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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
142 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
142 lines
4.7 KiB
Go
package handler
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"testing"
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"time"
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"github.com/google/uuid"
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"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/testutil"
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)
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func TestDaemonWebSocketMissingHubIsInternalError(t *testing.T) {
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h := &Handler{}
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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h.DaemonWebSocket(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil))
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if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 500: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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var body map[string]string
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if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
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}
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if body["code"] != "daemon_websocket_misconfigured" {
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t.Fatalf("code = %q, want daemon_websocket_misconfigured", body["code"])
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}
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}
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func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentitySeedsBatchRuntimeLeases(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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const daemonID = "lease-daemon"
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runtimeIDs := []string{
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dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease runtime 1", testutil.Cols{
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"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
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"daemon_id": daemonID,
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"provider": "ws-lease-1",
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"device_info": "WS lease runtime 1",
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}),
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dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease runtime 2", testutil.Cols{
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"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
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"daemon_id": daemonID,
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"provider": "ws-lease-2",
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"device_info": "WS lease runtime 2",
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}),
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}
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req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, daemonID)
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req.Header.Set("X-Client-Version", "0.9.0")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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identity, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, runtimeIDs, "")
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if !ok {
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t.Fatalf("buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity rejected valid runtimes: %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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if identity.DaemonID != daemonID || identity.WorkspaceID != testWorkspaceID {
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t.Fatalf("identity scope = daemon %q workspace %q", identity.DaemonID, identity.WorkspaceID)
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}
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if identity.ClientVersion != "0.9.0" {
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t.Fatalf("client version = %q, want 0.9.0", identity.ClientVersion)
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}
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if len(identity.RuntimeLeases) != len(runtimeIDs) {
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t.Fatalf("runtime leases = %d, want %d", len(identity.RuntimeLeases), len(runtimeIDs))
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}
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for _, runtimeID := range runtimeIDs {
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lease := identity.RuntimeLeases[runtimeID]
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if lease == nil {
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t.Fatalf("missing lease for runtime %s", runtimeID)
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}
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state := lease.Snapshot()
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if state.WorkspaceID != testWorkspaceID || state.Status != "online" || !state.LastSeenAtValid {
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t.Fatalf("lease %s = %+v", runtimeID, state)
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}
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if time.Since(state.LastSeenAt) > time.Minute {
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t.Fatalf("lease %s last_seen_at unexpectedly stale: %s", runtimeID, state.LastSeenAt)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityFailsClosedForMissingRuntime(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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req := newOwnerDaemonRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil)
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{uuid.NewString()}, ""); ok {
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t.Fatal("missing runtime unexpectedly authorized")
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}
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityRejectsWrongDaemon(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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runtimeID := dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease daemon scope", testutil.Cols{
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"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
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"daemon_id": "owner-daemon",
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"device_info": "WS lease daemon scope",
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})
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req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, "other-daemon")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{runtimeID}, ""); ok {
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t.Fatal("runtime owned by another daemon unexpectedly authorized")
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}
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityRejectsCrossWorkspaceRuntime(t *testing.T) {
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if testHandler == nil {
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t.Skip("database not available")
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}
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workspaceID := dbfx.Insert(t, "workspace", testutil.Cols{
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"name": "WS Lease Other Workspace",
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"slug": "ws-lease-" + uuid.NewString(),
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"description": "Cross-workspace lease test",
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"issue_prefix": "HWL",
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})
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runtimeID := dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease cross workspace", testutil.Cols{
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"workspace_id": workspaceID,
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"daemon_id": "lease-daemon",
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"device_info": "WS lease cross workspace",
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})
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req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, "lease-daemon")
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w := httptest.NewRecorder()
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if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{runtimeID}, ""); ok {
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t.Fatal("cross-workspace runtime unexpectedly authorized")
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}
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if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
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}
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}
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