !h.requireDaemonRuntimeAuthorized(w, r, workspaceID, rt.DaemonID, rt.OwnerID, "runtime not found") {
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return daemonws.ClientIdentity{}, false
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}
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if workspaceID != "" {
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if _, ok := seenWorkspaceIDs[workspaceID]; !ok {
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seenWorkspaceIDs[workspaceID] = struct{}{}
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workspaceIDs = append(workspaceIDs, workspaceID)
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}
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}
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identity.RuntimeLeases[runtimeID] = daemonws.NewRuntimeLease(
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workspaceID,
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rt.Status,
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rt.LastSeenAt.Time,
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rt.LastSeenAt.Valid,
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)
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}
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primaryWorkspaceID := ""
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if len(workspaceIDs) > 0 {
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primaryWorkspaceID = workspaceIDs[0]
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}
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identity.WorkspaceID = primaryWorkspaceID
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identity.WorkspaceIDs = workspaceIDs
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return identity, true
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}
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// daemonTokenHashForRequest returns the hash of the mdt_ token behind a
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// daemon-token request: the one DaemonAuth recorded, or — for a request that
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// carries a daemon context without passing DaemonAuth — the Authorization
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// header's. Empty for user credentials.
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func daemonTokenHashForRequest(r *http.Request) string {
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if middleware.DaemonWorkspaceIDFromContext(r.Context()) == "" {
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return ""
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}
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if hash := middleware.DaemonTokenHashFromContext(r.Context()); hash != "" {
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return hash
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}
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raw := strings.TrimPrefix(r.Header.Get("Authorization"), "Bearer ")
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if !strings.HasPrefix(raw, "mdt_") {
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return ""
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}
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return auth.HashToken(raw)
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}
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func parseRuntimeIDs(r *http.Request) []string {
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seen := map[string]struct{}{}
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var out []string
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add := func(raw string) {
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for _, part := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
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id := strings.TrimSpace(part)
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if id == "" {
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continue
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}
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if _, ok := seen[id]; ok {
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continue
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}
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seen[id] = struct{}{}
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out = append(out, id)
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}
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}
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for _, raw := range r.URL.Query()["runtime_id"] {
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add(raw)
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}
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for _, raw := range r.URL.Query()["runtime_ids"] {
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add(raw)
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}
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return out
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}
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