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* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154) /api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks (receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token), write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its daemon_id. - Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat, deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake: user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id. - Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row. Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner. - Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows. - Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status stays readable. - GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot paths keep one round trip. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154) Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154) Review of #9423: - P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile records use savepoints so they stay best-effort. - P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it, and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies to an open connection). - Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154) Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to (workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token). - daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled only where their daemon has exactly one owner. - DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2 so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the RPC bridge replays it. - Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner. Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids. - Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154) Third review of #9423: - Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim). - owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md). - Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never trigger legacy merges. - Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> * fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154) Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite another member's runtime. Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles. Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and refused shapes. Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]> --------- Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]> Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
106 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
106 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"context"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"log/slog"
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"time"
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"github.com/redis/go-redis/v9"
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)
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// daemonTokenCachePrefix namespaces daemon-token cache keys separately
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// from PAT (mul:auth:pat:*) so the two key spaces can't collide and an
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// invalidation on one kind of token doesn't accidentally hit the other.
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//
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// v2 (MUL-8154) added OwnerID; entries written before it are never read, so a
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// pre-upgrade entry cannot authorize a token without its owner binding.
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const daemonTokenCachePrefix = "mul:auth:daemon:v2:"
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// DaemonTokenIdentity is what DaemonAuth needs from the cached lookup —
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// the workspace_id and daemon_id that the middleware injects into the
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// request context. We deliberately omit token_hash, expires_at, and the
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// row id; cache entries should leak the minimum.
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type DaemonTokenIdentity struct {
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WorkspaceID string `json:"w"`
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DaemonID string `json:"d"`
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// OwnerID is the runtime owner the token was issued for ("" for
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// Qoder-managed tokens). MUL-8154.
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OwnerID string `json:"o,omitempty"`
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}
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// DaemonTokenCache caches resolved daemon-token (mdt_) lookups in Redis.
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// A nil *DaemonTokenCache is safe to use — every method becomes a no-op
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// or reports a cache miss, so single-node dev / tests with no REDIS_URL
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// degrade cleanly to direct DB lookups.
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type DaemonTokenCache struct {
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rdb redis.UniversalClient
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}
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// NewDaemonTokenCache returns a cache backed by rdb. Pass nil to disable
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// caching; the returned *DaemonTokenCache is safe to call but never hits
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// Redis.
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func NewDaemonTokenCache(rdb redis.UniversalClient) *DaemonTokenCache {
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if rdb == nil {
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return nil
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}
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return &DaemonTokenCache{rdb: rdb}
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}
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func daemonTokenCacheKey(hash string) string { return daemonTokenCachePrefix + hash }
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// Get returns the cached identity for a token hash. ok=false on cache
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// miss or any Redis / decode error — a dead Redis must not take down
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// auth.
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func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Get(ctx context.Context, hash string) (DaemonTokenIdentity, bool) {
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if c == nil {
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return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
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}
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raw, err := c.rdb.Get(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash)).Bytes()
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if err != nil {
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if !errors.Is(err, redis.Nil) {
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slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: get failed; falling back to DB", "error", err)
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}
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return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
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}
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var id DaemonTokenIdentity
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &id); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: malformed entry; falling back to DB", "error", err)
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return DaemonTokenIdentity{}, false
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}
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return id, true
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}
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// Set populates the cache with the given TTL. Use TTLForExpiry to clamp
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// the TTL to the token's remaining lifetime so a daemon token expiring
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// in <AuthCacheTTL can't outlive its expires_at on a cache hit.
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//
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// Errors are logged and swallowed — a cache write failure is not a
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// request failure.
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func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Set(ctx context.Context, hash string, id DaemonTokenIdentity, ttl time.Duration) {
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if c == nil || ttl <= 0 {
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return
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}
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raw, err := json.Marshal(id)
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if err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: marshal failed", "error", err)
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return
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}
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if err := c.rdb.Set(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash), raw, ttl).Err(); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: set failed", "error", err)
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}
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}
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// Invalidate removes the entry for hash. Called when a daemon token is
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// deleted so the deletion takes effect immediately rather than waiting
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// for the TTL.
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func (c *DaemonTokenCache) Invalidate(ctx context.Context, hash string) {
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if c == nil {
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return
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}
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if err := c.rdb.Del(ctx, daemonTokenCacheKey(hash)).Err(); err != nil {
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slog.Warn("daemon_token_cache: invalidate failed; entry will expire on TTL", "error", err)
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}
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}
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