diff --git a/controller/audit.go b/controller/audit.go
index d9c5bc411..5ec1ec45a 100644
--- a/controller/audit.go
+++ b/controller/audit.go
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
package controller
import (
+ "errors"
"fmt"
"os"
+ "strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/constant"
@@ -43,6 +45,11 @@ var auditContentTemplates = map[string]string{
"user.reset_passkey": "Reset the user passkey",
"option.update": "Updated system setting ${key}",
+ "option.passkey_domains": "Updated Passkey domains: removed ${domains}; affected ${known}; unknown ${unknown}",
+ "option.passkey_domains_confirmed": "Confirmed removal of Passkey domains: ${domains}; affected ${known}; unknown ${unknown}",
+ "option.passkey_domains_blocked": "Passkey domain change blocked: ${domains}; affected ${known}; unknown ${unknown}",
+ "option.passkey_domains_failed": "Passkey domain update failed",
+
"channel.create": "Created channel ${name} (type ${type}, count ${count})",
"channel.update": "Updated channel ${name} (ID: ${id})",
"channel.delete": "Deleted channel ${name} (ID: ${id})",
@@ -65,6 +72,33 @@ var auditContentTemplates = map[string]string{
"subscription.user_plan_reset": "Reset active plan ${plan_id} subscriptions for user ${target_user_id}",
}
+func recordPasskeyDomainAudit(c *gin.Context, change *model.PasskeyDomainChange, confirmed bool, err error) {
+ confirmed = confirmed && err == nil && change != nil && len(change.RemovedRPIDs) > 0
+ params := map[string]any{"success": err == nil, "confirmed": confirmed}
+ if change != nil {
+ params["domains"] = strings.Join(change.RemovedRPIDs, ", ")
+ params["removed_rp_ids"] = change.RemovedRPIDs
+ params["known"] = change.AffectedCredentials
+ params["unknown"] = change.UnknownCredentials
+ params["previous_rp_id"] = change.PreviousRPID
+ params["effective_rp_id"] = change.EffectiveRPID
+ }
+ action := "option.passkey_domains"
+ if errors.Is(err, model.ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation) {
+ action = "option.passkey_domains_blocked"
+ } else if err != nil {
+ action = "option.passkey_domains_failed"
+ } else if confirmed && change != nil && len(change.RemovedRPIDs) > 0 {
+ action = "option.passkey_domains_confirmed"
+ }
+ auditInfo := &model.AuditRequestInfo{
+ Method: c.Request.Method, Route: c.FullPath(), Path: c.FullPath(),
+ Status: c.Writer.Status(), Success: err == nil,
+ }
+ model.RecordOperationAuditLog(c.GetInt("id"), c.GetInt("role"), auditContentEN(action, params), c.ClientIP(), action, params, auditOperatorInfo(c), auditInfo, c)
+ markAuditLogged(c)
+}
+
// auditContentEN 按 action 模板渲染英文兜底文本;未登记的 action 退回 action 本身。
func auditContentEN(action string, params map[string]any) string {
tmpl, ok := auditContentTemplates[action]
diff --git a/controller/login_verification.go b/controller/login_verification.go
index 6d89b30d2..9f2997680 100644
--- a/controller/login_verification.go
+++ b/controller/login_verification.go
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ func VerifyLogin(c *gin.Context) {
func LoginPasskeyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
var request struct {
FlowToken string `json:"flow_token"`
+ RPID string `json:"rp_id"`
}
if common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request) != nil || request.FlowToken == "" {
common.ApiErrorMsg(c, "参数错误")
@@ -56,7 +57,11 @@ func LoginPasskeyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
+ credentialRPID := ""
+ if credential.RPID != nil {
+ credentialRPID = *credential.RPID
+ }
+ wa, rpIDs, err := passkeysvc.BuildLoginWebAuthn(c.Request, request.RPID, credentialRPID)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
@@ -75,7 +80,7 @@ func LoginPasskeyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
- common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"flow_token": token, "expires_at": expiresAt, "options": options})
+ common.ApiSuccess(c, gin.H{"flow_token": token, "expires_at": expiresAt, "options": options, "rp_ids": rpIDs})
}
func LoginPasskeyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
@@ -104,6 +109,7 @@ func LoginPasskeyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
+ c.Set("passkey_rp_id", sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
if security.LoginFlowID != verification.Flow.Id || sessionData.UserVerification != protocol.VerificationRequired {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid)
return
@@ -113,17 +119,21 @@ func LoginPasskeyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
+ wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthnForRPID(c.Request, sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
+ if credential.RPID != nil && *credential.RPID != "" && *credential.RPID != sessionData.RelyingPartyID {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, service.ErrVerificationFailed)
+ return
+ }
validated, err := wa.ValidateLogin(passkeysvc.NewWebAuthnUser(&model.User{Id: identity.UserID}, credential), *sessionData, parsed)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
- if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(identity.UserID, validated, time.Now()); err != nil {
+ if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(identity.UserID, validated, time.Now(), sessionData.RelyingPartyID); err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
diff --git a/controller/misc.go b/controller/misc.go
index 18105a583..1e688fc09 100644
--- a/controller/misc.go
+++ b/controller/misc.go
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ func TestStatus(c *gin.Context) {
func GetStatus(c *gin.Context) {
cs := console_setting.GetConsoleSetting()
+ passkeySetting := system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot()
common.OptionMapRWMutex.RLock()
defer common.OptionMapRWMutex.RUnlock()
- passkeySetting := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
legalSetting := system_setting.GetLegalSettings()
data := gin.H{
@@ -117,7 +117,8 @@ func GetStatus(c *gin.Context) {
"oidc_display_name": system_setting.GetOIDCSettings().GetEffectiveDisplayName(),
"passkey_login": passkeySetting.Enabled,
"passkey_display_name": passkeySetting.RPDisplayName,
- "passkey_rp_id": passkeySetting.RPID,
+ "passkey_rp_id": passkeySetting.EffectiveRPID(),
+ "passkey_rp_ids": passkeySetting.RelyingPartyIDs(),
"passkey_origins": passkeySetting.Origins,
"passkey_allow_insecure": passkeySetting.AllowInsecureOrigin,
"passkey_user_verification": passkeySetting.UserVerification,
diff --git a/controller/option.go b/controller/option.go
index cff783271..474475b3e 100644
--- a/controller/option.go
+++ b/controller/option.go
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
package controller
import (
+ "errors"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"slices"
@@ -135,6 +136,50 @@ type OptionUpdateRequest struct {
Value any `json:"value"`
}
+func UpdatePasskeyDomains(c *gin.Context) {
+ var request struct {
+ RPID *string `json:"rp_id"`
+ LegacyRPIDs *string `json:"legacy_rp_ids"`
+ Origins *string `json:"origins"`
+ Preview bool `json:"preview"`
+ RemovalConfirmation string `json:"removal_confirmation"`
+ }
+ if err := common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request); err != nil || request.RPID == nil || request.LegacyRPIDs == nil || request.Origins == nil {
+ common.ApiErrorI18n(c, i18n.MsgInvalidParams)
+ return
+ }
+ change, err := model.UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{
+ "passkey.rp_id": *request.RPID, "passkey.legacy_rp_ids": *request.LegacyRPIDs, "passkey.origins": *request.Origins,
+ }, request.Preview, request.RemovalConfirmation)
+ if err != nil {
+ writePasskeyDomainSettingsError(c, err)
+ if !request.Preview {
+ recordPasskeyDomainAudit(c, change, request.RemovalConfirmation != "", err)
+ }
+ return
+ }
+ if !request.Preview {
+ recordPasskeyDomainAudit(c, change, request.RemovalConfirmation != "", nil)
+ }
+ common.ApiSuccess(c, change)
+}
+
+func writePasskeyDomainSettingsError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
+ var removal *model.PasskeyDomainRemovalError
+ if errors.As(err, &removal) {
+ c.JSON(http.StatusConflict, gin.H{
+ "success": false, "code": "PASSKEY_RP_ID_REMOVAL_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED",
+ "message": i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDRemovalConfirmation), "data": removal.Change,
+ })
+ return
+ }
+ if errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid) {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
+ return
+ }
+ common.ApiError(c, err)
+}
+
func UpdateOption(c *gin.Context) {
var option OptionUpdateRequest
err := common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &option)
@@ -431,9 +476,24 @@ func UpdateOption(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
}
+ if model.IsPasskeyDomainOption(option.Key) {
+ change, updateErr := model.UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{option.Key: option.Value.(string)}, false, "")
+ if updateErr != nil {
+ writePasskeyDomainSettingsError(c, updateErr)
+ recordPasskeyDomainAudit(c, change, false, updateErr)
+ return
+ }
+ recordPasskeyDomainAudit(c, change, false, nil)
+ common.ApiSuccess(c, change)
+ return
+ }
err = model.UpdateOption(option.Key, option.Value.(string))
if err != nil {
- common.ApiError(c, err)
+ if errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid) {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
+ } else {
+ common.ApiError(c, err)
+ }
return
}
// 出于安全考虑只记录被修改的配置项名称,不记录配置值(可能含密钥等敏感信息)。
diff --git a/controller/passkey.go b/controller/passkey.go
index 94fc10665..ad80f09e7 100644
--- a/controller/passkey.go
+++ b/controller/passkey.go
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ type passkeyFinishRequest struct {
}
type passkeyVerifyBeginRequest struct {
+ RPID string `json:"rp_id"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
Context json.RawMessage `json:"context,omitempty"`
}
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@ func parsePasskeyFinishRequest(c *gin.Context) (*passkeyFinishRequest, error) {
}
func PasskeyRegisterBegin(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ func PasskeyRegisterBegin(c *gin.Context) {
}
func PasskeyRegisterFinish(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -142,12 +143,6 @@ func PasskeyRegisterFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
- if err != nil {
- writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
- return
- }
-
credentialRecord, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
if err != nil && !errors.Is(err, model.ErrPasskeyNotFound) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
@@ -171,6 +166,12 @@ func PasskeyRegisterFinish(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
+ wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthnForRPID(c.Request, sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
+ if err != nil {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
+ return
+ }
+ c.Set("passkey_rp_id", sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
if sessionData.UserVerification != protocol.VerificationRequired {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid)
return
@@ -193,6 +194,7 @@ func PasskeyRegisterFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
+ passkeyCredential.RPID = &sessionData.RelyingPartyID
if err := model.RegisterPasskeyForSession(identity, passkeyCredential); err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
@@ -281,7 +283,7 @@ func PasskeyStatus(c *gin.Context) {
}
func PasskeyLoginBegin(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -289,7 +291,16 @@ func PasskeyLoginBegin(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
+ var request struct {
+ RPID string `json:"rp_id"`
+ }
+ if c.Request.Body != nil && c.Request.ContentLength != 0 {
