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* feat(i18n): translate web console messages in the frontend and AI-client errors in the backend
Chinese text was hard-coded in API messages, stored log content, emails and
server logs, so it reached users of every interface language.
Text is now translated where its reader is:
- Web console APIs return the English source text as message_key with
message_params, and the web console translates it in all seven languages.
message keeps the English text for other API callers.
- Errors returned to AI clients, emails and notifications are translated by
the backend (en, zh-CN, zh-TW) in the language saved on the account, then
the language of the request's Accept-Language header.
- A reader who states no language still gets the original Chinese text of the
messages that were Chinese before, word for word. Gateways that use another
new-api as their upstream match that text, for example to disable a channel
whose account ran out of quota.
- Usage, top-up and system log content is stored as content_parts (key and
params) and rendered in the viewer's language. Task fail reasons and refund
reasons written by the gateway are English keys. Rows written earlier are
shown as before.
- Server logs are English.
Also:
- The saved interface language zhTW, and zh-HK, zh-MO and zh-Hant, now select
Traditional Chinese in the backend instead of Simplified Chinese.
- The built-in group descriptions are translated; descriptions an
administrator saved are shown as written.
- .agents/rules/i18n.md records the conventions. Tests in i18n/ fail on a
non-English string literal, on a web console message without translations
and on a locale key without a constant.
* feat(i18n): print server logs in Chinese when LOG_LANGUAGE asks for it
Server log lines are English by default. With LOG_LANGUAGE=zh-CN, the lines
that were Chinese before print their original Chinese text.
common.LogText formats a log line from its English format, which is also the
key of its Chinese text in common/log_text.zh-CN.json. A line without an entry
prints in English. go vet checks the arguments of every call, and
TestServerLogTexts checks that each entry still matches a call and has the
same verbs as its key.
* docs: list LOG_LANGUAGE in the docker compose example
* feat(i18n): translate every server log line and add DEFAULT_LANGUAGE
Every line the gateway prints goes through common.LogText. With
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE=zh-CN, the lines that have a Chinese text in
common/log_text.zh-CN.json print it and the others print English.
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE replaces LOG_LANGUAGE. It also sets the language of
backend messages, emails and notifications for a reader who states no
language: en, zh-CN or zh-TW, English when unset. The list of messages
that stayed Chinese for such readers is removed.
Review fixes:
- Channel test logs store the token name "Model test"; the console shows
it in the interface language.
- Task fail reasons written by the gateway are fixed sentences the console
translates. The HTTP status and the upstream detail go to the server log
when a polled task is failed.
- The auto-disable reason of a slow channel is written in DEFAULT_LANGUAGE.
Also:
- Drop the repository-scanning lint tests, the i18n rules file and its
read gate. AGENTS.md keeps the conventions in four lines.
- Payment error toasts keep their previous text and only add the
translated message key.
- Remove guards and helpers that no caller needs.
* fix(i18n): address review on language lookup, notices and error responses
- Relay requests no longer load the user a second time to find the
language: the settings TokenAuth put into the request are used as they
are, also when they hold no language.
- Upstream model update notices are rendered in each recipient's saved
language, DEFAULT_LANGUAGE when none.
- /api/usage/token and /api/log/token answer with backend-translated
messages again, with the keys and status codes used before this PR.
Their callers are scripts, not the web console.
- Webhook notifications fill {{value}} placeholders like the other
senders. Running the rendered text through Sprintf appended
%!(EXTRA ...) and broke %2F in links.
- RootUserLanguage reads the setting of the root user it already loaded.
- zh_TW and zh_HK are read as Traditional Chinese.
- Add common.ApiErrorStatus for error responses under another HTTP status
and use it where those responses were built by hand.
- Remove middleware.GetLanguage, which had no callers.
91 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
91 lines
3.9 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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)
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// SecureVerificationRequired protects channel key disclosure. Other sensitive
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// operations validate their narrower proof scopes in their controller.
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func SecureVerificationRequired() gin.HandlerFunc {
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return func(c *gin.Context) {
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channelID, err := strconv.Atoi(c.Param("id"))
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if err != nil || channelID <= 0 {
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID", "message": service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid.Error()})
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return
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}
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context, err := common.Marshal(service.ChannelKeyReadContext{ChannelID: channelID})
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if err != nil {
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c.AbortWithStatus(http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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if RequireSecurityProof(c, service.VerificationOperation{Scope: service.VerificationScopeChannelKeyRead, Context: context}) == nil {
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return
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}
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c.Set("secure_verified", true)
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c.Next()
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}
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}
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// RequireSecurityProof validates a proof against the authenticated dashboard
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// session or scoped access token and writes the shared proof error contract on
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// failure.
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func RequireSecurityProof(c *gin.Context, operation service.VerificationOperation) *model.AuthFlowAuthorization {
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identity, ok := GetStepUpIdentity(c)
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if !ok {
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_INVALID", "Security verification is no longer valid. Please verify again.")
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return nil
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}
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raw := strings.TrimSpace(c.GetHeader("X-Security-Proof"))
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if raw == "" {
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_REQUIRED", "Additional verification required")
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return nil
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}
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authorization, err := service.ConsumeOperationProof(raw, identity, operation)
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if err != nil {
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAuthTokenExpired):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_EXPIRED", "Security verification has expired. Please verify again.")
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofScope):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_SCOPE_MISMATCH", "Verification does not match this action.")
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid):
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c.Set("security_error_code", "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID")
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusBadRequest, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID", "message": service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid.Error()})
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationUnavailable):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_METHOD_UNAVAILABLE", service.ErrVerificationUnavailable.Error())
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofMethod):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_METHOD_MISMATCH", "This verification method is not allowed for this action.")
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofConsumed):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_CONSUMED", "This verification has already been used. Please verify again.")
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofContext):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_CONTEXT_MISMATCH", "Verification does not match this action's details. Please verify again.")
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationForbidden):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_ACTION_FORBIDDEN", service.ErrVerificationForbidden.Error())
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrLoginSessionInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrLoginSessionRevoked), errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInactive):
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securityProofError(c, "SECURITY_PROOF_INVALID", "Security verification is no longer valid. Please verify again.")
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default:
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_ = c.Error(err)
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c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR", "message": "Please try again later."})
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}
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return nil
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}
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return authorization
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}
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func securityProofError(c *gin.Context, code, message string) {
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c.Set("security_error_code", code)
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c.JSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{
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"success": false,
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"message": message,
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"code": code,
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})
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c.Abort()
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}
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