Files
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

142 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/testutil"
)
func TestDaemonWebSocketMissingHubIsInternalError(t *testing.T) {
h := &Handler{}
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
h.DaemonWebSocket(w, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil))
if w.Code != http.StatusInternalServerError {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 500: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
var body map[string]string
if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &body); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode response: %v", err)
}
if body["code"] != "daemon_websocket_misconfigured" {
t.Fatalf("code = %q, want daemon_websocket_misconfigured", body["code"])
}
}
func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentitySeedsBatchRuntimeLeases(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
const daemonID = "lease-daemon"
runtimeIDs := []string{
dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease runtime 1", testutil.Cols{
"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
"daemon_id": daemonID,
"provider": "ws-lease-1",
"device_info": "WS lease runtime 1",
}),
dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease runtime 2", testutil.Cols{
"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
"daemon_id": daemonID,
"provider": "ws-lease-2",
"device_info": "WS lease runtime 2",
}),
}
req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, daemonID)
req.Header.Set("X-Client-Version", "0.9.0")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
identity, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, runtimeIDs, "")
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity rejected valid runtimes: %d %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
if identity.DaemonID != daemonID || identity.WorkspaceID != testWorkspaceID {
t.Fatalf("identity scope = daemon %q workspace %q", identity.DaemonID, identity.WorkspaceID)
}
if identity.ClientVersion != "0.9.0" {
t.Fatalf("client version = %q, want 0.9.0", identity.ClientVersion)
}
if len(identity.RuntimeLeases) != len(runtimeIDs) {
t.Fatalf("runtime leases = %d, want %d", len(identity.RuntimeLeases), len(runtimeIDs))
}
for _, runtimeID := range runtimeIDs {
lease := identity.RuntimeLeases[runtimeID]
if lease == nil {
t.Fatalf("missing lease for runtime %s", runtimeID)
}
state := lease.Snapshot()
if state.WorkspaceID != testWorkspaceID || state.Status != "online" || !state.LastSeenAtValid {
t.Fatalf("lease %s = %+v", runtimeID, state)
}
if time.Since(state.LastSeenAt) > time.Minute {
t.Fatalf("lease %s last_seen_at unexpectedly stale: %s", runtimeID, state.LastSeenAt)
}
}
}
func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityFailsClosedForMissingRuntime(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
req := newOwnerDaemonRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil)
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{uuid.NewString()}, ""); ok {
t.Fatal("missing runtime unexpectedly authorized")
}
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityRejectsWrongDaemon(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
runtimeID := dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease daemon scope", testutil.Cols{
"workspace_id": testWorkspaceID,
"daemon_id": "owner-daemon",
"device_info": "WS lease daemon scope",
})
req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, "other-daemon")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{runtimeID}, ""); ok {
t.Fatal("runtime owned by another daemon unexpectedly authorized")
}
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}
func TestBuildDaemonWebSocketIdentityRejectsCrossWorkspaceRuntime(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
workspaceID := dbfx.Insert(t, "workspace", testutil.Cols{
"name": "WS Lease Other Workspace",
"slug": "ws-lease-" + uuid.NewString(),
"description": "Cross-workspace lease test",
"issue_prefix": "HWL",
})
runtimeID := dbfx.Runtime(t, "WS lease cross workspace", testutil.Cols{
"workspace_id": workspaceID,
"daemon_id": "lease-daemon",
"device_info": "WS lease cross workspace",
})
req := newDaemonTokenRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/daemon/ws", nil, testWorkspaceID, "lease-daemon")
w := httptest.NewRecorder()
if _, ok := testHandler.buildDaemonWebSocketIdentity(w, req, []string{runtimeID}, ""); ok {
t.Fatal("cross-workspace runtime unexpectedly authorized")
}
if w.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 404: %s", w.Code, w.Body.String())
}
}