+ if common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request) != nil {
+ common.ApiErrorMsg(c, "无效的 Passkey 验证请求")
+ return
+ }
+ }
+ wa, rpIDs, err := passkeysvc.BuildLoginWebAuthn(c.Request, request.RPID, "")
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
@@ -316,6 +327,7 @@ func PasskeyLoginBegin(c *gin.Context) {
"message": "",
"data": gin.H{
"options": assertion,
+ "rp_ids": rpIDs,
"flow_token": flowToken,
"expires_at": expiresAt,
},
@@ -323,7 +335,7 @@ func PasskeyLoginBegin(c *gin.Context) {
}
func PasskeyLoginFinish(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -342,12 +354,6 @@ func PasskeyLoginFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
- if err != nil {
- writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
- return
- }
-
sessionData, _, err := passkeysvc.PopSessionDataFlow(
request.FlowToken,
model.AuthFlowPurposePasskeyLogin,
@@ -357,6 +363,12 @@ func PasskeyLoginFinish(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
+ wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthnForRPID(c.Request, sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
+ if err != nil {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
+ return
+ }
+ c.Set("passkey_rp_id", sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
if sessionData.UserVerification != protocol.VerificationRequired {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid)
return
@@ -369,6 +381,10 @@ func PasskeyLoginFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("未找到 Passkey 凭证: %w", err)
}
+ if credential.RPID != nil && *credential.RPID != "" && *credential.RPID != sessionData.RelyingPartyID {
+ return nil, service.ErrVerificationFailed
+ }
+
// 通过凭证获取用户
user := &model.User{Id: credential.UserID}
if err := user.FillUserById(); err != nil {
@@ -415,7 +431,7 @@ func PasskeyLoginFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(modelUser.Id, credential, time.Now()); err != nil {
+ if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(modelUser.Id, credential, time.Now(), sessionData.RelyingPartyID); err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
@@ -474,7 +490,7 @@ func AdminResetPasskey(c *gin.Context) {
}
func PasskeyVerifyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -516,7 +532,11 @@ func PasskeyVerifyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
+ credentialRPID := ""
+ if credential.RPID != nil {
+ credentialRPID = *credential.RPID
+ }
+ wa, rpIDs, err := passkeysvc.BuildLoginWebAuthn(c.Request, request.RPID, credentialRPID)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
@@ -544,6 +564,7 @@ func PasskeyVerifyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
"message": "",
"data": gin.H{
"options": assertion,
+ "rp_ids": rpIDs,
"flow_token": flowToken,
"expires_at": expiresAt,
},
@@ -551,7 +572,7 @@ func PasskeyVerifyBegin(c *gin.Context) {
}
func PasskeyVerifyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
"success": false,
"message": "管理员未启用 Passkey 登录",
@@ -576,12 +597,6 @@ func PasskeyVerifyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(c.Request)
- if err != nil {
- writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
- return
- }
-
credential, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
if err != nil {
c.JSON(http.StatusOK, gin.H{
@@ -605,11 +620,21 @@ func PasskeyVerifyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
+ wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthnForRPID(c.Request, sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
+ if err != nil {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
+ return
+ }
+ c.Set("passkey_rp_id", sessionData.RelyingPartyID)
if sessionData.UserVerification != protocol.VerificationRequired {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid)
return
}
+ if credential.RPID != nil && *credential.RPID != "" && *credential.RPID != sessionData.RelyingPartyID {
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, service.ErrVerificationFailed)
+ return
+ }
waUser := passkeysvc.NewWebAuthnUser(user, credential)
validatedCredential, err := wa.ValidateLogin(waUser, *sessionData, parsedCredential)
if err != nil {
@@ -617,7 +642,7 @@ func PasskeyVerifyFinish(c *gin.Context) {
return
}
- if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validatedCredential, time.Now()); err != nil {
+ if err := model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validatedCredential, time.Now(), sessionData.RelyingPartyID); err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
diff --git a/controller/passkey_test.go b/controller/passkey_test.go
index f1150f7ec..8702a5e9a 100644
--- a/controller/passkey_test.go
+++ b/controller/passkey_test.go
@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
package controller
import (
+ "bytes"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/rand"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ "encoding/base64"
+ "errors"
+ "fmt"
+ "maps"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"strings"
@@ -11,18 +17,705 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/middleware"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
+ passkeysvc "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/passkey"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
+ "github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
+ "github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/webauthn"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
+ "gorm.io/gorm"
)
type passkeyTestBody struct {
*strings.Reader
}
+type passkeyDomainBegin struct {
+ FlowToken string `json:"flow_token"`
+ RPIDs []string `json:"rp_ids"`
+ Options struct {
+ PublicKey struct {
+ Challenge string `json:"challenge"`
+ RPID string `json:"rpId"`
+ RP struct {
+ ID string `json:"id"`
+ } `json:"rp"`
+ } `json:"publicKey"`
+ } `json:"options"`
+}
+
+func passkeyDomainRequest(t *testing.T, path string, payload any, identity service.AuthIdentity, origin string, handler gin.HandlerFunc) *httptest.ResponseRecorder {
+ t.Helper()
+ body, err := common.Marshal(payload)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ return securityEnrollmentRequest(http.MethodPost, path, string(body), "", identity, func(c *gin.Context) {
+ c.Request.Header.Set("Origin", origin)
+ handler(c)
+ })
+}
+
+func decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t *testing.T, response *httptest.ResponseRecorder) passkeyDomainBegin {
+ t.Helper()
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ var begin passkeyDomainBegin
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(result.Data, &begin))
+ return begin
+}
+
+// Reuse the existing software authenticator, replacing the domain-bound bytes
+// and recomputing the signature exactly as a browser/authenticator would.
+func passkeyDomainAssertion(t *testing.T, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, challenge, rpID, origin string, userID int, verified bool) map[string]any {
+ t.Helper()
+ var assertion map[string]any
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(securityPasskeyResponse(t, key, challenge, false, 1, verified), &assertion))
+ response := assertion["response"].(map[string]any)
+ clientData, err := common.Marshal(map[string]string{"type": "webauthn.get", "challenge": challenge, "origin": origin})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ authData, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(response["authenticatorData"].(string))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ rpHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(rpID))
+ copy(authData, rpHash[:])
+ clientHash := sha256.Sum256(clientData)
+ signedHash := sha256.Sum256(append(append([]byte{}, authData...), clientHash[:]...))
+ signature, err := ecdsa.SignASN1(rand.Reader, key, signedHash[:])
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ response["clientDataJSON"] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(clientData)
+ response["authenticatorData"] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(authData)
+ response["signature"] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(signature)
+ response["userHandle"] = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(fmt.Sprint(userID)))
+ return assertion
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainsPreserveCredentialsAcrossVerificationFlows(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, kind := range []string{"direct", "login factor", "sensitive action", "historical mixed case"} {
+ t.Run(kind, func(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ key := newSecurityLoginPasskey(t, user.Id)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ legacyRPID := "www.example.com"
+ if kind == "historical mixed case" {
+ legacyRPID = "WWW.example.com"
+ }
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = legacyRPID
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ beginPath, finishPath := "/api/user/passkey/login/begin", "/api/user/passkey/login/finish"
+ beginHandler, finishHandler := PasskeyLoginBegin, PasskeyLoginFinish
+ request := map[string]any{"rp_id": legacyRPID}
+ if kind == "login factor" {
+ pending, err := service.StartLoginVerification(user, "password")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ request["flow_token"] = pending.FlowToken
+ beginPath, finishPath = "/api/user/login/passkey/begin", "/api/user/login/passkey/finish"
+ beginHandler, finishHandler = LoginPasskeyBegin, LoginPasskeyFinish
+ } else if kind == "sensitive action" {
+ request["scope"] = service.VerificationScopeAccessTokenGenerate
+ beginPath, finishPath = "/api/user/passkey/verify/begin", "/api/user/passkey/verify/finish"
+ beginHandler, finishHandler = PasskeyVerifyBegin, PasskeyVerifyFinish
+ }
+ begin := decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, passkeyDomainRequest(t, beginPath, request, identity, "https://www.example.com", beginHandler))
+ assert.Equal(t, legacyRPID, begin.Options.PublicKey.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"example.com", legacyRPID}, begin.RPIDs)
+ before, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.Nil(t, before.RPID)
+ finish := map[string]any{"flow_token": begin.FlowToken, "credential": passkeyDomainAssertion(t, key, begin.Options.PublicKey.Challenge, legacyRPID, "https://www.example.com", user.Id, true)}
+ if kind == "login factor" {
+ finish["flow_token"], finish["passkey_flow_token"] = request["flow_token"], begin.FlowToken
+ }
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, finishPath, finish, identity, "https://www.example.com", finishHandler)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ after, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.NotNil(t, after.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, legacyRPID, *after.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, before.CredentialID, after.CredentialID)
+ assert.Equal(t, before.PublicKey, after.PublicKey)
+ if kind == "sensitive action" {
+ var proof service.SecurityProof
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(result.Data, &proof))
+ assert.Equal(t, service.VerificationScopeAccessTokenGenerate, proof.Scope)
+ }
+ count, err := model.CountActiveUserSessions(user.Id, time.Now().Unix())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ replay := passkeyDomainRequest(t, finishPath, finish, identity, "https://www.example.com", finishHandler)
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(replay.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ assert.False(t, result.Success)
+ afterCount, err := model.CountActiveUserSessions(user.Id, time.Now().Unix())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, count, afterCount)
+ // Once identified, a browser hint cannot override the credential's binding.
