Require scoped, single-use verification for account bindings and password
operations. Bind OAuth authorization and email confirmations to the initiating
session; preserve the last usable login method and audit operation outcomes.
Apply Unicode-aware password length limits, Argon2id writes with bcrypt
compatibility, and long-password encryption.
Return has_password with the existing profile SELECT without extra queries.
Reuse the existing security dialogs and add all seven locale translations.
Validation:
- Go: go test ./common ./model ./service ./middleware ./controller ./router -count=1
- DB: SQLite 3.50.4, MySQL 8.4.11, PostgreSQL 16.15; separate main/log databases
- MySQL/PostgreSQL: TEST_SECURITY_DIALECT=<dialect> with TEST_<DIALECT>_DSN,
go test ./controller -run '^(TestSecurityAccount|TestSecurityEnrollment|TestGenerateOAuthCode|TestOAuthBind|TestTelegramOAuth)' -count=1 -v
- Web: relevant Vitest suites, bun run typecheck, targeted oxlint/format,
bun run i18n:sync, and bun run build
Roll out dual-format readers to every instance with
ACCOUNT_PASSWORD_HASH_ALGORITHM=bcrypt before enabling Argon2id writes
and the new UI. Rollbacks must retain Argon2id and v2 envelope readers.
Relevant controls: ASVS 5.0.0 6.2.1-6.2.3, 6.2.5-6.2.9, 6.3.7, 7.4.3, 7.5.1;
this change does not assert application-wide ASVS certification.
Use authorization code flow with PKCE and verified ID tokens for Telegram login, binding, and security verification. Preserve existing bindings and require administrator OAuth configuration.
Keep the restricted WeChat first-enrollment session proof, fix missing-target authentication errors, and preserve callback requests after OAuth popups close.
* fix: purge authentication data on hard user deletion
* fix: fail closed when 2FA status lookup fails
* fix: reject stale Telegram login callbacks
* fix(twofa): prevent concurrent backup code and lockout bypasses
* fix(auth): harden user deletion and Telegram verification
CaIon