Files
multica/server/cmd/server/source_context_actor_integration_test.go
T
YYClaw 8c563b49be MUL-6555 feat(issues): preserve source context for sub-issues (#7461)
* feat(issues): preserve source context for sub-issues

* fix(issues): address source context review findings

* fix(migrations): guard source context rollback preflight
2026-08-25 12:00:49 +08:00

99 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

package main
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"net/http"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/multica-ai/multica/server/internal/auth"
)
func TestSourceContextRoutesRejectAuthoritativeTaskToken(t *testing.T) {
if testPool == nil {
t.Skip("no database connection")
}
ctx := context.Background()
var agentID string
if err := testPool.QueryRow(ctx, `
SELECT id::text
FROM agent
WHERE workspace_id = $1
ORDER BY created_at
LIMIT 1
`, testWorkspaceID).Scan(&agentID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("load integration-test agent: %v", err)
}
taskID := ensureAgentTask(t, agentID)
token, err := auth.GenerateAgentTaskToken()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("generate task token: %v", err)
}
var tokenID string
if err := testPool.QueryRow(ctx, `
INSERT INTO task_token (token_hash, task_id, agent_id, workspace_id, user_id, expires_at)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
RETURNING id::text
`, auth.HashToken(token), taskID, agentID, testWorkspaceID, testUserID, time.Now().Add(time.Hour)).Scan(&tokenID); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("insert task token: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() {
if _, err := testPool.Exec(context.Background(), `DELETE FROM task_token WHERE id = $1`, tokenID); err != nil {
t.Logf("delete task token fixture: %v", err)
}
})
do := func(t *testing.T, method, path string) *http.Response {
t.Helper()
var body *bytes.Reader
if method == http.MethodPost || method == http.MethodPut {
body = bytes.NewReader([]byte(`{}`))
} else {
body = bytes.NewReader(nil)
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, testServer.URL+path, body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("create request: %v", err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
// Auth must discard both spoofed values and stamp the token's
// authoritative actor source and workspace before route guards run.
req.Header.Set("X-Actor-Source", "member")
req.Header.Set("X-Workspace-ID", "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000099")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("perform request: %v", err)
}
return resp
}
const commentPath = "/api/comments/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000098"
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
method string
path string
}{
{name: "preview", method: http.MethodGet, path: commentPath + "/sub-issue-preview"},
{name: "create", method: http.MethodPost, path: commentPath + "/sub-issues"},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
resp := do(t, tc.method, tc.path)
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want 403", resp.StatusCode)
}
})
}
t.Run("sibling comment route remains outside human-only guard", func(t *testing.T) {
resp := do(t, http.MethodPut, commentPath+"/")
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("status = %d, want downstream 404 proving the route-level guard did not wrap sibling routes", resp.StatusCode)
}
})
}