+ wa, ids, err := passkeysvc.BuildLoginWebAuthn(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, beginPath, nil), "example.com", *after.RPID)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, legacyRPID, wa.Config.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{legacyRPID}, ids)
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainsRejectInvalidAssertions(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, failure := range []string{"wrong RP ID", "unlisted origin", "origin outside RP scope", "wrong user", "bad signature", "missing user verification", "expired challenge", "removed domain", "known different domain"} {
+ t.Run(failure, func(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ key := newSecurityLoginPasskey(t, user.Id)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com"
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ begin := decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/begin", map[string]string{"rp_id": "www.example.com"}, identity, "https://www.example.com", PasskeyLoginBegin))
+ rpID, origin, handle := "www.example.com", "https://www.example.com", user.Id
+ switch failure {
+ case "wrong RP ID":
+ rpID = "example.com"
+ case "unlisted origin":
+ origin = "https://evil.example.com"
+ case "origin outside RP scope":
+ origin = "https://example.com"
+ case "wrong user":
+ handle++
+ case "expired challenge":
+ flow, err := model.GetAuthFlow(begin.FlowToken, model.AuthFlowMatch{Purpose: model.AuthFlowPurposePasskeyLogin})
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ var payload struct {
+ SessionData webauthn.SessionData `json:"session_data"`
+ Security passkeysvc.FlowSecurity `json:"security"`
+ }
+ require.NoError(t, common.UnmarshalJsonStr(flow.Payload, &payload))
+ payload.SessionData.Expires = time.Now().Add(-time.Second)
+ encoded, err := common.Marshal(payload)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Model(flow).Update("payload", string(encoded)).Error)
+ case "removed domain":
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = ""
+ case "known different domain":
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Model(&model.PasskeyCredential{}).Where("user_id = ?", user.Id).Update("rp_id", "example.com").Error)
+ }
+ assertion := passkeyDomainAssertion(t, key, begin.Options.PublicKey.Challenge, rpID, origin, handle, failure != "missing user verification")
+ if failure == "bad signature" {
+ assertion["response"].(map[string]any)["signature"] = "AA"
+ }
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/finish", map[string]any{"flow_token": begin.FlowToken, "credential": assertion}, identity, "https://www.example.com", PasskeyLoginFinish)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ assert.False(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ assert.Empty(t, response.Header().Values("Set-Cookie"))
+ count, err := model.CountActiveUserSessions(user.Id, time.Now().Unix())
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 1, count)
+ stored, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ if failure == "known different domain" {
+ assert.Equal(t, "example.com", *stored.RPID)
+ } else {
+ assert.Nil(t, stored.RPID)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainChoicesRespectOriginAndConfiguration(t *testing.T) {
+ _, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com"
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ for _, test := range []struct {
+ origin, hint string
+ success bool
+ ids []string
+ }{
+ {"https://www.example.com", "", true, []string{"example.com", "www.example.com"}},
+ {"https://example.com", "", true, []string{"example.com"}},
+ {"https://example.com", "www.example.com", false, nil},
+ {"https://www.example.com", "unconfigured.example.com", false, nil},
+ {"https://attacker.test", "", false, nil},
+ } {
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/begin", map[string]string{"rp_id": test.hint}, identity, test.origin, PasskeyLoginBegin)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ assert.Equal(t, test.success, result.Success, "%+v", test)
+ if test.success {
+ assert.Equal(t, test.ids, decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, response).RPIDs)
+ } else {
+ assert.Equal(t, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", result.Code)
+ }
+ }
+ settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins, settings.AllowInsecureOrigin = "localhost", "", "http://localhost:3000,http://localhost:3001", true
+ for _, origin := range []string{"http://localhost:3000", "http://localhost:3001"} {
+ begin := decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/begin", nil, identity, origin, PasskeyLoginBegin))
+ assert.Equal(t, "localhost", begin.Options.PublicKey.RPID)
+ }
+}
+
+func setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t *testing.T) {
+ t.Helper()
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.AutoMigrate(&model.Option{}))
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RLock()
+ previousOptions := maps.Clone(common.OptionMap)
+ previousAddress := system_setting.ServerAddress
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RUnlock()
+ t.Cleanup(func() {
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.Lock()
+ common.OptionMap = previousOptions
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = previousAddress
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.Unlock()
+ })
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainRemovalProtectsExistingAndUnknownCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, binding := range []string{"www.example.com", ""} {
+ t.Run("binding="+binding, func(t *testing.T) {
+ user, _ := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com"
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ credential := &model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, CredentialID: "existing", PublicKey: "key"}
+ if binding != "" {
+ credential.RPID = &binding
+ }
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(credential).Error)
+ assert.Error(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.legacy_rp_ids", ""))
+ assert.Equal(t, "www.example.com", system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().LegacyRPIDs)
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainRemovalWithoutAffectedCredentialsNeedsNoOverride(t *testing.T) {
+ user, _ := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com,WWW.example.com"
+ upper := "WWW.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(&model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, RPID: &upper, CredentialID: "uppercase", PublicKey: "key"}).Error)
+ change, err := model.UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{"passkey.legacy_rp_ids": upper}, false, "")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"www.example.com"}, change.RemovedRPIDs)
+ assert.Zero(t, change.AffectedCredentials)
+ assert.Zero(t, change.UnknownCredentials)
+ assert.False(t, change.ConfirmationRequired)
+ assert.Equal(t, upper, settings.LegacyRPIDs)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeySnapshotDoesNotMaterializeDefaults(t *testing.T) {
+ setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.RPID, settings.Origins = "", ""
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = "https://www.example.com"
+ assert.Equal(t, "www.example.com", system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().EffectiveRPID())
+ assert.Empty(t, settings.RPID)
+ assert.Empty(t, settings.Origins)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainPreviewConfirmationAndAudit(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com,WWW.example.com"
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ lower, upper, empty := "www.example.com", "WWW.example.com", ""
+ for i, binding := range []*string{&lower, &upper, nil, &empty, &lower} {
+ credential := &model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id + i, RPID: binding, CredentialID: fmt.Sprint(i), PublicKey: "key"}
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(credential).Error)
+ if i == 4 {
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Delete(credential).Error)
+ }
+ }
+ request := map[string]any{"rp_id": "example.com", "legacy_rp_ids": upper, "origins": settings.Origins, "preview": true}
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/option/passkey/domains", request, identity, "https://example.com", UpdatePasskeyDomains)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ var preview model.PasskeyDomainChange
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(result.Data, &preview))
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{lower}, preview.RemovedRPIDs)
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 1, preview.AffectedCredentials)
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 2, preview.UnknownCredentials)
+ assert.True(t, preview.ConfirmationRequired)
+ require.NotEmpty(t, preview.RemovalConfirmation)
+ options, err := model.AllOption()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Empty(t, options, "preview must not materialize default rows")
+ assert.Equal(t, "www.example.com,WWW.example.com", settings.LegacyRPIDs)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.UpdateOptionsBulk(map[string]string{"passkey.legacy_rp_ids": upper, "Notice": "must roll back"}), model.ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation)
+ blocked := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/option/", map[string]string{"key": "passkey.legacy_rp_ids", "value": upper}, identity, "https://example.com", UpdateOption)
+ assert.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, blocked.Code)
+ assert.Contains(t, blocked.Body.String(), "PASSKEY_RP_ID_REMOVAL_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED")
+ request["preview"] = false
+ request["removal_confirmation"] = preview.RemovalConfirmation
+ // A new unknown credential makes the reviewed impact stale.
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(&model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id + 10, CredentialID: "new", PublicKey: "key"}).Error)
+ response = passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/option/passkey/domains", request, identity, "https://example.com", UpdatePasskeyDomains)
+ assert.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, response.Code)
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(result.Data, &preview))
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 3, preview.UnknownCredentials)
+ options, err = model.AllOption()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Empty(t, options)
+ request["removal_confirmation"] = preview.RemovalConfirmation
+ response = passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/option/passkey/domains", request, identity, "https://example.com", UpdatePasskeyDomains)
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ assert.Equal(t, upper, settings.LegacyRPIDs)
+ var audits []model.AuditLog
+ require.NoError(t, model.LOG_DB.Find(&audits).Error)
+ for _, audit := range audits {
+ if audit.Action == "option.passkey_domains_blocked" {
+ assert.False(t, audit.Success)
+ assert.Equal(t, http.StatusConflict, audit.Status)
+ }
+ if audit.Action == "option.passkey_domains_confirmed" {
+ assert.True(t, audit.Success)
+ require.NotNil(t, audit.Other.Op)
+ params, err := common.Marshal(audit.Other.Op.Params)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ var impact struct {
+ Known, Unknown int64
+ Confirmed bool
+ RemovedRPIDs []string `json:"removed_rp_ids"`
+ }
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(params, &impact))
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 1, impact.Known)
+ assert.EqualValues(t, 3, impact.Unknown)
+ assert.True(t, impact.Confirmed)
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{lower}, impact.RemovedRPIDs)
+ }
+ }
+ encoded, err := common.Marshal(audits)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Contains(t, string(encoded), "option.passkey_domains_confirmed")
+ assert.Contains(t, string(encoded), "option.passkey_domains_blocked")
+ assert.NotContains(t, string(encoded), preview.RemovalConfirmation)
+ // Simulate an old node's cache after removal: persistence must use DB trust.
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = lower + "," + upper
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, &webauthn.Credential{ID: []byte("0")}, time.Now(), lower), system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.RegisterPasskeyForSession(identity, &model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, RPID: &lower, CredentialID: "replacement", PublicKey: "key"}), system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainSettingsAcceptExactHTTPSInternalHosts(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, test := range []struct {
+ rpID, origins string
+ valid bool
+ }{
+ {"intranet", "https://intranet:8443", true},
+ {"intranet", "https://child.intranet", false},
+ {"intranet", "http://intranet", false},
+ {"com", "https://com", false},
+ {"127.0.0.1", "https://127.0.0.1", false},
+ {"intranet:8443", "https://intranet:8443", false},
+ {"localhost", "http://localhost:3000", true},
+ } {
+ t.Run(test.rpID+"/"+test.origins, func(t *testing.T) {
+ setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ change, err := model.UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{"passkey.rp_id": test.rpID, "passkey.legacy_rp_ids": "", "passkey.origins": test.origins}, false, "")
+ if !test.valid {
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
+ return
+ }
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, test.rpID, change.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, "example.com", change.LegacyRPIDs)
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyImplicitDomainChangesRetainPreviousTrust(t *testing.T) {
+ setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.RPID, settings.Origins = "", ""
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = "https://www.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("ServerAddress", "https://example.com"))
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"example.com", "www.example.com"}, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().RelyingPartyIDs())
+ assert.Equal(t, "https://www.example.com,https://example.com", settings.Origins)
+ // Moving the retained RP into the primary is not a removal.
+ change, err := model.UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{"passkey.rp_id": "www.example.com", "passkey.legacy_rp_ids": ""}, false, "")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Empty(t, change.RemovedRPIDs)
+ assert.Equal(t, "example.com", change.LegacyRPIDs)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyRegistrationAndDomainRemovalSerialize(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.legacy_rp_ids", "www.example.com"))
+ registering, release := make(chan struct{}), make(chan struct{})
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Callback().Create().Before("gorm:create").Register("passkey_registration_barrier", func(tx *gorm.DB) {
+ if _, ok := tx.Statement.Dest.(*model.PasskeyCredential); ok {
+ close(registering)
+ <-release
+ }
+ }))
+ t.Cleanup(func() { _ = model.DB.Callback().Create().Remove("passkey_registration_barrier") })
+ rpID := "www.example.com"
+ registered, removed := make(chan error, 1), make(chan error, 1)
+ go func() {
+ registered <- model.RegisterPasskeyForSession(identity, &model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, RPID: &rpID, CredentialID: "concurrent", PublicKey: "key"})
+ }()
+ <-registering
+ removing := make(chan struct{})
+ go func() {
+ close(removing)
+ removed <- model.UpdateOption("passkey.legacy_rp_ids", "")
+ }()
+ <-removing
+ // A concurrent snapshot must remain read-only while the write is pending.
