Files
multica/server/pkg/db/generated/daemon_token.sql.go
T
13eb4bda93 MUL-8154 fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (#9423)
* fix(daemon): enforce runtime ownership on daemon routes (MUL-8154)

/api/daemon/* accepts any workspace member's PAT/JWT, and authorization only
checked workspace membership. Any member could claim another member's tasks
(receiving the agent's custom_env, MCP config and an owner-scoped task token),
write task results/messages, and take a runtime over by re-registering its
daemon_id.

- Runtime-level check on every runtime/task daemon route, HTTP heartbeat,
  deregister, batch claim (and so the WS claim RPC) and the WS handshake:
  user credentials must own the runtime (NULL owner fails closed); daemon
  tokens must match a non-empty runtime daemon_id.
- Register: pre-check that every existing row on the daemon_id belongs to the
  caller, plus a required_owner_id fence in both upserts (incl. the
  failed-profile path) so a concurrent registration cannot win the row.
  Daemon-token registration keeps the existing owner.
- Legacy merge: only for user-credential registrations, and only when the
  caller owns both rows, verified on the FOR UPDATE-locked rows.
- Tasks without a runtime are not writable through daemon routes; status
  stays readable.
- GetTaskStatus / WS lease queries carry runtime owner/daemon so the hot
  paths keep one round trip.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* test(daemon): authenticate fixtures as the runtime owner (MUL-8154)

Most handler tests drove daemon routes with a daemon token whose daemon_id
did not match the fixture runtime, relying on the workspace-wide token scope
this fix removes. They now authenticate the way real daemons do, with the
runtime owner's user credential (newOwnerDaemonRequest). Tests about daemon
token scoping keep mdt_ and get fixtures with a matching daemon_id; the
ownerless-runtime tests also assert that a user credential is refused.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): serialize registration per daemon and keep Qoder WS claims working (MUL-8154)

Review of #9423:

- P1: the owner pre-check and the per-provider/profile upserts hit different
  conflict keys, so two members registering different providers of the same
  daemon could both pass the pre-check and both insert, leaving one daemon
  with two owners (and a daemon token for either runtime reaching the
  other's). Registration now runs the pre-check and every runtime write in one
  transaction under a pg_advisory_xact_lock on (workspace_id, daemon_id), on a
  single connection so queued registrations cannot starve the holder. Legacy
  merges, analytics and the register event run after commit; failed-profile
  records use savepoints so they stay best-effort.
- P2: the Qoder revocation check read the Authorization header, which the WS
  RPC bridge's in-process request does not carry, so valid Qoder WS claims
  silently returned nothing. DaemonAuth now records the mdt_ token hash in the
  request context, the WS identity keeps it, the RPC bridge re-attaches it,
  and the check validates that hash on every call (revocation still applies
  to an open connection).
- Regression tests for cross-provider and provider+profile concurrent
  registration, and for valid/revoked Qoder credentials over WS RPC.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): bind daemon tokens to the runtime owner they were issued for (MUL-8154)

Second review of #9423: a daemon_id can be re-registered by another member
after its runtimes are deleted, and a daemon token was bound only to
(workspace, daemon_id), so the previous owner's Remote MCP token reached the
new owner's runtime (heartbeat, claim, owner-scoped task token).

- daemon_token.owner_id (migration 588). Remote MCP tokens are bound to the
  locked runtime owner inside FinalizeTaskClaim; live tokens are backfilled
  only where their daemon has exactly one owner.
- DaemonAuth carries the owner binding (DB and cache; cache key bumped to v2
  so pre-upgrade entries are never read), the WS identity keeps it and the
  RPC bridge replays it.
- Daemon-token authorization now also requires token owner == runtime owner.
  Qoder-managed tokens stay unbound (governed by cloud_agent_connection), and
  user credentials can no longer register the reserved qoder-managed-* ids.
- Tests: the reuse lifecycle over HTTP, a new WS handshake and an already
  open WS connection; the reserved daemon_id; the concurrency barrier now
  hooks the registration transaction (TxStarter) so the interleaving is real.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): owner-bind daemon-token registration; drop unsafe token backfill (MUL-8154)

Third review of #9423:

- Migration 588 no longer backfills daemon_token.owner_id from the daemon's
  current owner: that owner may be a later re-registrant, which re-bound the
  previous owner's live token to them. Existing non-Qoder tokens stay NULL and
  are refused (24h Remote MCP credentials, re-issued on the next claim).
- owner_id is a plain UUID column, no foreign key / cascade (AGENTS.md).
- Register via a non-Qoder daemon token now uses the token's owner for the
  in-transaction pre-check and the SQL owner fence, and refuses unbound
  tokens. Qoder keeps its connection-based check; daemon tokens still never
  trigger legacy merges.
- Tests: an old owner's bound token and an unbound legacy token can neither
  register over nor heartbeat the replacement owner's runtime.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

* fix(daemon): grant the Qoder registration exemption only with a live connection (MUL-8154)

Fourth review of #9423: register skipped the token owner binding for any
qoder-managed-* daemon token, but checked the Qoder connection only when the
body declared a qoder_cloud runtime. A pre-upgrade Remote MCP token under that
prefix (no owner, no connection) could register type=claude and rewrite
another member's runtime.

