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0c69f1f95f
A resumed Hermes session whose persisted provider identity can no longer resolve its credentials fails with the SDK's "Could not resolve authentication method" message. The server-side resume guards already blacklist that session, so the NEXT turn starts fresh and succeeds — which is exactly why Chat alternated success / failure instead of staying broken (GH #6777). Curing the failing turn needs the daemon's in-turn fresh-session retry, which never fired: nothing identified this error as fatal-to-resume. Add it as a third form of positive evidence in shouldRetryWithFreshSession, alongside ResumeRejected and UnresumableHistory. Deciding in the shared gate rather than in each ACP adapter is what makes it correct and narrow: - priorSessionID != "" already proves the run was a resume, which is the whole distinction between "the session's provider copy is broken" (curable) and "the credentials are wrong" (not curable). An adapter cannot tell those apart from the error text alone, which is why Result.ResumeRejected still documents auth errors as out of scope. - The failure surfaces at session/resume, session/set_model (MUL-5029 provider re-routing, the likelier path on a resumed session) and session/prompt; only two carry any resume-failure signal today. The final error text carries the phrase on all three. - tools == 0 is untouched, so a turn that already acted is never replayed. The phrase now has a single home in taskfailure.AuthMethodUnresolved, shared with ResumeUnsafeFailure. The SQL guards stay as-is: they are the only protection for rows written by a daemon too old to have this retry. Co-authored-by: Eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>