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"example.com", "www.example.com"}, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().RelyingPartyIDs())
+ close(release)
+ require.NoError(t, <-registered)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, <-removed, model.ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation)
+ stored, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.NotNil(t, stored.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, rpID, *stored.RPID)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainEndpointRequiresRoot(t *testing.T) {
+ user, _ := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ bundle, err := service.CreateLoginSession(user.Id, "password", "127.0.0.1", "domain-settings-test")
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ router := gin.New()
+ router.PUT("/api/option/passkey/domains", middleware.RootAuth(), UpdatePasskeyDomains)
+ for _, bearer := range []string{"", bundle.AccessToken} {
+ request := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPut, "/api/option/passkey/domains", strings.NewReader(`{"rp_id":"example.com","legacy_rp_ids":"","origins":"https://example.com","preview":true}`))
+ if bearer != "" {
+ request.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+bearer)
+ }
+ response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ router.ServeHTTP(response, request)
+ assert.Contains(t, []int{http.StatusUnauthorized, http.StatusForbidden}, response.Code)
+ }
+ options, err := model.AllOption()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Empty(t, options)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDefaultsDoNotRestrictUnrelatedServerAddressSetup(t *testing.T) {
+ setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.Enabled, settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins = false, "", "", ""
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = ""
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("ServerAddress", "http://127.0.0.1:3000"))
+ assert.Equal(t, "http://127.0.0.1:3000", system_setting.ServerAddress)
+ assert.Empty(t, settings.RPID)
+ assert.Empty(t, settings.LegacyRPIDs)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyRegistrationRejectsUnavailableRequestOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+ _, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.RPID = "www.example.com"
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = "example.com"
+ settings.Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ proof := issueSecurityEnrollmentProof(t, identity, service.VerificationOperation{Scope: "passkey.register"}, "password")
+ response := securityEnrollmentRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/user/passkey/register/begin", "", proof, identity, func(c *gin.Context) {
+ c.Request.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com")
+ PasskeyRegisterBegin(c)
+ })
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ assert.False(t, result.Success)
+ assert.Equal(t, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", result.Code)
+ var count int64
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Model(&model.AuthFlow{}).Where("purpose = ?", model.AuthFlowPurposePasskeyRegister).Count(&count).Error)
+ assert.Zero(t, count)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyRPIDRotationRetainsDefaultsAndRollsBackOnFailure(t *testing.T) {
+ setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs = "", ""
+ settings.Origins = "https://www.example.com,https://example.com,https://login.example.com"
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = "https://www.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(&model.Option{Key: "passkey.rp_id", Value: ""}).Error)
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.rp_id", "example.com"))
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"example.com", "www.example.com"}, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().RelyingPartyIDs())
+ // Simulate a second node with an older local cache. Persisted domains win.
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().RPID = "www.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.rp_id", "login.example.com"))
+ assert.Equal(t, []string{"login.example.com", "www.example.com", "example.com"}, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().RelyingPartyIDs())
+ before, err := model.AllOption()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ snapshot := system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot()
+ failure := errors.New("synthetic option write failure")
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Callback().Update().Before("gorm:update").Register("passkey_option_failure", func(tx *gorm.DB) {
+ if option, ok := tx.Statement.Dest.(*model.Option); ok && option.Key == "passkey.legacy_rp_ids" {
+ tx.AddError(failure)
+ }
+ }))
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.UpdateOptionsBulk(map[string]string{"passkey.rp_id": "next.example.com", "passkey.legacy_rp_ids": "www.example.com"}), failure)
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Callback().Update().Remove("passkey_option_failure"))
+ after, err := model.AllOption()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.ElementsMatch(t, before, after)
+ assert.Equal(t, snapshot, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot())
+ for _, invalid := range []string{"*.example.com", "https://example.com", "example.com:443", "example.com/path", "com"} {
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.rp_id", invalid), system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.legacy_rp_ids", invalid), system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
+ }
+ assert.Equal(t, snapshot, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot())
+ // Older settings accepted mixed case. Rotation must preserve its hash input.
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Model(&model.Option{}).Where(&model.Option{Key: "passkey.rp_id"}).Update("value", "WWW.example.com").Error)
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.rp_id", "next.example.com"))
+ assert.Contains(t, system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().RelyingPartyIDs(), "WWW.example.com")
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyRPIDRotationKeepsInFlightRegistration(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ proof := issueSecurityEnrollmentProof(t, identity, service.VerificationOperation{Scope: "passkey.register"}, "password")
+ begin := decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, securityEnrollmentRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/user/passkey/register/begin", "", proof, identity, PasskeyRegisterBegin))
+ assert.Equal(t, "example.com", begin.Options.PublicKey.RP.ID)
+ require.NoError(t, model.UpdateOption("passkey.rp_id", "www.example.com"))
+ key, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/register/finish", passkeyFinishRequest{FlowToken: begin.FlowToken, Credential: securityPasskeyResponse(t, key, begin.Options.PublicKey.Challenge, true, 0)}, identity, "https://example.com", PasskeyRegisterFinish)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ require.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ credential, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ require.NotNil(t, credential.RPID)
+ assert.Equal(t, "example.com", *credential.RPID)
+ // A later registration uses the current primary, not the retained domain.
+ wa, err := passkeysvc.BuildWebAuthn(httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "https://www.example.com/api/user/passkey/register/begin", nil))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ options, _, err := wa.BeginRegistration(passkeysvc.NewWebAuthnUser(user, credential))
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, "www.example.com", options.Response.RelyingParty.ID)
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainFailuresDoNotLogCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+ gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
+ var output bytes.Buffer
+ common.LogWriterMu.Lock()
+ previousWriter := gin.DefaultErrorWriter
+ gin.DefaultErrorWriter = &output
+ common.LogWriterMu.Unlock()
+ t.Cleanup(func() {
+ common.LogWriterMu.Lock()
+ gin.DefaultErrorWriter = previousWriter
+ common.LogWriterMu.Unlock()
+ })
+ response := securityEnrollmentRequest(http.MethodPost, "/api/user/passkey/login/finish", "", "", service.AuthIdentity{}, func(c *gin.Context) {
+ c.Set("passkey_rp_id", "www.example.com")
+ writeSecurityOperationError(c, protocol.ErrVerification.WithDetails("private-flow-token").WithInfo("private-challenge"))
+ })
+ assert.Contains(t, response.Body.String(), "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FAILED")
+ assert.Contains(t, output.String(), "verification_error")
+ assert.Contains(t, output.String(), "www.example.com")
+ for _, secret := range []string{"private-flow-token", "private-challenge"} {
+ assert.NotContains(t, response.Body.String(), secret)
+ assert.NotContains(t, output.String(), secret)
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyDomainErrorsRespectRequestLanguage(t *testing.T) {
+ user, _ := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ setupPasskeyDomainOptions(t)
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com"
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(&model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, CredentialID: "unknown-domain", PublicKey: "key"}).Error)
+ for _, locale := range []struct {
+ language, invalid, unavailable, removal string
+ }{
+ {"zh-CN", "通行密钥域名无效。请填写域名,不包含协议、端口、路径或通配符。", "此通行密钥域名无法在当前网站使用。请前往原网站或选择其他验证方式。", "请核对受影响的通行密钥并确认删除域名。配置或影响范围发生变化后,需要重新确认。"},
+ {"zh-TW", "通行金鑰網域無效。請填寫網域,不包含通訊協定、連接埠、路徑或萬用字元。", "此通行金鑰網域無法在目前網站使用。請前往原網站或選擇其他驗證方式。", "請核對受影響的通行金鑰並確認刪除網域。設定或影響範圍變更後,需要重新確認。"},
+ {"en", "Invalid Passkey domain. Enter a domain without a scheme, port, path or wildcard.", "This Passkey domain is not available on this website. Use its original website or another verification method.", "Review the affected Passkeys and confirm the domain removal. If the settings or impact have changed, confirmation is required again."},
+ } {
+ t.Run(locale.language, func(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, request := range []struct {
+ path, body, code, message string
+ handler gin.HandlerFunc
+ }{
+ {"/api/option/", `{"key":"passkey.rp_id","value":"localhost:3000"}`, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", locale.invalid, UpdateOption},
+ {"/api/option/", `{"key":"passkey.legacy_rp_ids","value":"localhost:3001"}`, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", locale.invalid, UpdateOption},
+ {"/api/option/", `{"key":"passkey.legacy_rp_ids","value":""}`, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_REMOVAL_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED", locale.removal, UpdateOption},
+ {"/api/user/passkey/login/begin", `{"rp_id":"unconfigured.example.com"}`, "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", locale.unavailable, PasskeyLoginBegin},
+ } {
+ response := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ c, _ := gin.CreateTestContext(response)
+ method := http.MethodPost
+ if request.path == "/api/option/" {
+ method = http.MethodPut
+ }
+ c.Request = httptest.NewRequest(method, request.path, strings.NewReader(request.body))
+ c.Request.Header.Set("Accept-Language", locale.language)
+ c.Request.Header.Set("Origin", "https://example.com")
+ c.Set("id", user.Id)
+ c.Set("role", common.RoleRootUser)
+ request.handler(c)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ expectedStatus := http.StatusOK
+ if request.code == "PASSKEY_RP_ID_REMOVAL_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED" {
+ expectedStatus = http.StatusConflict
+ }
+ assert.Equal(t, expectedStatus, response.Code)
+ assert.False(t, result.Success)
+ assert.Equal(t, request.code, result.Code)
+ assert.Equal(t, request.message, result.Message)
+ }
+ })
+ }
+}
+
+func TestPasskeyRPIDMigrationPreservesExistingCredentials(t *testing.T) {
+ for _, upgrade := range []bool{false, true} {
+ t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("upgrade=%t", upgrade), func(t *testing.T) {
+ user, identity := setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t)
+ key := newSecurityLoginPasskey(t, user.Id)
+ before, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ if upgrade {
+ // This schema is copied from the latest released model at
+ // v1.0.0-rc.36, with the same GORM and database driver versions.
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Migrator().DropTable(&model.PasskeyCredential{}))
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.AutoMigrate(&passkeyCredentialBeforeRPID{}))
+ encoded, err := common.Marshal(before)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ var legacy passkeyCredentialBeforeRPID
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(encoded, &legacy))
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.Create(&legacy).Error)
+ }
+ pool, err := model.DB.DB()
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ for range 2 {
+ // Each migration represents a new application startup. Discard
+ // PostgreSQL's old SELECT * prepared plans along with its old pool.
