Files
multica/server/internal/handler/task_message_call_id_test.go
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

107 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package handler
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"net/http"
"reflect"
"testing"
"github.com/google/uuid"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/events"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/middleware"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/testutil"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/util"
db "github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/db/generated"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/pkg/protocol"
)
func TestTaskMessageCallIDLiveAndHistory(t *testing.T) {
if testHandler == nil {
t.Skip("database not available")
}
taskID := seedBatchTask(t, "call-id")
h := *testHandler
h.Bus = events.New()
var live []map[string]any
h.Bus.Subscribe(protocol.EventTaskMessage, func(e events.Event) {
if e.TaskID != taskID {
return
}
data, err := json.Marshal(e.Payload)
if err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
var row map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &row); err != nil {
t.Error(err)
return
}
live = append(live, row)
})
testutil.Call(t, h.ReportTaskMessages, batchMessagesRequest(t, taskID, []any{
map[string]any{"seq": 1, "type": "tool_use", "tool": "Bash", "call_id": "attempt:A"},
map[string]any{"seq": 2, "type": "tool_use", "tool": "Bash", "call_id": "attempt:B"},
map[string]any{"seq": 3, "type": "tool_result", "tool": "Bash", "call_id": "attempt:B", "output": "B finished"},
map[string]any{"seq": 4, "type": "tool_result", "tool": "Bash", "call_id": "attempt:A", "output": "A finished"},
map[string]any{"seq": 5, "type": "tool_use", "tool": "Read"},
})).Want(http.StatusOK)
if len(live) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("got %d live events, want 5", len(live))
}
for i, want := range []string{"attempt:A", "attempt:B", "attempt:B", "attempt:A"} {
if live[i]["call_id"] != want {
t.Errorf("live row %d call_id = %v, want %s", i, live[i]["call_id"], want)
}
}
if _, ok := live[4]["call_id"]; ok {
t.Error("legacy message must omit call_id")
}
var legacyNull bool
dbfx.QueryRow(t, `SELECT call_id IS NULL FROM task_message WHERE task_id=$1 AND seq=5`, taskID).Scan(&legacyNull)
if !legacyNull {
t.Error("missing call_id must persist as NULL")
}
// Both readers and incremental reconnects must agree with the live payload.
for _, reader := range []struct {
name string
handler http.HandlerFunc
}{
{"daemon", h.ListTaskMessages}, {"user", h.ListTaskMessagesByUser},
} {
for _, suffix := range []string{"", "?since=2"} {
t.Run(reader.name+suffix, func(t *testing.T) {
req := testutil.JSONRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/tasks/"+taskID+"/messages"+suffix, nil)
req = testutil.WithURLParams(req, "taskId", taskID)
// Both readers authenticate as the fixture runtime's owner.
req.Header.Set("X-User-ID", testUserID)
ctx := middleware.SetMemberContext(req.Context(), testWorkspaceID, db.Member{})
var history []map[string]any
testutil.Call(t, reader.handler, req.WithContext(ctx)).Want(http.StatusOK).JSON(&history)
want := live
if suffix != "" {
want = live[2:]
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(history, want) {
t.Fatalf("history differs from live: got %+v want %+v", history, want)
}
})
}
}
// The single-row writer is also used outside daemon batch ingestion.
row, err := h.Queries.CreateTaskMessage(context.Background(), db.CreateTaskMessageParams{
ID: pgtype.UUID{Bytes: uuid.Must(uuid.NewV7()), Valid: true},
TaskID: util.MustParseUUID(taskID), Seq: 6, Type: "tool_result",
CallID: pgtype.Text{String: "single-call", Valid: true},
})
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if row.CallID.String != "single-call" {
t.Fatalf("single writer lost call_id: %+v", row)
}
}