Files
multica/server/internal/auth/daemon_token_cache.go
T
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

106 lines
3.6 KiB
Go

package auth
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"log/slog"
"time"
"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
)
// daemonTokenCachePrefix namespaces daemon-token cache keys separately
// from PAT (mul:auth:pat:*) so the two key spaces can't collide and an
// invalidation on one kind of token doesn't accidentally hit the other.
//
// v2 (MUL-8154) added OwnerID; entries written before it are never read, so a
// pre-upgrade entry cannot authorize a token without its owner binding.
const daemonTokenCachePrefix = "mul:auth:daemon:v2:"
// DaemonTokenIdentity is what DaemonAuth needs from the cached lookup —
// the workspace_id and daemon_id that the middleware injects into the
// request context. We deliberately omit token_hash, expires_at, and the
// row id; cache entries should leak the minimum.
type DaemonTokenIdentity struct {
WorkspaceID string `json:"w"`
DaemonID string `json:"d"`
// OwnerID is the runtime owner the token was issued for ("" for
// Qoder-managed tokens). MUL-8154.
OwnerID string `json:"o,omitempty"`
}
// DaemonTokenCache caches resolved daemon-token (mdt_) lookups in Redis.
// A nil *DaemonTokenCache is safe to use — every method becomes a no-op
// or reports a cache miss, so single-node dev / tests with no REDIS_URL
// degrade cleanly to direct DB lookups.
type DaemonTokenCache struct {
rdb redis.UniversalClient
}
// NewDaemonTokenCache returns a cache backed by rdb. Pass nil to disable
// caching; the returned *DaemonTokenCache is safe to call but never hits
// Redis.
func NewDaemonTokenCache(rdb redis.UniversalClient) *DaemonTokenCache {
if rdb == nil {
return nil
}
return &DaemonTokenCache{rdb: rdb}
}
func daemonTokenCacheKey(hash string) string { return daemonTokenCachePrefix + hash }
// Get returns the cached identity for a token hash. ok=false on cache
// miss or any Redis / decode error — a dead Redis must not take down
// auth.
func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Get(ctx context.Context, hash string) (DaemonTokenIdentity, bool) {
if c == nil {
return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
}
raw, err := c.rdb.Get(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash)).Bytes()
if err != nil {
if !errors.Is(err, redis.Nil) {
slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: get failed; falling back to DB", "error", err)
}
return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
}
var id DaemonTokenIdentity
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &id); err != nil {
slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: malformed entry; falling back to DB", "error", err)
return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
}
return id, true
}
// Set populates the cache with the given TTL. Use TTLForExpiry to clamp
// the TTL to the token's remaining lifetime so a daemon token expiring
// in <AuthCacheTTL can't outlive its expires_at on a cache hit.
//
// Errors are logged and swallowed — a cache write failure is not a
// request failure.
func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Set(ctx context.Context, hash string, id DaemonTokenIdentity, ttl time.Duration) {
if c == nil || ttl <= 0 {
return
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(id)
if err != nil {
slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: marshal failed", "error", err)
return
}
if err := c.rdb.Set(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash), raw, ttl).Err(); err != nil {
slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: set failed", "error", err)
}
}
// Invalidate removes the entry for hash. Called when a daemon token is
// deleted so the deletion takes effect immediately rather than waiting
// for the TTL.
func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Invalidate(ctx context.Context, hash string) {
if c == nil {
return
}
if err := c.rdb.Del(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash)).Err(); err != nil {
slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: invalidate failed; entry will expire on TTL", "error", err)
}
}