+ pool.SetMaxIdleConns(0)
+ pool.SetMaxIdleConns(2)
+ require.NoError(t, model.DB.AutoMigrate(&model.PasskeyCredential{}))
+ }
+ after, err := model.GetPasskeyByUserID(user.Id)
+ require.NoError(t, err)
+ assert.Equal(t, before, after)
+ assert.True(t, model.DB.Migrator().HasIndex(&model.PasskeyCredential{}, "idx_passkey_credentials_deleted_at"))
+ assert.Error(t, model.DB.Create(&model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id, CredentialID: "another-key", PublicKey: "key"}).Error)
+ assert.Error(t, model.DB.Create(&model.PasskeyCredential{UserID: user.Id + 1, CredentialID: before.CredentialID, PublicKey: "key"}).Error)
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().LegacyRPIDs = "www.example.com"
+ system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Origins = "https://example.com,https://www.example.com"
+ begin := decodePasskeyDomainBegin(t, passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/begin", map[string]string{"rp_id": "www.example.com"}, identity, "https://www.example.com", PasskeyLoginBegin))
+ response := passkeyDomainRequest(t, "/api/user/passkey/login/finish", map[string]any{"flow_token": begin.FlowToken, "credential": passkeyDomainAssertion(t, key, begin.Options.PublicKey.Challenge, "www.example.com", "https://www.example.com", user.Id, true)}, identity, "https://www.example.com", PasskeyLoginFinish)
+ var result securityEnrollmentResponse
+ require.NoError(t, common.Unmarshal(response.Body.Bytes(), &result))
+ assert.True(t, result.Success, response.Body.String())
+ })
+ }
+}
+
func (*passkeyTestBody) Close() error { return nil }
func TestParsePasskeyFinishRequestDoesNotRewriteRequestBody(t *testing.T) {
@@ -70,3 +763,26 @@ func TestPasskeyRegisterFinishRejectsUnapprovedFlowWithoutConsumingIt(t *testing
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Nil(t, flow.ConsumedAt)
}
+
+type passkeyCredentialBeforeRPID struct {
+ ID int `json:"id" gorm:"primaryKey"`
+ UserID int `json:"user_id" gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null"`
+ CredentialID string `json:"credential_id" gorm:"type:varchar(512);uniqueIndex;not null"` // base64 encoded
+ PublicKey string `json:"public_key" gorm:"type:text;not null"` // base64 encoded
+ AttestationType string `json:"attestation_type" gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
+ AAGUID string `json:"aaguid" gorm:"type:varchar(512)"` // base64 encoded
+ SignCount uint32 `json:"sign_count" gorm:"default:0"`
+ CloneWarning bool `json:"clone_warning"`
+ UserPresent bool `json:"user_present"`
+ UserVerified bool `json:"user_verified"`
+ BackupEligible bool `json:"backup_eligible"`
+ BackupState bool `json:"backup_state"`
+ Transports string `json:"transports" gorm:"type:text"`
+ Attachment string `json:"attachment" gorm:"type:varchar(32)"`
+ LastUsedAt *time.Time `json:"last_used_at"`
+ CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
+ UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
+ DeletedAt gorm.DeletedAt `json:"-" gorm:"index"`
+}
+
+func (passkeyCredentialBeforeRPID) TableName() string { return "passkey_credentials" }
diff --git a/controller/secure_verification.go b/controller/secure_verification.go
index 06dbd6b88..69c1aaf26 100644
--- a/controller/secure_verification.go
+++ b/controller/secure_verification.go
@@ -3,12 +3,18 @@ package controller
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
+ "slices"
+ "strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/i18n"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/logger"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/middleware"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/oauth"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
+ passkeysvc "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/passkey"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
)
@@ -34,6 +40,10 @@ func writeSecurityOperationError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
var code, message string
var protocolError *protocol.Error
switch {
+ case errors.Is(err, passkeysvc.ErrRPIDUnavailable):
+ code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDUnavailable)
+ case errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid):
+ code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailRestricted):
code, message = "EMAIL_ADDRESS_REJECTED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailAlreadyTaken):
@@ -112,6 +122,15 @@ func writeSecurityOperationError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
return
}
c.Set("security_error_code", code)
+ if strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/passkey/") {
+ reason := "verification_failed"
+ if errors.As(err, &protocolError) && slices.Contains([]string{"invalid_request", "challenge_mismatch", "parse_error", "auth_data", "verification_error", "invalid_signature", "invalid_key_type", "unsupported_key_algorithm"}, protocolError.Type) {
+ reason = protocolError.Type
+ }
+ // Protocol details can contain challenges and client-controlled data.
+ // Only fixed categories and the server-selected public RP ID are logged.
+ logger.LogWarn(c.Request.Context(), "passkey verification rejected: code=%s reason=%s rp_id=%q", code, reason, c.GetString("passkey_rp_id"))
+ }
c.JSON(status, gin.H{"success": false, "code": code, "message": message})
}
diff --git a/controller/security_enrollment_test.go b/controller/security_enrollment_test.go
index 1df088c0d..e0901ea86 100644
--- a/controller/security_enrollment_test.go
+++ b/controller/security_enrollment_test.go
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ func setupSecurityEnrollmentTest(t *testing.T) (*model.User, service.AuthIdentit
var version string
require.NoError(t, db.Raw(versionQuery).Scan(&version).Error)
t.Logf("database: %s %s", dialect, version)
- require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.UserSession{}, &model.TwoFA{}, &model.TwoFABackupCode{}, &model.PasskeyCredential{}, &model.AuthFlow{}, &model.UserOAuthBinding{}))
+ require.NoError(t, db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.UserSession{}, &model.TwoFA{}, &model.TwoFABackupCode{}, &model.PasskeyCredential{}, &model.AuthFlow{}, &model.UserOAuthBinding{}, &model.Option{}))
require.NoError(t, logDB.AutoMigrate(&model.AuditLog{}))
model.DB, model.LOG_DB = db, logDB
dbType := common.DatabaseTypeSQLite
diff --git a/i18n/keys.go b/i18n/keys.go
index c0948c1a2..98bac83d7 100644
--- a/i18n/keys.go
+++ b/i18n/keys.go
@@ -221,11 +221,14 @@ const (
// Passkey related messages
const (
- MsgPasskeyCreateFailed = "passkey.create_failed"
- MsgPasskeyLoginAbnormal = "passkey.login_abnormal"
- MsgPasskeyUpdateFailed = "passkey.update_failed"
- MsgPasskeyInvalidUserId = "passkey.invalid_user_id"
- MsgPasskeyVerifyFailed = "passkey.verify_failed"
+ MsgPasskeyCreateFailed = "passkey.create_failed"
+ MsgPasskeyLoginAbnormal = "passkey.login_abnormal"
+ MsgPasskeyUpdateFailed = "passkey.update_failed"
+ MsgPasskeyInvalidUserId = "passkey.invalid_user_id"
+ MsgPasskeyVerifyFailed = "passkey.verify_failed"
+ MsgPasskeyRPIDInvalid = "passkey.rp_id_invalid"
+ MsgPasskeyRPIDUnavailable = "passkey.rp_id_unavailable"
+ MsgPasskeyRPIDRemovalConfirmation = "passkey.rp_id_removal_confirmation"
)
// 2FA related messages
diff --git a/i18n/locales/en.yaml b/i18n/locales/en.yaml
index c5aa99091..3f2a6bc0f 100644
--- a/i18n/locales/en.yaml
+++ b/i18n/locales/en.yaml
@@ -195,6 +195,9 @@ passkey.login_abnormal: "Passkey login status is abnormal"
passkey.update_failed: "Passkey credential update failed"
passkey.invalid_user_id: "Invalid user ID"
passkey.verify_failed: "Passkey verification failed, please try again or contact administrator"
+passkey.rp_id_invalid: "Invalid Passkey domain. Enter a domain without a scheme, port, path or wildcard."
+passkey.rp_id_unavailable: "This Passkey domain is not available on this website. Use its original website or another verification method."
+passkey.rp_id_removal_confirmation: "Review the affected Passkeys and confirm the domain removal. If the settings or impact have changed, confirmation is required again."
# 2FA messages
twofa.not_enabled: "User has not enabled 2FA"
diff --git a/i18n/locales/zh-CN.yaml b/i18n/locales/zh-CN.yaml
index 646959eb1..574fe36e1 100644
--- a/i18n/locales/zh-CN.yaml
+++ b/i18n/locales/zh-CN.yaml
@@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ passkey.login_abnormal: "Passkey 登录状态异常"
passkey.update_failed: "Passkey 凭证更新失败"
passkey.invalid_user_id: "无效的用户 ID"
passkey.verify_failed: "Passkey 验证失败,请重试或联系管理员"
+passkey.rp_id_invalid: "通行密钥域名无效。请填写域名,不包含协议、端口、路径或通配符。"
+passkey.rp_id_unavailable: "此通行密钥域名无法在当前网站使用。请前往原网站或选择其他验证方式。"
+passkey.rp_id_removal_confirmation: "请核对受影响的通行密钥并确认删除域名。配置或影响范围发生变化后,需要重新确认。"
# 2FA messages
twofa.not_enabled: "用户未启用2FA"
diff --git a/i18n/locales/zh-TW.yaml b/i18n/locales/zh-TW.yaml
index 1a1b38c26..901611eef 100644
--- a/i18n/locales/zh-TW.yaml
+++ b/i18n/locales/zh-TW.yaml
@@ -196,6 +196,9 @@ passkey.login_abnormal: "Passkey 登錄狀態異常"
passkey.update_failed: "Passkey 憑證更新失敗"
passkey.invalid_user_id: "無效的使用者 ID"
passkey.verify_failed: "Passkey 驗證失敗,請重試或聯繫管理員"
+passkey.rp_id_invalid: "通行金鑰網域無效。請填寫網域,不包含通訊協定、連接埠、路徑或萬用字元。"
+passkey.rp_id_unavailable: "此通行金鑰網域無法在目前網站使用。請前往原網站或選擇其他驗證方式。"
+passkey.rp_id_removal_confirmation: "請核對受影響的通行金鑰並確認刪除網域。設定或影響範圍變更後,需要重新確認。"
# 2FA messages
twofa.not_enabled: "使用者未啟用2FA"
diff --git a/model/option.go b/model/option.go
index 1852d4404..24f0fd638 100644
--- a/model/option.go
+++ b/model/option.go
@@ -195,13 +195,21 @@ func InitOptionMap() {
}
func loadOptionsFromDatabase() {
+ passkeyOptionMutex.Lock()
+ defer passkeyOptionMutex.Unlock()
options, _ := AllOption()
+ passkeyOptions := make(map[string]string)
for _, option := range options {
+ if IsPasskeyDomainOption(option.Key) {
+ passkeyOptions[option.Key] = option.Value
+ continue
+ }
err := updateOptionMap(option.Key, option.Value)
if err != nil {
common.SysLog("failed to update option map: " + err.Error())
}
}
+ applyPasskeyDomainOptions(passkeyOptions)
}
func SyncOptions(frequency int) {
@@ -226,6 +234,10 @@ func validateOptionValue(key string, value string) error {
}
func UpdateOption(key string, value string) error {
+ if IsPasskeyDomainOption(key) {
+ _, err := UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(map[string]string{key: value}, false, "")
+ return err
+ }
if IsModelPricingOption(key) {
return UpdateModelPricingOptions(map[string]string{key: value})
}
@@ -256,6 +268,12 @@ func UpdateOptionsBulk(values map[string]string) error {
if len(values) == 0 {
return nil
}
+ for key := range values {
+ if IsPasskeyDomainOption(key) {
+ _, err := UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(values, false, "")
+ return err
+ }
+ }
for key, value := range values {
if err := validateOptionValue(key, value); err != nil {
return err
diff --git a/model/passkey.go b/model/passkey.go
index b38cbda29..b171b75d6 100644
--- a/model/passkey.go
+++ b/model/passkey.go
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/webauthn"
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ var (
type PasskeyCredential struct {
ID int `json:"id" gorm:"primaryKey"`
UserID int `json:"user_id" gorm:"uniqueIndex;not null"`
+ RPID *string `json:"rp_id,omitempty" gorm:"column:rp_id;type:varchar(253)"`
CredentialID string `json:"credential_id" gorm:"type:varchar(512);uniqueIndex;not null"` // base64 encoded
PublicKey string `json:"public_key" gorm:"type:text;not null"` // base64 encoded
AttestationType string `json:"attestation_type" gorm:"type:varchar(255)"`
@@ -161,29 +163,49 @@ func GetPasskeyByCredentialID(credentialID []byte) (*PasskeyCredential, error) {
// UpdatePasskeyAssertionState persists only fields produced by a successful
// assertion. Registration identity (credential ID, public key, AAGUID,
// transports and attestation metadata) is immutable on this path.
