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Preserve legacy credentials across primary RP ID changes and bind successful assertions to their verified RP ID. Share domain selection across sign-in, login verification and sensitive operations without replaying ceremonies. Save domain settings atomically, preview known and unknown credential impact, and require fresh confirmation before removing domains still in use. Recheck trusted RP IDs when persisting credentials and record safe operation audits. Use read-only configuration snapshots, accept trusted HTTPS intranet hosts, check registration origins early, and preserve historical capitalization. Update settings guidance and all supported translations. Validation: SQLite 3.50.4, MySQL 8.0.46 and PostgreSQL 16.15, including fresh and released-schema upgrade checks; Go regression and race checks; 79 frontend tests; TypeScript, lint, frontend build and root Go build. Security references: OWASP ASVS 5.0.0 V6.3.4 and V6.3.8, Authentication and Session Management Cheat Sheets, and the WebAuthn RP ID/origin rules.
156 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
156 lines
7.7 KiB
Go
package controller
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import (
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/i18n"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/logger"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/middleware"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/oauth"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
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passkeysvc "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/passkey"
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"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
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)
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func GetVerificationMethods(c *gin.Context) {
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identity, ok := middleware.GetSessionAuthIdentity(c)
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if !ok {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "message": "当前认证方式不支持安全验证"})
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return
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}
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requirements, err := service.GetVerificationRequirements(identity, c.Query("scope"))
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if err != nil {
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writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
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return
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}
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common.ApiSuccess(c, requirements)
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}
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// writeSecurityOperationError only exposes known, fixed business messages.
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// Unexpected errors retain their cause for the existing server-side auth logger.
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func writeSecurityOperationError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
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status := http.StatusOK
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var code, message string
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var protocolError *protocol.Error
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switch {
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case errors.Is(err, passkeysvc.ErrRPIDUnavailable):
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code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDUnavailable)
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case errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid):
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code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailRestricted):
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code, message = "EMAIL_ADDRESS_REJECTED", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailAlreadyTaken):
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code, message = "EMAIL_ALREADY_TAKEN", "This email address is already in use."
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrEmailBindingDelivery):
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code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_DELIVERY_FAILED", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingCodeInvalid):
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code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_CODE_INVALID", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingLocked):
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code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_LOCKED", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingResendWait):
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status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
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code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_RESEND_WAIT", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordLength), errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordSame), errors.Is(err, common.ErrPasswordLegacyLimit):
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code, message = "PASSWORD_POLICY_REJECTED", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrCurrentPasswordInvalid):
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code, message = "CURRENT_PASSWORD_INVALID", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountPasswordState), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountBindingChanged):
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status = http.StatusConflict
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code, message = "ACCOUNT_SECURITY_STATE_CHANGED", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrLastLoginMethod):
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code, message = "LAST_LOGIN_METHOD", err.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured):
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code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict):
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code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_CONFLICT", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed):
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code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_FAILED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound):
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code, message = "TELEGRAM_ACCOUNT_NOT_BOUND", oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrExternalIdentityAlreadyClaimed):
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code, message = "ACCOUNT_ALREADY_BOUND", "This external account is already bound."
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if c.Param("provider") == "telegram" {
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code, message = "TELEGRAM_BIND_ALREADY_BOUND", "This Telegram account is already bound."
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}
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid):
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status = http.StatusBadRequest
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code, message = "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID", service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationForbidden):
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status = http.StatusForbidden
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code, message = "SECURITY_ACTION_FORBIDDEN", service.ErrVerificationForbidden.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFailed), errors.As(err, &protocolError):
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code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FAILED", service.ErrVerificationFailed.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationLocked):
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code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_LOCKED", service.ErrVerificationLocked.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationUnavailable):
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code, message = "SECURITY_METHOD_UNAVAILABLE", service.ErrVerificationUnavailable.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired):
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status = http.StatusBadRequest
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code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FLOW_REQUIRED", service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofMethod):
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code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_METHOD_MISMATCH", "This verification method is not allowed for this action."
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofScope):
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code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_SCOPE_MISMATCH", "Verification does not match this action."
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case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch):
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code, message = "OAUTH_ACCOUNT_MISMATCH", service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid):
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status = http.StatusConflict
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code, message = "TWOFA_SETUP_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid):
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code, message = "TWOFA_CODE_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid.Error()
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFAAlreadyEnabled):
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code, message = "TWOFA_ALREADY_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is already enabled."
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFANotEnabled):
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code, message = "TWOFA_NOT_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is not enabled."
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrPasskeyNotFound):
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code, message = "PASSKEY_NOT_FOUND", "No Passkey is registered."
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowExpired), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowConsumed):
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code, message = "AUTH_FLOW_INVALID", "Verification flow expired"
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case errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInactive):
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writeAuthSessionError(c, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid)
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return
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default:
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c.Set("security_error_code", "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR")
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writeAuthSessionError(c, err)
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return
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}
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c.Set("security_error_code", code)
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if strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/passkey/") {
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reason := "verification_failed"
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if errors.As(err, &protocolError) && slices.Contains([]string{"invalid_request", "challenge_mismatch", "parse_error", "auth_data", "verification_error", "invalid_signature", "invalid_key_type", "unsupported_key_algorithm"}, protocolError.Type) {
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reason = protocolError.Type
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}
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// Protocol details can contain challenges and client-controlled data.
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// Only fixed categories and the server-selected public RP ID are logged.
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logger.LogWarn(c.Request.Context(), "passkey verification rejected: code=%s reason=%s rp_id=%q", code, reason, c.GetString("passkey_rp_id"))
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}
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c.JSON(status, gin.H{"success": false, "code": code, "message": message})
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}
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func UniversalVerify(c *gin.Context) {
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identity, ok := middleware.GetSessionAuthIdentity(c)
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if !ok {
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c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "message": "当前认证方式不支持安全验证"})
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return
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}
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var request service.VerificationInput
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if err := common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request); err != nil {
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common.ApiErrorMsg(c, "参数错误")
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return
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}
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proof, err := service.VerifySecurityInput(identity, request)
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if err != nil {
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writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
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return
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}
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recordUserSecurityAudit(c, identity.UserID, "user.security_verify", map[string]any{"method": proof.Method, "scope": proof.Scope})
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common.ApiSuccess(c, proof)
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}
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