Register now verifies the token against a live cloud_agent_connection before
anything else whenever the token is in the Qoder namespace, regardless of the
declared runtimes, and restricts that namespace to the bridge's own shape: a
built-in qoder_cloud runtime, no custom profiles, no failed_profiles.

Test covers built-in, custom-profile, failed-profiles-only and qoder_cloud
bodies with an unconnected token, plus the connected token's allowed and
refused shapes.

Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>

---------

Co-authored-by: multica-eve <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: multica-agent <[email protected]>
2026-10-22 16:47:06 +08:00

119 lines
3.4 KiB
Go

// Code generated by sqlc. DO NOT EDIT.
// versions:
// sqlc v1.31.1
// source: daemon_token.sql
package db
import (
"context"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgtype"
)
const createDaemonToken = `-- name: CreateDaemonToken :one
INSERT INTO daemon_token (token_hash, workspace_id, daemon_id, expires_at, owner_id)
VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5)
RETURNING id, token_hash, workspace_id, daemon_id, expires_at, created_at, owner_id
`
type CreateDaemonTokenParams struct {
TokenHash string `json:"token_hash"`
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonID string `json:"daemon_id"`
ExpiresAt pgtype.Timestamptz `json:"expires_at"`
OwnerID pgtype.UUID `json:"owner_id"`
}
// owner_id binds the token to the runtime owner it was issued for (MUL-8154);
// NULL only for Qoder-managed tokens.
func (q *Queries) CreateDaemonToken(ctx context.Context, arg CreateDaemonTokenParams) (DaemonToken, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, createDaemonToken,
arg.TokenHash,
arg.WorkspaceID,
arg.DaemonID,
arg.ExpiresAt,
arg.OwnerID,
)
var i DaemonToken
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.TokenHash,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.ExpiresAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
)
return i, err
}
const deleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemons = `-- name: DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemons :many
DELETE FROM daemon_token
WHERE workspace_id = $1
AND daemon_id = ANY($2::text[])
RETURNING token_hash
`
type DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemonsParams struct {
WorkspaceID pgtype.UUID `json:"workspace_id"`
DaemonIds []string `json:"daemon_ids"`
}
// Deletes every daemon_token row matching the (workspace_id, daemon_id)
// pairs implied by `daemon_ids`. Used by the member-revocation flow to
// nuke tokens for all runtimes a leaving member owned in one shot.
// Returns token_hash so the caller can invalidate auth.DaemonTokenCache
// before the 10-minute TTL expires — without that invalidate, a daemon
// can keep using its stale token until cache eviction even though the
// DB row is gone.
func (q *Queries) DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemons(ctx context.Context, arg DeleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemonsParams) ([]string, error) {
rows, err := q.db.Query(ctx, deleteDaemonTokensByWorkspaceAndDaemons, arg.WorkspaceID, arg.DaemonIds)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer rows.Close()
items := []string{}
for rows.Next() {
var token_hash string
if err := rows.Scan(&token_hash); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
items = append(items, token_hash)
}
if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return items, nil
}
const deleteExpiredDaemonTokens = `-- name: DeleteExpiredDaemonTokens :exec
DELETE FROM daemon_token
WHERE expires_at <= now()
`
func (q *Queries) DeleteExpiredDaemonTokens(ctx context.Context) error {
_, err := q.db.Exec(ctx, deleteExpiredDaemonTokens)
return err
}
const getDaemonTokenByHash = `-- name: GetDaemonTokenByHash :one
SELECT id, token_hash, workspace_id, daemon_id, expires_at, created_at, owner_id FROM daemon_token
WHERE token_hash = $1 AND expires_at > now()
`
func (q *Queries) GetDaemonTokenByHash(ctx context.Context, tokenHash string) (DaemonToken, error) {
row := q.db.QueryRow(ctx, getDaemonTokenByHash, tokenHash)
var i DaemonToken
err := row.Scan(
&i.ID,
&i.TokenHash,
&i.WorkspaceID,
&i.DaemonID,
&i.ExpiresAt,
&i.CreatedAt,
&i.OwnerID,
)
return i, err
}