-func UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(userID int, credential *webauthn.Credential, lastUsedAt time.Time) error {
- if userID <= 0 || credential == nil || len(credential.ID) == 0 || lastUsedAt.IsZero() {
+func UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(userID int, credential *webauthn.Credential, lastUsedAt time.Time, rpID string) error {
+ if userID <= 0 || credential == nil || len(credential.ID) == 0 || lastUsedAt.IsZero() || rpID == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("Passkey 保存失败,请重试")
}
credentialID := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(credential.ID)
- result := DB.Model(&PasskeyCredential{}).
- Where("user_id = ? AND credential_id = ?", userID, credentialID).
- Updates(map[string]any{
- "sign_count": credential.Authenticator.SignCount,
- "clone_warning": credential.Authenticator.CloneWarning,
- "user_present": credential.Flags.UserPresent,
- "user_verified": credential.Flags.UserVerified,
- "backup_eligible": credential.Flags.BackupEligible,
- "backup_state": credential.Flags.BackupState,
- "last_used_at": lastUsedAt,
- })
- if result.Error != nil {
- return result.Error
- }
- if result.RowsAffected != 1 {
- return ErrPasskeyNotFound
- }
- return nil
+ passkeyOptionMutex.Lock()
+ defer passkeyOptionMutex.Unlock()
+ return DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+ if err := validatePasskeyRPIDWithTx(tx, rpID); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ var stored PasskeyCredential
+ if err := lockForUpdate(tx).Where("user_id = ? AND credential_id = ?", userID, credentialID).First(&stored).Error; err != nil {
+ if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
+ return ErrPasskeyNotFound
+ }
+ return err
+ }
+ // Compare in Go: the database collation may fold historical case.
+ if stored.RPID != nil && *stored.RPID != "" && *stored.RPID != rpID {
+ return system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ result := tx.Model(&PasskeyCredential{}).
+ Where("user_id = ? AND credential_id = ?", userID, credentialID).
+ Where("rp_id IS NULL OR rp_id = ? OR rp_id = ?", "", rpID).
+ Updates(map[string]any{
+ "rp_id": rpID,
+ "sign_count": credential.Authenticator.SignCount,
+ "clone_warning": credential.Authenticator.CloneWarning,
+ "user_present": credential.Flags.UserPresent,
+ "user_verified": credential.Flags.UserVerified,
+ "backup_eligible": credential.Flags.BackupEligible,
+ "backup_state": credential.Flags.BackupState,
+ "last_used_at": lastUsedAt,
+ })
+ if result.Error != nil {
+ return result.Error
+ }
+ if result.RowsAffected != 1 {
+ return ErrPasskeyNotFound
+ }
+ return nil
+ })
}
func upsertPasskeyCredentialWithTx(tx *gorm.DB, credential *PasskeyCredential) error {
@@ -212,7 +234,17 @@ func upsertPasskeyCredentialWithAuthVersion(credential *PasskeyCredential, ident
if credential == nil || credential.UserID <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("Passkey 保存失败,请重试")
}
+ passkeyOptionMutex.Lock()
+ defer passkeyOptionMutex.Unlock()
if err := DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+ if identity != nil && (credential.RPID == nil || *credential.RPID == "") {
+ return system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ if credential.RPID != nil && *credential.RPID != "" {
+ if err := validatePasskeyRPIDWithTx(tx, *credential.RPID); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
if identity != nil {
if identity.UserID != credential.UserID {
return ErrUserSessionInactive
diff --git a/model/passkey_option.go b/model/passkey_option.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..09a580f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/model/passkey_option.go
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+package model
+
+import (
+ "crypto/hmac"
+ "errors"
+ "maps"
+ "slices"
+ "strings"
+ "sync"
+
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
+ "gorm.io/gorm"
+ "gorm.io/gorm/clause"
+)
+
+var passkeyOptionMutex sync.Mutex
+var errPasskeyDomainPreview = errors.New("passkey domain preview")
+var ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation = errors.New("Review the affected Passkeys and confirm the domain removal.")
+
+// PasskeyDomainChange is both the preview and the authoritative saved result.
+// Unknown credentials may belong to a removed domain; they are not a known loss.
+type PasskeyDomainChange struct {
+ RPID string `json:"rp_id"`
+ LegacyRPIDs string `json:"legacy_rp_ids"`
+ Origins string `json:"origins"`
+ PreviousRPID string `json:"previous_rp_id"`
+ EffectiveRPID string `json:"effective_rp_id"`
+ RemovedRPIDs []string `json:"removed_rp_ids"`
+ AffectedCredentials int64 `json:"affected_credentials"`
+ UnknownCredentials int64 `json:"unknown_credentials"`
+ ConfirmationRequired bool `json:"confirmation_required"`
+ RemovalConfirmation string `json:"removal_confirmation"`
+}
+
+type PasskeyDomainRemovalError struct {
+ Change *PasskeyDomainChange
+}
+
+func (e *PasskeyDomainRemovalError) Error() string {
+ return ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation.Error()
+}
+func (e *PasskeyDomainRemovalError) Unwrap() error { return ErrPasskeyDomainRemovalConfirmation }
+
+// ServerAddress and origins participate because either can change an implicit RP ID.
+func IsPasskeyDomainOption(key string) bool {
+ return key == "passkey.rp_id" || key == "passkey.legacy_rp_ids" || key == "passkey.origins" || key == "ServerAddress"
+}
+
+// lockPasskeyDomainSettings serializes trust changes and credential writes across
+// nodes. Callers also hold passkeyOptionMutex for SQLite and local cache ordering.
+// Always acquire these option rows before any user/session/credential row locks.
+func lockPasskeyDomainSettings(tx *gorm.DB) (system_setting.PasskeySettings, string, error) {
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RLock()
+ settings, serverAddress := *system_setting.GetPasskeySettings(), system_setting.ServerAddress
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RUnlock()
+ rows := []Option{
+ {Key: "ServerAddress", Value: serverAddress},
+ {Key: "passkey.legacy_rp_ids", Value: settings.LegacyRPIDs},
+ {Key: "passkey.origins", Value: settings.Origins},
+ {Key: "passkey.rp_id", Value: settings.RPID},
+ }
+ // The first write also acquires SQLite's writer lock before any reads.
+ if err := tx.Clauses(clause.OnConflict{DoNothing: true}).Create(&rows).Error; err != nil {
+ return settings, serverAddress, err
+ }
+ for i := range rows {
+ if err := lockForUpdate(tx).Where(&Option{Key: rows[i].Key}).First(&rows[i]).Error; err != nil {
+ return settings, serverAddress, err
+ }
+ }
+ serverAddress = rows[0].Value
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins, settings.RPID = rows[1].Value, rows[2].Value, rows[3].Value
+ return settings, serverAddress, nil
+}
+
+func validatePasskeyRPIDWithTx(tx *gorm.DB, rpID string) error {
+ settings, serverAddress, err := lockPasskeyDomainSettings(tx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ // Preserve the existing request-derived default only when no domain or
+ // origin has ever been configured. Finish still checks the signed origin.
+ if settings.RPID == "" && settings.LegacyRPIDs == "" && settings.Origins == "" && serverAddress == "" {
+ return nil
+ }
+ if !slices.Contains(settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress).RelyingPartyIDs(), rpID) {
+ return system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ return nil
+}
+
+// UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions keeps every supplied option in one transaction,
+// including unrelated keys from UpdateOptionsBulk. Preview rolls back even the
+// initial default rows and never publishes a local configuration change.
+func UpdatePasskeyDomainOptions(values map[string]string, preview bool, confirmation string) (*PasskeyDomainChange, error) {
+ passkeyOptionMutex.Lock()
+ defer passkeyOptionMutex.Unlock()
+ values = maps.Clone(values)
+ for key, value := range values {
+ if err := validateOptionValue(key, value); err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ }
+ var change *PasskeyDomainChange
+ err := DB.Transaction(func(tx *gorm.DB) error {
+ settings, serverAddress, err := lockPasskeyDomainSettings(tx)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ previous := settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress)
+ before := [4]string{serverAddress, settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins}
+ if value, changed := values["ServerAddress"]; changed {
+ serverAddress = value
+ }
+ if value, changed := values["passkey.origins"]; changed {
+ origins := []string{}
+ for _, origin := range strings.FieldsFunc(value, func(c rune) bool { return c == ',' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' }) {
+ origin = strings.TrimSpace(origin)
+ if origin != "" && !slices.Contains(origins, origin) {
+ origins = append(origins, origin)
+ }
+ }
+ settings.Origins = strings.Join(origins, ",")
+ } else if before[0] != serverAddress && (settings.Origins == "" || settings.Origins == "[]") {
+ // Retain the previously trusted implicit website as well as the new
+ // default, so retaining its RP ID does not leave its keys unusable.
+ origins := []string{}
+ for _, origin := range []string{previous.Origins, settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress).Origins} {
+ if origin != "" && !slices.Contains(origins, origin) {
+ origins = append(origins, origin)
+ }
+ }
+ settings.Origins = strings.Join(origins, ",")
+ }
+ if value, changed := values["passkey.rp_id"]; changed {
+ settings.RPID = strings.TrimSpace(value)
+ if settings.RPID != "" {
+ settings.RPID, err = system_setting.NormalizePasskeyRPID(settings.RPID, settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress).Origins)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if value, changed := values["passkey.legacy_rp_ids"]; changed {
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = value
+ }
+ effective := settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress)
+ legacy, err := system_setting.ParsePasskeyRPIDs(settings.LegacyRPIDs, effective.Origins)
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ oldRPID, nextRPID := previous.EffectiveRPID(), effective.EffectiveRPID()
+ _, previousDomainError := system_setting.NormalizePasskeyRPID(oldRPID, previous.Origins)
+ if previousDomainError == nil && oldRPID != nextRPID && !slices.Contains(legacy, oldRPID) {
+ legacy = append(legacy, oldRPID)
+ }
+ settings.LegacyRPIDs = strings.Join(legacy, ",")
+ // Validate retained single-label domains against the complete proposed
+ // origin set too. Do not normalize their historical hash inputs.
