Files
new-api/controller/secure_verification.go
T
CaIon caca52f8de feat(auth): replace the dashboard access token with scoped access tokens
Each user can now hold up to 20 named access tokens in the
user_access_tokens table instead of a single token on the user row.
Tokens are shown once at creation (nap_ prefix) and stored as a SHA-256
digest. They expire after 30 days by default; a token without expiry is
allowed with a warning.

A token only reaches the routes its scopes allow. Scopes are picked from
the same permission matrix as admin permissions and are limited to what
the owner can do; every management route declares the scope it needs,
and routes without a declaration reject tokens. Token management itself
always requires a browser session.

Tokens can complete step-up verification, so verified actions such as
changing a password or 2FA settings work with a token; such changes sign
out all browser sessions. Disabling a user keeps their tokens, deleting
the account removes them.

The existing dashboard token keeps working for 30 days after the
upgrade. It can be revoked but no longer regenerated, and afterwards it
is rejected with ACCESS_TOKEN_LEGACY_RETIRED. The security page lists
tokens with their access records, and audit details show scope names.
2026-09-30 17:24:19 +08:00

169 lines
8.4 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/i18n"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/logger"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/middleware"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/oauth"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
passkeysvc "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/passkey"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
)
func GetVerificationMethods(c *gin.Context) {
identity, ok := middleware.GetStepUpIdentity(c)
if !ok {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "message": "当前认证方式不支持安全验证"})
return
}
requirements, err := service.GetVerificationRequirements(identity, c.Query("scope"))
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, requirements)
}
// writeSecurityOperationError only exposes known, fixed business messages.
// Unexpected errors retain their cause for the existing server-side auth logger.
func writeSecurityOperationError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
status := http.StatusOK
var code, message string
var protocolError *protocol.Error
switch {
case errors.Is(err, passkeysvc.ErrRPIDUnavailable):
code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDUnavailable)
case errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid):
code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", i18n.T(c, i18n.MsgPasskeyRPIDInvalid)
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailRestricted):
code, message = "EMAIL_ADDRESS_REJECTED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailAlreadyTaken):
code, message = "EMAIL_ALREADY_TAKEN", "This email address is already in use."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrEmailBindingDelivery):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_DELIVERY_FAILED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingCodeInvalid):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_CODE_INVALID", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingLocked):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_LOCKED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingResendWait):
status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_RESEND_WAIT", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordLength), errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordSame), errors.Is(err, common.ErrPasswordLegacyLimit):
code, message = "PASSWORD_POLICY_REJECTED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrCurrentPasswordInvalid):
code, message = "CURRENT_PASSWORD_INVALID", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountPasswordState), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountBindingChanged):
status = http.StatusConflict
code, message = "ACCOUNT_SECURITY_STATE_CHANGED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrLastLoginMethod):
code, message = "LAST_LOGIN_METHOD", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_CONFLICT", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_FAILED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_ACCOUNT_NOT_BOUND", oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrExternalIdentityAlreadyClaimed):
code, message = "ACCOUNT_ALREADY_BOUND", "This external account is already bound."
if c.Param("provider") == "telegram" {
code, message = "TELEGRAM_BIND_ALREADY_BOUND", "This Telegram account is already bound."
}
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid):
status = http.StatusBadRequest
code, message = "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID", service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationForbidden):
status = http.StatusForbidden
code, message = "SECURITY_ACTION_FORBIDDEN", service.ErrVerificationForbidden.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFailed), errors.As(err, &protocolError):
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FAILED", service.ErrVerificationFailed.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationLocked):
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_LOCKED", service.ErrVerificationLocked.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationUnavailable):
code, message = "SECURITY_METHOD_UNAVAILABLE", service.ErrVerificationUnavailable.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired):
status = http.StatusBadRequest
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FLOW_REQUIRED", service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofMethod):
code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_METHOD_MISMATCH", "This verification method is not allowed for this action."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofScope):
code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_SCOPE_MISMATCH", "Verification does not match this action."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch):
code, message = "OAUTH_ACCOUNT_MISMATCH", service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid):
status = http.StatusConflict
code, message = "TWOFA_SETUP_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid):
code, message = "TWOFA_CODE_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFAAlreadyEnabled):
code, message = "TWOFA_ALREADY_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is already enabled."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFANotEnabled):
code, message = "TWOFA_NOT_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is not enabled."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrPasskeyNotFound):
code, message = "PASSKEY_NOT_FOUND", "No Passkey is registered."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowExpired), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowConsumed):
code, message = "AUTH_FLOW_INVALID", "Verification flow expired"
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInactive):
writeAuthSessionError(c, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid)
return
default:
c.Set("security_error_code", "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR")
writeAuthSessionError(c, err)
return
}
c.Set("security_error_code", code)
if strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/passkey/") {
reason := "verification_failed"
if errors.As(err, &protocolError) && slices.Contains([]string{"invalid_request", "challenge_mismatch", "parse_error", "auth_data", "verification_error", "invalid_signature", "invalid_key_type", "unsupported_key_algorithm"}, protocolError.Type) {
reason = protocolError.Type
}
// Protocol details can contain challenges and client-controlled data.
// Only fixed categories and the server-selected public RP ID are logged.
logger.LogWarn(c.Request.Context(), "passkey verification rejected: code=%s reason=%s rp_id=%q", code, reason, c.GetString("passkey_rp_id"))
}
c.JSON(status, gin.H{"success": false, "code": code, "message": message})
}
// requireAdminUserProof consumes the step-up proof for an administrative user
// operation after the caller has already authorized the operator against the
// managed user. context is one of the service.AdminUser*Context structs.
func requireAdminUserProof(c *gin.Context, scope string, context any) *model.AuthFlowAuthorization {
payload, err := common.Marshal(context)
if err != nil {
_ = c.Error(err)
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR", "message": "Please try again later."})
return nil
}
return middleware.RequireSecurityProof(c, service.VerificationOperation{Scope: scope, Context: payload})
}
func UniversalVerify(c *gin.Context) {
identity, ok := middleware.GetStepUpIdentity(c)
if !ok {
c.JSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"success": false, "message": "当前认证方式不支持安全验证"})
return
}
var request service.VerificationInput
if err := common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request); err != nil {
common.ApiErrorMsg(c, "参数错误")
return
}
proof, err := service.VerifySecurityInput(identity, request)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
recordUserSecurityAudit(c, identity.UserID, "user.security_verify", map[string]any{"method": proof.Method, "scope": proof.Scope})
common.ApiSuccess(c, proof)
}