+ if _, err := system_setting.ParsePasskeyRPIDs(settings.LegacyRPIDs, effective.Origins); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ // ServerAddress also supports non-WebAuthn deployments (for example an
+ // IP during initial setup). Restrict explicit RP IDs, not that URL.
+ if settings.RPID != "" {
+ if _, err := system_setting.NormalizePasskeyRPID(nextRPID, effective.Origins); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ change = &PasskeyDomainChange{
+ RPID: settings.RPID, LegacyRPIDs: settings.LegacyRPIDs, Origins: settings.Origins,
+ PreviousRPID: oldRPID, EffectiveRPID: nextRPID, RemovedRPIDs: []string{},
+ }
+ nextIDs := settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress).RelyingPartyIDs()
+ for _, id := range previous.RelyingPartyIDs() {
+ if !slices.Contains(nextIDs, id) {
+ change.RemovedRPIDs = append(change.RemovedRPIDs, id)
+ }
+ }
+ if len(change.RemovedRPIDs) > 0 {
+ // MySQL may compare/group text case-insensitively. Select only
+ // candidate RP values, then count exact bytes without credential IDs.
+ rows, err := tx.Model(&PasskeyCredential{}).Select("rp_id").
+ Where("rp_id IS NULL OR rp_id = ? OR rp_id IN ?", "", change.RemovedRPIDs).Rows()
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ defer rows.Close()
+ for rows.Next() {
+ var rpID *string
+ if err := rows.Scan(&rpID); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if rpID == nil || *rpID == "" {
+ change.UnknownCredentials++
+ } else if slices.Contains(change.RemovedRPIDs, *rpID) {
+ change.AffectedCredentials++
+ }
+ }
+ if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ if err := rows.Close(); err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ change.ConfirmationRequired = change.AffectedCredentials > 0 || change.UnknownCredentials > 0
+ // This is an intent/freshness binding, not an authentication credential.
+ // Root authorization remains mandatory. No map iteration affects its hash.
+ payload, err := common.Marshal(struct {
+ Before [4]string
+ After [4]string
+ Removed []string
+ Known, Unknown int64
+ }{before, [4]string{serverAddress, settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins}, change.RemovedRPIDs, change.AffectedCredentials, change.UnknownCredentials})
+ if err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ change.RemovalConfirmation = common.GenerateHMACWithKey([]byte("passkey-domains-v1:"+common.SessionSecret), string(payload))
+ if preview {
+ return errPasskeyDomainPreview
+ }
+ if (change.ConfirmationRequired || confirmation != "") && !hmac.Equal([]byte(confirmation), []byte(change.RemovalConfirmation)) {
+ return &PasskeyDomainRemovalError{Change: change}
+ }
+ values["passkey.rp_id"], values["passkey.legacy_rp_ids"], values["passkey.origins"] = settings.RPID, settings.LegacyRPIDs, settings.Origins
+ values["ServerAddress"] = serverAddress
+ keys := slices.Sorted(maps.Keys(values))
+ for _, key := range keys {
+ if err := tx.Save(&Option{Key: key, Value: values[key]}).Error; err != nil {
+ return err
+ }
+ }
+ return nil
+ })
+ if errors.Is(err, errPasskeyDomainPreview) {
+ return change, nil
+ }
+ if err != nil {
+ return change, err
+ }
+ applyPasskeyDomainOptions(values)
+ for key, value := range values {
+ if !IsPasskeyDomainOption(key) {
+ if err := updateOptionMap(key, value); err != nil {
+ return change, err
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return change, nil
+}
+
+func applyPasskeyDomainOptions(values map[string]string) {
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.Lock()
+ defer common.OptionMapRWMutex.Unlock()
+ if common.OptionMap == nil {
+ common.OptionMap = make(map[string]string)
+ }
+ for _, key := range []string{"ServerAddress", "passkey.legacy_rp_ids", "passkey.origins", "passkey.rp_id"} {
+ if value, ok := values[key]; ok {
+ common.OptionMap[key] = value
+ if key == "ServerAddress" {
+ system_setting.ServerAddress = value
+ } else {
+ handleConfigUpdate(key, value)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/model/user_authentication_test.go b/model/user_authentication_test.go
index 6f5149969..fdf6700d8 100644
--- a/model/user_authentication_test.go
+++ b/model/user_authentication_test.go
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
+ "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/go-redis/redis/v8"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/webauthn"
"github.com/pquerna/otp/totp"
@@ -260,6 +261,22 @@ func TestSecurityFactorMutationsAdvanceUserAuthVersion(t *testing.T) {
func TestUpdatePasskeyAssertionStateCannotRewriteRegistrationIdentity(t *testing.T) {
truncateTables(t)
+ require.NoError(t, DB.AutoMigrate(&Option{}))
+ previousSettings := *system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
+ domainKeys := map[string]any{"key": []string{"ServerAddress", "passkey.rp_id", "passkey.legacy_rp_ids", "passkey.origins"}}
+ var previousOptions []Option
+ require.NoError(t, DB.Where(domainKeys).Find(&previousOptions).Error)
+ t.Cleanup(func() {
+ *system_setting.GetPasskeySettings() = previousSettings
+ require.NoError(t, DB.Where(domainKeys).Delete(&Option{}).Error)
+ if len(previousOptions) > 0 {
+ require.NoError(t, DB.Create(&previousOptions).Error)
+ }
+ })
+ *system_setting.GetPasskeySettings() = system_setting.PasskeySettings{RPID: "example.com", Origins: "https://example.com"}
+ for _, option := range []Option{{Key: "passkey.rp_id", Value: "example.com"}, {Key: "passkey.legacy_rp_ids", Value: ""}, {Key: "passkey.origins", Value: "https://example.com"}} {
+ require.NoError(t, DB.Save(&option).Error)
+ }
user := User{Username: "passkey-assertion-state", Password: "password", AuthVersion: 1}
require.NoError(t, DB.Create(&user).Error)
@@ -292,7 +309,7 @@ func TestUpdatePasskeyAssertionStateCannotRewriteRegistrationIdentity(t *testing
CloneWarning: true,
},
}
- require.NoError(t, UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validated, usedAt))
+ require.NoError(t, UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validated, usedAt, "example.com"))
var updated PasskeyCredential
require.NoError(t, DB.First(&updated, stored.ID).Error)
@@ -312,7 +329,7 @@ func TestUpdatePasskeyAssertionStateCannotRewriteRegistrationIdentity(t *testing
assert.Equal(t, usedAt.Unix(), updated.LastUsedAt.Unix())
validated.ID = []byte("another-credential")
- assert.ErrorIs(t, UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validated, usedAt), ErrPasskeyNotFound)
+ assert.ErrorIs(t, UpdatePasskeyAssertionState(user.Id, validated, usedAt, "example.com"), ErrPasskeyNotFound)
}
func assertUserAuthVersion(t *testing.T, userID int, expected int64) {
diff --git a/router/api-router.go b/router/api-router.go
index 18d37f92b..b6b80fd3e 100644
--- a/router/api-router.go
+++ b/router/api-router.go
@@ -205,6 +205,7 @@ func SetApiRouter(router *gin.Engine) {
{
optionRoute.GET("/", controller.GetOptions)
optionRoute.PUT("/", controller.UpdateOption)
+ optionRoute.PUT("/passkey/domains", controller.UpdatePasskeyDomains)
optionRoute.GET("/model_pricing", controller.GetModelPricingConfig)
optionRoute.PATCH("/model_pricing", controller.UpdateModelPricingConfig)
optionRoute.POST("/model_pricing/convert", controller.PreviewModelPricingConversion)
diff --git a/service/account_security.go b/service/account_security.go
index 9e407f3ed..436cfd396 100644
--- a/service/account_security.go
+++ b/service/account_security.go
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import (
func UnbindAccountOAuth(identity AuthIdentity, providerID int) error {
enabled := model.AccountLoginMethods{
Password: common.PasswordLoginEnabled,
- Passkey: system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled,
+ Passkey: system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled,
WeChat: common.WeChatAuthEnabled,
}
for _, provider := range oauth.GetAllProviders() {
diff --git a/service/passkey/service.go b/service/passkey/service.go
index 243eae3f6..39c020e5c 100644
--- a/service/passkey/service.go
+++ b/service/passkey/service.go
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
+ "slices"
"strings"
"time"
@@ -16,27 +17,45 @@ import (
webauthn "github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/webauthn"
)
+var ErrRPIDUnavailable = system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable
+
// BuildWebAuthn constructs a WebAuthn instance using the current passkey settings and request context.
func BuildWebAuthn(r *http.Request) (*webauthn.WebAuthn, error) {
- settings := system_setting.GetPasskeySettings()
- if settings == nil {
- return nil, errors.New("未找到 Passkey 设置")
- }
+ return BuildWebAuthnForRPID(r, "")
+}
+
+// BuildWebAuthnForRPID uses a single configured RP ID, never a list of IDs to
+// try against the same signed response. An empty ID is for new registrations.
+func BuildWebAuthnForRPID(r *http.Request, selectedRPID string) (*webauthn.WebAuthn, error) {
+ settings := system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot()
displayName := strings.TrimSpace(settings.RPDisplayName)
if displayName == "" {
displayName = common.SystemName
}
- origins, err := resolveOrigins(r, settings)
+ origins, err := resolveOrigins(r, &settings)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
- rpID, err := resolveRPID(r, settings, origins)
+ rpID, err := resolveRPID(r, &settings, origins)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
+ if selectedRPID != "" && selectedRPID != rpID {
+ if !slices.Contains(settings.RelyingPartyIDs(), selectedRPID) {
+ return nil, ErrRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ rpID = selectedRPID
+ }
+ origins = originsForRPID(origins, rpID)
+ if len(origins) == 0 {
+ return nil, ErrRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ if origin := r.Header.Get("Origin"); origin != "" && !protocol.IsOriginInHaystack(origin, origins) {
+ return nil, ErrRPIDUnavailable
+ }
selection := protocol.AuthenticatorSelection{
ResidentKey: protocol.ResidentKeyRequirementRequired,
@@ -73,6 +92,71 @@ func BuildWebAuthn(r *http.Request) (*webauthn.WebAuthn, error) {
return webauthn.New(config)
}
+// BuildLoginWebAuthn gives a known credential's binding precedence over a
+// browser's last-successful-domain hint. All choices remain server controlled.
+func BuildLoginWebAuthn(r *http.Request, hint, credentialRPID string) (*webauthn.WebAuthn, []string, error) {
+ settings := system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot()
+ origins, err := resolveOrigins(r, &settings)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ primary, err := resolveRPID(r, &settings, origins)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, nil, err
+ }
+ configured := append([]string{primary}, settings.RelyingPartyIDs()...)
+ available := []string{}
+ for _, id := range configured {
+ if credentialRPID != "" && id != credentialRPID {
+ continue
+ }
+ allowedOrigins := originsForRPID(origins, id)
+ if len(allowedOrigins) == 0 || (r.Header.Get("Origin") != "" && !protocol.IsOriginInHaystack(r.Header.Get("Origin"), allowedOrigins)) {
+ continue
+ }
+ if !slices.Contains(available, id) {
+ available = append(available, id)
+ }
+ }
+ if len(available) == 0 {
+ return nil, nil, ErrRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ selected := credentialRPID
+ if selected == "" {
+ selected = hint
+ }
+ if selected == "" {
+ selected = available[0]
+ }
+ if !slices.Contains(available, selected) {
+ return nil, nil, ErrRPIDUnavailable
+ }
+ wa, err := BuildWebAuthnForRPID(r, selected)
+ return wa, available, err
+}
+
+func originsForRPID(origins []string, rpID string) []string {
+ allowed := []string{}
+ for _, origin := range origins {
+ parsed, err := url.Parse(origin)
+ if err != nil || (parsed.Scheme != "https" && parsed.Scheme != "http") || parsed.User != nil {
+ continue
+ }
+ host := strings.ToLower(parsed.Hostname())
+ domain := strings.ToLower(rpID)
+ if !strings.Contains(domain, ".") && domain != "localhost" {
+ if host == domain && parsed.Scheme == "https" {
+ allowed = append(allowed, origin)
+ }
+ continue
+ }
+ if host == domain || strings.HasSuffix(host, "."+domain) {
+ allowed = append(allowed, origin)
+ }
+ }
+ return allowed
+}
+
func resolveOrigins(r *http.Request, settings *system_setting.PasskeySettings) ([]string, error) {
originsStr := strings.TrimSpace(settings.Origins)
if originsStr != "" {
diff --git a/service/passkey/session.go b/service/passkey/session.go
index b138ba55a..c38de9873 100644
--- a/service/passkey/session.go
+++ b/service/passkey/session.go
@@ -72,6 +72,12 @@ func PopSessionDataFlow(token, purpose string, identity model.AuthSessionIdentit
if err := common.UnmarshalJsonStr(flow.Payload, &payload); err != nil {
return err
}
+ if payload.SessionData.RelyingPartyID == "" || payload.SessionData.Expires.IsZero() {
+ return model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid
+ }
+ if !time.Now().Before(payload.SessionData.Expires) {
+ return model.ErrAuthFlowExpired
+ }
if purpose == model.AuthFlowPurposePasskeyLogin {
return nil
}
diff --git a/service/security_verification.go b/service/security_verification.go
index b2fd984e0..3006a6784 100644
--- a/service/security_verification.go
+++ b/service/security_verification.go
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ func securityVerificationPolicy(scope string, state model.UserVerificationState)
if method == VerificationMethodTwoFA && state.TwoFALocked {
option.Available, option.Reason = false, ErrVerificationLocked.Error()
}
- if !system_setting.GetPasskeySettings().Enabled && (method == VerificationMethodPasskey || scope == VerificationScopePasskeyRegister) {
+ if !system_setting.PasskeySettingsSnapshot().Enabled && (method == VerificationMethodPasskey || scope == VerificationScopePasskeyRegister) {
option.Available, option.Reason = false, "Passkey authentication is disabled."
}
options = append(options, option)
diff --git a/setting/system_setting/passkey.go b/setting/system_setting/passkey.go
index 41855898c..171a3351f 100644
--- a/setting/system_setting/passkey.go
+++ b/setting/system_setting/passkey.go
@@ -1,23 +1,138 @@
package system_setting
import (
+ "errors"
+ "net"
"net/url"
+ "slices"
"strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/config"
+ "golang.org/x/net/idna"
+ "golang.org/x/net/publicsuffix"
)
type PasskeySettings struct {
Enabled bool `json:"enabled"`
RPDisplayName string `json:"rp_display_name"`
RPID string `json:"rp_id"`
+ LegacyRPIDs string `json:"legacy_rp_ids"`
Origins string `json:"origins"`
AllowInsecureOrigin bool `json:"allow_insecure_origin"`
UserVerification string `json:"user_verification"`
AttachmentPreference string `json:"attachment_preference"`
}
+var ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid = errors.New("Invalid Passkey domain. Enter a domain without a scheme, port, path or wildcard.")
+var ErrPasskeyRPIDUnavailable = errors.New("This Passkey domain is not available on this website. Use its original website or another verification method.")
+
+// PasskeySettingsSnapshot includes the effective defaults without sharing a
+// mutable settings pointer with a WebAuthn ceremony.
+func PasskeySettingsSnapshot() PasskeySettings {
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RLock()
+ settings, serverAddress := defaultPasskeySettings, ServerAddress
+ common.OptionMapRWMutex.RUnlock()
+ return settings.WithDefaults(serverAddress)
+}
+
+// EffectiveRPID preserves the existing default and port handling for settings
+// created before explicit Passkey domains were introduced.
+func (s PasskeySettings) EffectiveRPID() string {
+ rpID := strings.TrimSpace(s.RPID)
+ if rpID == "" {
+ for origin := range strings.SplitSeq(s.Origins, ",") {
+ if parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(origin)); err == nil && parsed.Host != "" {
+ rpID = parsed.Host
+ break
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(rpID); err == nil {
+ return host
+ }
+ return rpID
+}
+
+func NormalizePasskeyRPID(value string, configuredOrigins ...string) (string, error) {
+ rpID, err := idna.Lookup.ToASCII(strings.TrimSpace(value))
+ rpID = strings.ToLower(rpID)
+ if err != nil || rpID == "" || len(rpID) > 253 || strings.ContainsAny(rpID, ":/*@?#\\") || net.ParseIP(rpID) != nil {
+ return "", ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid
+ }
+ for label := range strings.SplitSeq(rpID, ".") {
+ if label == "" || len(label) > 63 || label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
+ return "", ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid
+ }
+ for _, c := range label {
+ if c != '-' && (c < 'a' || c > 'z') && (c < '0' || c > '9') {
+ return "", ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if rpID == "localhost" {
+ return rpID, nil
+ }
+ if _, err := publicsuffix.EffectiveTLDPlusOne(rpID); err == nil {
+ return rpID, nil
+ }
+ // An unknown single-label hostname is usable only at its exact, explicitly
+ // trusted HTTPS origin, never as a suffix of other hosts.
+ _, icann := publicsuffix.PublicSuffix(rpID)
+ if icann || strings.Contains(rpID, ".") {
+ return "", ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid
+ }
+ for _, origins := range configuredOrigins {
+ for origin := range strings.SplitSeq(origins, ",") {
+ parsed, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(origin))
+ if err != nil || parsed.Scheme != "https" || parsed.User != nil || (parsed.Path != "" && parsed.Path != "/") || parsed.RawQuery != "" || parsed.Fragment != "" {
+ continue
+ }
+ if strings.EqualFold(parsed.Hostname(), rpID) {
+ return rpID, nil
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return "", ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid
+}
+
+func ParsePasskeyRPIDs(value string, configuredOrigins ...string) ([]string, error) {
+ ids := []string{}
+ for _, value := range strings.FieldsFunc(value, func(c rune) bool { return c == ',' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' }) {
+ if strings.TrimSpace(value) == "" {
+ continue
+ }
+ _, err := NormalizePasskeyRPID(value, configuredOrigins...)
+ if err != nil {
+ return nil, err
+ }
+ // Legacy credentials hash the exact RP ID supplied at registration.
+ // Validate the domain without changing that historical value.
+ id := strings.TrimSpace(value)
+ if !slices.Contains(ids, id) {
+ ids = append(ids, id)
+ }
+ }
+ return ids, nil
+}
+
+func (s PasskeySettings) RelyingPartyIDs() []string {
+ ids := []string{}
+ if primary := s.EffectiveRPID(); primary != "" {
+ ids = append(ids, primary)
+ }
+ legacy, err := ParsePasskeyRPIDs(s.LegacyRPIDs, s.Origins)
+ if err != nil {
+ return ids
+ }
+ for _, id := range legacy {
+ if !slices.Contains(ids, id) {
+ ids = append(ids, id)
+ }
+ }
+ return ids
+}
+
var defaultPasskeySettings = PasskeySettings{
Enabled: false,
RPDisplayName: common.SystemName,
@@ -33,18 +148,22 @@ func init() {
}
func GetPasskeySettings() *PasskeySettings {
- if defaultPasskeySettings.RPID == "" && ServerAddress != "" {
- // 从ServerAddress提取域名作为RPID
- // ServerAddress可能是 "https://newapi.pro" 这种格式
- serverAddr := strings.TrimSpace(ServerAddress)
- if parsed, err := url.Parse(serverAddr); err == nil && parsed.Host != "" {
- defaultPasskeySettings.RPID = parsed.Host
- } else {
- defaultPasskeySettings.RPID = serverAddr
- }
- }
- if defaultPasskeySettings.Origins == "" || defaultPasskeySettings.Origins == "[]" {
- defaultPasskeySettings.Origins = ServerAddress
- }
return &defaultPasskeySettings
}
+
+func (s PasskeySettings) WithDefaults(serverAddress string) PasskeySettings {
+ if s.RPID == "" && serverAddress != "" {
+ // 从ServerAddress提取域名作为RPID
+ // ServerAddress可能是 "https://newapi.pro" 这种格式
+ serverAddr := strings.TrimSpace(serverAddress)
+ if parsed, err := url.Parse(serverAddr); err == nil && parsed.Host != "" {
+ s.RPID = parsed.Host
+ } else {
+ s.RPID = serverAddr
+ }
+ }
+ if s.Origins == "" || s.Origins == "[]" {
+ s.Origins = serverAddress
+ }
+ return s
+}
diff --git a/web/src/features/auth/passkey/__tests__/domain-verification.test.tsx b/web/src/features/auth/passkey/__tests__/domain-verification.test.tsx
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3b87e4a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/web/src/features/auth/passkey/__tests__/domain-verification.test.tsx
@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+/*
+Copyright (C) 2023-2026 QuantumNous
+
+This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU Affero General Public License as
+published by the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the
+License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+GNU Affero General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU Affero General Public License
+along with this program. If not, see
+ {t(
+ 'Choose the domain used when this Passkey was created, then try again.'
+ )}
+
+ {t(
+ 'If your Passkey belongs to another website, start sign-in there:'
+ )}
+
{t('Passkey is not supported on this device.')}
diff --git a/web/src/features/system-settings/api.ts b/web/src/features/system-settings/api.ts
index 9e9c9a7f2..dc05ed341 100644
--- a/web/src/features/system-settings/api.ts
+++ b/web/src/features/system-settings/api.ts
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ import type {
SystemTaskResponse,
UpdateOptionRequest,
UpdateOptionResponse,
+ UpdatePasskeyDomainsRequest,
+ UpdatePasskeyDomainsResponse,
UpstreamChannelsResponse,
UpstreamRatiosResponse,
} from './types'
@@ -41,6 +43,20 @@ export async function updateSystemOption(request: UpdateOptionRequest) {
return res.data
}
+export async function updatePasskeyDomains(
+ request: UpdatePasskeyDomainsRequest
+) {
+ const res = await api.put